Analysis
Corporate America Demands Billions in Trump Tariff Refunds After Supreme Court Strikes Down Levies
The Supreme Court’s 6-3 ruling invalidating Trump’s IEEPA tariffs sets off a potentially chaotic $160B+ refund battle — even as the president vows new 10% global duties to replace them.
The phone call came before dawn. A purchasing director at a mid-sized electronics importer in New Jersey had been refreshing the Supreme Court’s website since 5 a.m., armed with a spreadsheet totaling the $4.7 million his company had paid in IEEPA-based tariffs since April 2025. By mid-morning on February 20, 2026, he had his answer — and his lawyers had their instructions: file for a refund immediately.
Scenes like this played out across American boardrooms on Friday as the U.S. Supreme Court delivered a landmark 6-3 ruling that President Donald Trump’s sweeping import tariffs, imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, exceeded his constitutional authority. The decision in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump and V.O.S. Selections v. United States — authored by Chief Justice John Roberts and joined by an unusual cross-ideological coalition — is the most consequential check on executive trade power in a generation. It immediately triggers what experts are already calling the messiest federal refund process since the New Deal.
The Supreme Court Ruling: Why Trump’s Tariffs Were Struck Down
To understand what happened on February 20, 2026, you have to understand what Trump tried to do — and how far he pushed the boundaries of a 47-year-old statute that was never designed to carry that weight.
Starting in April 2025, the Trump administration invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs of 10% to 145% on goods from nearly every U.S. trading partner. These were not narrow, targeted measures. They covered virtually the entire American import base — from Chinese electronics to French wine, from Canadian lumber to Vietnamese sneakers. The legal theory rested on two words buried in IEEPA: “regulate” and “importation.” The administration argued that those words granted the president virtually unlimited authority to tax imports at any rate, for any duration, against any country, as long as a national emergency had been declared.
Chief Justice Roberts rejected that argument with rare bluntness. <span style=”font-style: italic;”>”Those words cannot bear such weight,”</span> he wrote, in a passage that legal scholars are already comparing to the Court’s landmark limits on the administrative state. Roberts invoked the “major questions doctrine” — the principle that Congress must speak clearly when it intends to delegate powers of enormous economic significance to the executive branch. In 2025, IEEPA tariffs generated between $130 billion and $160 billion in federal revenue, according to Tax Foundation estimates, with the Penn-Wharton Budget Model placing the figure closer to $175 billion. The idea that Congress quietly delegated authority over sums of that magnitude through two ambiguous words, the majority held, defied common sense.
The ruling was not unanimous in its reasoning. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined Roberts, though Gorsuch and Barrett signed only parts of the majority opinion. Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Alito dissented. Notably, Kavanaugh’s dissent focused less on defending Trump’s tariff authority and more on warning about the practical chaos ahead — predicting that the refund process would be, in his own word, a “mess.”
The ruling does not affect all Trump-era tariffs. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, which predate IEEPA and rest on separate statutory grounds, remain in place. According to Reuters, those account for roughly one-third of Trump’s total new tariff revenue — meaning the struck-down duties represent the lion’s share of his trade policy’s fiscal footprint.
Corporate Push for Tariff Refunds: Who’s Demanding What?
Within hours of the ruling, the corporate response was swift and coordinated. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Retail Federation, and the American Association of Importers and Exporters issued joint statements demanding “full, fast, and automatic” refunds. The We Pay the Tariffs coalition — a group representing over 800 small businesses — went further, calling on Congress to legislate a streamlined refund mechanism that bypasses the courts entirely. “Small businesses cannot afford to wait months or years while bureaucratic delays play out,” said Dan Anthony, the group’s executive director.
The Financial Times reported a surge in legal filings from major importers including retailers, automotive suppliers, and consumer goods companies who had pre-filed protective claims in the Court of International Trade anticipating this moment. Lawsuits from companies spanning sectors as varied as footwear, spirits, and industrial components had been queuing in the federal trade courts since mid-2025. Some of the country’s largest importers — firms with sophisticated customs compliance teams who had been tracking the litigation closely — are positioned to move fastest.
The equity implications are significant, and troubling to some economists. As Senator Elizabeth Warren noted bluntly in a Friday statement, large corporations with armies of lawyers are far better positioned to navigate a complex refund process than the small businesses and individual consumers who ultimately bore the cost of higher prices. Consumer pass-through of tariff costs is well-documented: a Kiel Institute study estimated that 96% of tariff costs imposed on U.S. imports were ultimately borne by American buyers. Getting that money back to households — rather than to corporate balance sheets — presents a structural challenge that no court ruling can easily resolve.
Trump’s Defiant Response: New 10% Global Tariff and Section 301 Investigations
The president did not go quietly. Speaking to reporters within hours of the ruling’s release, Trump called the six majority justices a “disgrace to our nation” and said he was “absolutely ashamed” of the decision. Within the same press appearance, however, he outlined a rapid-response trade strategy.
First, Trump announced he would sign an executive order imposing a new 10% global tariff on all countries under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. The BBC reported that this authority allows the president to impose duties of up to 15% for up to 150 days to address balance-of-payments concerns, with any extension requiring congressional approval — which Trump said he would not seek. Second, Trump directed the administration to initiate broad Section 301 investigations into unfair trade practices, a tool previously used to impose and maintain tariffs on China during his first term.
Neither alternative fully replicates the scope or longevity of IEEPA’s reach. Forbes noted that Section 122 is by design a temporary, capped measure — a blunt instrument for balance-of-payments crises, not a framework for permanent restructuring of global trade relationships. Section 301 investigations, meanwhile, take months or years to produce enforceable results. Oxford Economics’ chief U.S. economist Michael Pearce warned that while the administration will likely “rebuild tariffs through other, more durable means,” the by-country and by-sector implications could look dramatically different — “which will create another bout of trade policy uncertainty for business, investors, and households.”
Economic Impacts: What Tariffs Cost America — and What Lifting Them Might Restore
The macroeconomic ledger on Trump’s IEEPA tariffs is complex, but the broad strokes are clear. Tax Foundation economists estimated that the struck-down duties, had they remained in place from 2026 through 2035, would have generated $1.4 trillion in federal revenue — while shrinking long-run U.S. GDP by 0.3%. Consumer prices rose across goods categories heavily weighted toward imports: electronics, clothing, footwear, and household goods. The tariffs acted, in economic terms, as a regressive consumption tax, falling hardest on lower- and middle-income families who spend a larger share of their income on goods.
There is a credible case on the other side. Some domestic industries — segments of steel, aluminum, and semiconductor manufacturing — received genuine protection from foreign competition during the tariff period. Proponents argue that tariff-induced supply chain reshoring, however disruptive in the short term, builds long-term economic resilience. The trade deals that Trump’s team negotiated using IEEPA tariffs as leverage — most notably a recently signed U.S.-India pact — are now in legal limbo as the underlying authority has been invalidated.
Globally, the ruling reverberated through trading capitals from Ottawa to Beijing. Canada’s trade minister Dominic LeBlanc welcomed the decision as confirmation that the IEEPA tariffs were “unjustified.” Port authorities in Los Angeles and Long Beach, who had tracked significant cargo volume declines tied to import uncertainty, signaled cautious optimism. Axios reported that logistics and freight companies were rapidly reassessing shipping contracts and inventory forecasts.
The Refund Process: Slow, Complex, and Unlikely to Reach Consumers
Here is where American importers, large and small, need to manage their expectations. The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address refunds — punting the question back to the Court of International Trade. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent noted the court’s silence on “whether, and if so how, the Government should go about returning the billions of dollars that it has collected from importers.”
What happens next, in practical terms:
- No automatic refunds. Businesses must actively file claims. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has an existing duty refund mechanism, but it was not designed for an operation of this scale.
- Timelines are long. TD Securities estimates refunds could take 12 to 18 months to begin flowing, with complex cases taking years through the Court of International Trade.
- Consumers are almost certainly excluded. Because tariffs are legally paid by importers, not end consumers, households who absorbed higher prices through retail markups have no direct legal avenue for compensation — regardless of the political optics.
- Interest may apply. Trade lawyers note that some refund claims carry statutory interest, potentially adding billions to the government’s ultimate liability.
Democratic governors including Gavin Newsom of California and J.B. Pritzker of Illinois have called for household-level refunds of approximately $1,700 per family with interest — a politically resonant but legally speculative demand that would require an act of Congress. The New York Times described the coming process as likely to be “chaotic” — a word that appears with striking frequency from both supporters and critics of the ruling.
What Comes Next: Trade Policy, Midterms, and the Call for Congressional Reform
The February 20 ruling does not end the American tariff debate. It relocates it — from executive orders to congressional chambers, from emergency declarations to the harder work of democratic deliberation. The Constitution’s text on this point is unambiguous: Article I, Section 8 assigns the power to set tariffs to Congress, not the president. For decades, Congress delegated that authority broadly, trading legislative prerogative for administrative flexibility. The Supreme Court’s ruling is, in part, a demand that Congress reclaim its constitutional role.
Whether that happens is a political question as much as a legal one. Broad tariffs on China retain bipartisan support. Tariffs on traditional allies like Canada and the European Union do not. A Congress willing to codify selective tariff authority while constraining presidential emergency workarounds would reflect the kind of nuanced trade policy the U.S. has not managed to produce in decades.
The midterm elections — now less than two years away — will be shaped partly by this ruling’s economic aftermath. If the refund process flows smoothly and trade policy stabilizes, the political damage to Trump may be contained. If the administration’s Section 122 gambit expires without renewal, and if the Section 301 investigations take years to bear fruit, the tariff-induced economic disruption could deepen precisely when it matters most politically.
For now, the importing community is filing claims, lawyers are billing by the hour, and a question worth $160 billion or more hangs unanswered over the federal court system. The Supreme Court delivered its verdict on executive overreach. The verdict on what happens next belongs to Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the American electorate.
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Analysis
China Economy 2026: Export Growth Masks Manufacturing Overcapacity
China’s exports have been the good-news story in an otherwise mixed economic picture. They’re not just holding up; through the first four months of 2026 they were running about 14% to 15% above the same period a year earlier, according to figures cited by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission and Vanguard’s economic outlook. That’s the kind of number that would normally signal a healthy economy. The complication is what’s happening underneath it.
A growth model showing its age
Manufacturing capacity utilization fell to 73.9% in early 2026 — near a decade low outside of the pandemic shutdowns, per the Commission’s bulletin. That’s the tell. China is producing and shipping more, but a growing share of its industrial base is running under capacity, which points to a structural mismatch: the country’s manufacturing engine has outgrown both its domestic consumption and, increasingly, what the rest of the world is willing to absorb without pushback.
Goldman Sachs Research, in a report cited by Goldman Sachs’ own analysis, forecasts 4.8% real GDP growth for 2026 — above consensus expectations of 4.5% — driven substantially by continued export strength and a softening drag from the property downturn. But that same report flags the labor market as a genuine weak spot: hiring, measured across a weighted average of PMI employment sub-indexes, is at its most depressed level in a decade outside Covid, and urban nominal wage growth slowed to just 3.8% year-on-year in Q3 2025.
Why Beijing isn’t reaching for stimulus
Given the export strength, one might expect policymakers to feel less urgency about consumption-side stimulus. That’s roughly what’s happening — and it’s a deliberate choice, not an oversight. Xi Jinping’s government remains committed to dominating high-value manufacturing, which means comprehensive fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers remains unlikely even as domestic demand stays soft, according to the Commission’s bulletin.
The People’s Bank of China is expected to hold its policy rate steady through the rest of the year, preferring targeted structural tools over a broad-based rate cut, per Vanguard’s forecast. That’s a notably cautious stance given how weak the property sector remains — property investment indicators are down 50% to 80% from their 2020–21 peaks, and a “meaningful domestic-demand turnaround remains elusive,” in Vanguard’s own words.
The regulatory push to keep capital at home
Two moves by Chinese regulators in mid-2026 point to where Beijing’s real priority sits: keeping household savings and private capital funneled toward domestic industrial policy rather than flowing overseas. New rules taking effect July 1 restrict outbound investment that could be used to export restricted technology or expertise under the guise of ordinary capital flows, with violations carrying fines, visa restrictions and industry blacklisting, according to the Commission’s bulletin. The regulations follow Beijing’s move to block the founders of AI firm Manus from completing a sale to Meta, even after the company had relocated its headquarters from China to Singapore — a signal that Beijing is willing to reach across borders to keep promising tech assets tethered to domestic or Hong Kong listings.
The currency and trade angle
Goldman’s team makes an out-of-consensus call worth flagging: it expects China’s current account surplus to rise to 4.2% of GDP in 2026, up from 3.6% in 2025, while the broader analyst consensus surveyed by Bloomberg expects a decline to 2.5%. The divergence comes down to export resilience — falling export prices are making Chinese goods more competitive even as the yuan is expected to appreciate slightly, with export-price inflation in dollar terms forecast to turn positive, rising to 0.7% from -2.7% the prior year.
The bottom line
China’s economy in 2026 is a study in contrasts: robust headline export growth sitting on top of underutilized factories, a weak labor market, and a property sector still in its fifth year of decline. The World Bank’s own baseline, published in its country program materials, projects growth moderating toward 4.0% by 2026 — a more conservative read than Goldman’s. Either way, the consensus across forecasters is the same: exports are carrying more of China’s growth than is healthy for the long run, and Beijing’s policy choices this year suggest it’s betting on technological dominance to eventually solve the demand problem, rather than opening the stimulus taps to solve it directly.
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Analysis
Pakistan Circular Debt Crisis 2026: IMF Deadline Missed, Rs 3.44 Trillion
There’s a number that keeps showing up in every conversation about Pakistan’s economy, and it keeps getting bigger: circular debt. As of early July 2026, the gas sector’s share of that debt alone has topped Rs 3.44 trillion, and Islamabad has missed a deadline the IMF set for tariff reforms meant to arrest the slide, according to Dawn.
What circular debt actually is, and why it won’t go away
Circular debt is the chain of unpaid obligations that builds up when the price consumers pay for electricity or gas doesn’t cover what it actually costs to produce and deliver it. Someone in the chain — a power producer, a gas utility, a state-owned enterprise — ends up carrying an IOU, and that IOU gets passed down the line. Earlier this year, IMF officials pressed Pakistan on exactly this dynamic, questioning the government’s plan to zero out gas-sector circular debt, according to Aaj English. At the time, officials said around Rs 150 billion remained payable to companies including Oil and Gas Development Company Limited and Pakistan Petroleum Limited.
Islamabad’s proposed fix included a Rs 5-per-unit levy on gas, dividends from state-owned companies redirected toward debt reduction, and the sale of 35 LNG cargoes annually on the international market. The IMF, per that same reporting, raised pointed questions about whether the plan was actually viable.
The commitments Pakistan has already made
Under its Extended Fund Facility, Pakistan has committed to capping circular debt growth at Rs 300 billion for FY2027 and cutting power-sector subsidies from 0.7% of GDP to 0.6%, according to details reported by ProPakistani. The government has also shifted Nepra’s annual tariff-rebasing cycle from July to January, and Ogra now revises gas tariffs twice a year instead of once.
Structurally, some of this is working. The IMF’s own review in May 2026 credited Pakistan with a primary fiscal surplus of 1.6% of GDP for FY26, broadly in line with program targets, and noted gross reserves had climbed to $16 billion by end-December, up from $14.5 billion six months earlier, according to the IMF’s own press release. That progress unlocked roughly $1.1 billion under the EFF and $220 million under a parallel climate-resilience facility, bringing total disbursements under the two arrangements to about $4.8 billion.
Where the fault lines actually are
The uncomfortable part of this story, laid out by commentary reported in The Hans India, is that revenue targets get IMF scrutiny with great precision, while structural reform of loss-making public enterprises — Pakistan International Airlines and Pakistan Steel Mills chief among them — moves far more slowly. Those enterprises’ losses are absorbed by the national exchequer through subsidies, guarantees, and debt restructuring year after year, and privatization plans keep slipping because the political cost of confronting them is high.
Distribution company inefficiency compounds the problem. In FY25, Discos posted Rs 265 billion in losses, an improvement on FY24’s Rs 276 billion but still a substantial drag, according to Geo News, with Quetta, Peshawar and Hyderabad among the worst-performing utilities.
What happens if the pattern holds
Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio sits between 70% and 80% as of 2026, according to Wikipedia’s economic summary, with debt servicing occasionally consuming two-thirds of government spending. That’s the backdrop against which every circular-debt conversation happens: there is very little fiscal room left to absorb another missed deadline.
The missed gas tariff deadline doesn’t automatically trigger a program breakdown — Pakistan has weathered similar friction points before during its current EFF arrangement. But with the IMF’s own documentation showing persistent concern about the credibility of debt-reduction plans, and with global energy prices still elevated in the aftermath of the Iran war, the margin for further slippage is thin. The next review will likely hinge less on the rhetoric around reform and more on whether the Rs 5 levy and LNG cargo sales actually show up in the numbers.
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Analysis
Malaysia Bets Its 2026 on “Execution” — And the Semiconductor Upcycle Is Doing the Heavy Lifting
Malaysia’s government has declared 2026 a year of “execution” and “discipline” as the Anwar Ibrahim administration races to deliver on the 13th Malaysia Plan (RMK13) ahead of elections that could come as early as February 2028, according to Fortune’s interview with economy minister Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir.
A Strong Base to Build From
Malaysia’s economy grew 4.9% in 2025 following 5.1% growth the year before, with unemployment falling to 2.9% — the lowest in a decade — and the ringgit trading at its strongest level in five years. HSBC’s ASEAN economist Yun Liu forecasts 4.6% growth for 2026, citing strength in electrical equipment manufacturing, tourism, and sound government policy, while Nomura economists have projected an even more bullish 5.2%, pointing to infrastructure spending under RMK13.
The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) projects growth moderating slightly to 4.6% from an estimated 4.9% in 2025, describing Malaysia’s performance as reflecting its “entrenched position in global semiconductor and electronics value chains” and the broader global tech upcycle, according to AMRO’s assessment of Malaysia’s investment upcycle.
Navigating Washington Without Picking Sides
Malaysia’s trade relationship with the US has been turbulent. Washington imposed 25% tariffs on Malaysian goods in April 2025, rattling the country’s export-led economy, before a deal reduced US duties to 19% in exchange for Malaysia lowering tariffs on select American products, with exemptions carved out for aviation components and electrical equipment. Malaysia’s trade hit a record high of more than 3 trillion ringgit (roughly $780 billion) last year despite the friction.
Deputy finance minister Liew Chin Tong has framed Malaysia’s positioning explicitly around neutrality: the country is “not China, not the US,” a stance he argues gives Malaysia a strategic advantage in both geopolitical and supply-chain terms, according to Fortune’s reporting from the Forum Ekonomi Malaysia summit.
Capital Is Flowing In — From Everywhere
Malaysia recorded 22.8 billion ringgit (about $5.8 billion) in foreign direct investment in the first quarter of 2026, a 6.0% year-on-year increase, moderating from the prior quarter’s 48.7% surge. Inflows into information and communication technology services remained particularly strong, with China, Hong Kong, and Singapore serving as the primary capital sources, according to McKinsey’s Southeast Asia quarterly economic review. Bank Negara Malaysia has held its policy rate steady following a pre-emptive 25 basis-point cut in July 2025, with headline inflation projected to average just 2.0% in 2026.
The Long Game: Semiconductors, Rare Earths, and Nuclear Power
Beyond RMK13’s near-term targets, Malaysian officials are positioning the country’s industrial strategy around decades, not years. Minister Akmal has reiterated commitments to eliminate coal use by 2044 and reach net zero by 2050, while confirming Malaysia is actively “exploring the potential” of nuclear power to meet the energy demands of its expanding data-center and semiconductor sectors. AMRO’s structural policy guidance urges Malaysia to develop domestic semiconductor and rare-earth capabilities as a hedge against ongoing US-China “geoeconomic fracturing,” positioning the country as a trusted neutral hub for global manufacturers diversifying away from concentrated exposure to either superpower.
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