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Can Exxon Build the World’s Biggest Carbon Capture Business?

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The oil giant has started its first commercial carbon capture project, committed $20 billion through 2030, and set its sights on 100 million tonnes of annual storage capacity. The engineering may be the easy part.

The pipes began moving carbon dioxide in July 2025. In Donaldsonville, Louisiana — a town more associated with fertiliser plants than climate ambitions — ExxonMobil quietly activated the first commercial operation of what it intends to become the largest carbon capture and storage (CCS) business ever assembled. The customer was CF Industries, a nitrogen producer looking to cut its emissions by up to 50 percent at a single site. The scale, for now, is modest. The implications are not.

What ExxonMobil is attempting along the U.S. Gulf Coast is something no oil company has tried at this magnitude: converting decades of pipeline, geology, and subsurface engineering expertise into a revenue-generating service business — one that gets paid to dispose of other industries’ carbon dioxide. The ambition is enormous. The obstacles are equally so.

The Macro Backdrop: Why Carbon Capture Is Having Its Moment

Carbon capture and storage has been a fixture of climate policy discussions since the 1970s, perpetually promising more than it delivered. That began to change when the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 restructured the economics of the industry with its 45Q tax credit — offering $85 per tonne for CO2 directly air-captured and $60 per tonne for point-source capture. Suddenly, projects that had struggled to close financing found the numbers working. Mordor Intelligence

The IEA now estimates that operational capture capacity worldwide could reach 430 million tonnes by 2030, with over 474 projects announced globally targeting 812 million tonnes per annum of capacity — a figure that would have seemed fantastical five years ago. The global CCS market, valued at roughly $7.85 billion in 2025, is forecast to more than double to $22.69 billion by 2035, expanding at a compound annual growth rate exceeding 11 percent. Persistence Market ResearchResearch Nester

ExxonMobil is betting it can claim the commanding position in that market before the competition arrives.

1: The ExxonMobil Carbon Capture Business — What It Actually Is

The term “carbon capture business” can sound vaguely abstract. What ExxonMobil is constructing is concrete, literal, and industrial: a network of CO2 pipelines, injection wells, and geologic storage sites stretching across Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, operated as a third-party service that heavy emitters — steel mills, ammonia plants, gas processors — pay to access.

The company claims to have cumulatively captured more CO2 than any other corporation — 120 million metric tons — accounting for approximately 40 percent of all anthropogenic CO2 ever commercially captured. That history of operating CO2 pipelines, built originally for enhanced oil recovery rather than climate remediation, is now being redeployed for a different purpose. ExxonMobil

The first commercial CCS operation with CF Industries went live in mid-2025. Three more projects are scheduled to activate in 2026: a natural gas gathering facility in Louisiana called NG3, and industrial partnerships with Linde and Nucor. ExxonMobil is also targeting a final investment decision on its first Low Carbon Data Center by late 2026 — a project that would pair natural gas power generation with carbon capture to supply data centres with low-carbon electricity. ExxonMobil

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The target ExxonMobil has set itself is 30 million tonnes per annum (MTA) of CCS capacity under contract by 2030. It currently has roughly 9 MTA signed with third parties. The company estimates that its U.S. Gulf Coast network can ultimately remove up to 100 MTA of captured CO2 — more than seven times what it has committed to so far. That 100 MTA figure, if ever realised, would make the Gulf Coast hub the largest single carbon disposal system in human history. ExxonMobil

To get there, ExxonMobil is pursuing up to $30 billion in lower-emission investments from 2025 through 2030, with approximately 65 percent directed toward reducing the emissions of other companies — a telling reorientation of capital toward a service business model rather than commodity production. ExxonMobil

2: Why ExxonMobil’s Carbon Capture Strategy Is More Than Climate Theatre

Is ExxonMobil’s carbon capture target realistic by 2030?

ExxonMobil’s 30 MTA target for 2030 is ambitious but not implausible. The company currently holds approximately 9 MTA under contract with third-party customers, has operationalised its first commercial project, and has three more starting in 2026. Reaching 30 MTA would require roughly tripling contracted volumes over four years — achievable if policy support remains intact and permitting timelines hold.

What makes ExxonMobil’s positioning distinct from a conventional oil major diversification story is the structural logic underlying it. Heavy industry — cement, steel, chemicals, fertilisers — produces roughly a third of global CO2 emissions. Electrification alone cannot decarbonise these sectors at scale; the process heat and chemical reactions involved produce CO2 as an unavoidable byproduct. The IEA estimates that CCUS could contribute to 25 percent of emissions reductions in iron and steel, 63 percent in cement, and over 80 percent in fuel transformation by 2050. BCC Research

That leaves heavy industry facing a structural need for a disposal service — precisely what ExxonMobil is now selling.

The data centre angle adds another dimension. AI-driven computing demand has sent power consumption soaring, and hyperscalers are increasingly desperate for low-carbon electricity sources that renewables alone cannot reliably supply at scale. An integrated system pairing natural gas generation with CCS — what ExxonMobil calls its Low Carbon Data Center concept — addresses that need in a way that does not require grid-scale battery storage or new transmission infrastructure. It’s an elegant proposition, if the economics close.

The picture is more complicated when you look at the cost structure. Capture costs for high-purity industrial CO2 streams, such as natural gas processing, run approximately $15 to $25 per tonne in North America. That’s manageable — often below the 45Q credit value. But for dilute streams from power and cement plants, costs escalate sharply. The U.S. Department of Energy has set a target of lowering carbon capture costs to under $40 per tonne by 2025 and $30 per tonne by 2035 — goals that represent genuine engineering progress but have not yet been universally met in commercial deployment. Coherent Market InsightsBCC Research

ExxonMobil’s competitive moat, at least for now, rests on infrastructure. It already owns the largest CO2 pipeline network in the United States. Building that from scratch would cost multiples of what it costs to expand the existing system. New entrants face not just capital barriers but years of permitting, right-of-way negotiations, and regulatory approvals for Class VI injection wells — the EPA-regulated deep wells required for permanent CO2 storage.

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3: The Implications — Markets, Policy, and the Shape of a New Industry

If ExxonMobil succeeds, the consequences ripple far beyond its own balance sheet.

For heavy industrial companies — the steelmakers, fertiliser producers, and petrochemical firms that have quietly struggled to articulate credible decarbonisation strategies — a commercially available, third-party CCS service changes the calculus. Rather than owning and operating capture infrastructure themselves, they can treat CO2 disposal as an operating cost, analogous to waste management. Louisiana alone has already seen approximately $61 billion invested into new emissions reduction projects, with CCS serving as the anchor technology attracting industrial relocations. ExxonMobil

That investment dynamic has regional implications. States with favourable geology — deep saline aquifers, depleted reservoirs, existing pipeline corridors — stand to become hubs for low-carbon industrial activity, much as port access shaped industrial geography in the 19th century. The U.S. Gulf Coast, Texas, and the North Sea already hold significant advantages.

For financial markets, the emergence of a CCS service revenue stream raises a question that hasn’t been asked before: how do you value it? ExxonMobil’s own projections suggest its new low-carbon businesses could reach $13 billion in earnings by 2040 as lower-emissions markets mature. That’s a number large enough to move the needle on a company of Exxon’s scale — but only if contracted volumes, tax credits, and carbon markets all develop as anticipated. Each variable carries meaningful uncertainty. ExxonMobil

The policy dependency is where the picture gets sharply conditional. The 45Q credit is the economic backbone of U.S. CCS economics. Any legislative modification — a reduction in credit value, a tightening of eligibility criteria, or simple regulatory delay in well permitting — restructures project economics overnight. ExxonMobil has been explicit that further expansion beyond 2030 hinges on supportive regulation, timely permitting, and broader market formation — language that is technically accurate and simultaneously a signal that the 100 MTA aspiration is contingent, not committed. spglobal

The data centre bet deserves particular attention. If the final investment decision expected in late 2026 leads to construction, it would mark the first time an oil major has entered the power-and-compute market as a principal, not a fuel supplier. That’s either visionary or a distraction, depending on whether AI demand growth continues to outpace low-carbon power supply — a question the entire energy industry is grappling with simultaneously.

4: The Counterargument — Scale, Credibility, and the Climate Accounting Problem

Not everyone finds ExxonMobil’s carbon capture ambitions convincing.

The IEA itself, before moderating its language, published analysis accusing the fossil fuel industry of maintaining “an illusion that implausibly large amounts of carbon capture are the solution.” The agency’s point wasn’t that CCS is worthless — it’s that using CCS to justify continued oil and gas expansion conflates two separate questions: whether CCS can help decarbonise hard-to-abate industries (it can) and whether it justifies not accelerating the energy transition (it doesn’t).

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A scientific review of ExxonMobil’s 2025 climate report found that the company misrepresents conclusions from both the IPCC and IEA by denying the importance of a fossil fuel phaseout and instead framing CCS as the essential solution to climate targets — a framing the review notes is inconsistent with the actual recommendations of both institutions. Union of Concerned Scientists

The IPCC’s 2023 Synthesis Report acknowledges pathways that include CCS but stipulates that all such pathways also require steep and immediate emissions reductions. ExxonMobil’s corporate narrative, critics argue, uses the legitimate role of CCS to defer the harder structural question — whether the business model of a company producing and selling fossil fuels at record volumes is compatible with 1.5°C targets, regardless of how much CO2 it buries.

CEO Darren Woods has pushed back with characteristic directness. His argument — that EV sceptics were once told the same thing about implausible scale, and that “there is no solution set out there today that is at the scale to solve the problem” — is not entirely wrong. Scale takes time. But the parallel is imperfect: solar and wind costs declined by 90 percent over a decade of deployment; CCS costs have proven stickier and more dependent on policy than on learning curves.

There’s also the Scope 3 omission. ExxonMobil’s net-zero commitments cover Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions from its own operations. They do not extend to the CO2 released when its customers burn the oil and gas it sells — which accounts for the overwhelming majority of the company’s climate footprint. Burying a few hundred million tonnes of industrial CO2 while producing billions of barrels of oil is arithmetically coherent but climatically insufficient by any serious net-zero accounting.

Closing: A Bet Worth Watching

ExxonMobil is not pretending to be a renewable energy company. Its Low Carbon Solutions strategy is explicitly a service business grafted onto a hydrocarbons core — a bet that the world will need to remove CO2 from heavy industry long before it stops burning fossil fuels, and that the company with the infrastructure, geological knowledge, and financial durability to build a capture network at scale will command pricing power in a market that barely exists today.

That bet may well prove correct. The 45Q credit structure, the intractable emissions profile of steel and cement and chemicals, and the sheer inertia of the global energy system all support a future in which someone has to manage industrial carbon at scale. ExxonMobil has the pipes, the wells, the geology, and the balance sheet to be that someone.

Yet “realistic” and “sufficient” are different standards. The world’s largest carbon capture business, if ExxonMobil builds it, will still capture a fraction of the emissions the company’s products release when burned. The Gulf Coast network is a genuine industrial innovation. It is not a climate strategy.

What it is, perhaps most accurately, is a preview of the climate economy the world is likely to get — not the one its models prescribed.


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Analysis

China Economy 2026: Export Growth Masks Manufacturing Overcapacity

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China’s exports have been the good-news story in an otherwise mixed economic picture. They’re not just holding up; through the first four months of 2026 they were running about 14% to 15% above the same period a year earlier, according to figures cited by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission and Vanguard’s economic outlook. That’s the kind of number that would normally signal a healthy economy. The complication is what’s happening underneath it.

A growth model showing its age

Manufacturing capacity utilization fell to 73.9% in early 2026 — near a decade low outside of the pandemic shutdowns, per the Commission’s bulletin. That’s the tell. China is producing and shipping more, but a growing share of its industrial base is running under capacity, which points to a structural mismatch: the country’s manufacturing engine has outgrown both its domestic consumption and, increasingly, what the rest of the world is willing to absorb without pushback.

Goldman Sachs Research, in a report cited by Goldman Sachs’ own analysis, forecasts 4.8% real GDP growth for 2026 — above consensus expectations of 4.5% — driven substantially by continued export strength and a softening drag from the property downturn. But that same report flags the labor market as a genuine weak spot: hiring, measured across a weighted average of PMI employment sub-indexes, is at its most depressed level in a decade outside Covid, and urban nominal wage growth slowed to just 3.8% year-on-year in Q3 2025.

Why Beijing isn’t reaching for stimulus

Given the export strength, one might expect policymakers to feel less urgency about consumption-side stimulus. That’s roughly what’s happening — and it’s a deliberate choice, not an oversight. Xi Jinping’s government remains committed to dominating high-value manufacturing, which means comprehensive fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers remains unlikely even as domestic demand stays soft, according to the Commission’s bulletin.

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The People’s Bank of China is expected to hold its policy rate steady through the rest of the year, preferring targeted structural tools over a broad-based rate cut, per Vanguard’s forecast. That’s a notably cautious stance given how weak the property sector remains — property investment indicators are down 50% to 80% from their 2020–21 peaks, and a “meaningful domestic-demand turnaround remains elusive,” in Vanguard’s own words.

The regulatory push to keep capital at home

Two moves by Chinese regulators in mid-2026 point to where Beijing’s real priority sits: keeping household savings and private capital funneled toward domestic industrial policy rather than flowing overseas. New rules taking effect July 1 restrict outbound investment that could be used to export restricted technology or expertise under the guise of ordinary capital flows, with violations carrying fines, visa restrictions and industry blacklisting, according to the Commission’s bulletin. The regulations follow Beijing’s move to block the founders of AI firm Manus from completing a sale to Meta, even after the company had relocated its headquarters from China to Singapore — a signal that Beijing is willing to reach across borders to keep promising tech assets tethered to domestic or Hong Kong listings.

The currency and trade angle

Goldman’s team makes an out-of-consensus call worth flagging: it expects China’s current account surplus to rise to 4.2% of GDP in 2026, up from 3.6% in 2025, while the broader analyst consensus surveyed by Bloomberg expects a decline to 2.5%. The divergence comes down to export resilience — falling export prices are making Chinese goods more competitive even as the yuan is expected to appreciate slightly, with export-price inflation in dollar terms forecast to turn positive, rising to 0.7% from -2.7% the prior year.

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The bottom line

China’s economy in 2026 is a study in contrasts: robust headline export growth sitting on top of underutilized factories, a weak labor market, and a property sector still in its fifth year of decline. The World Bank’s own baseline, published in its country program materials, projects growth moderating toward 4.0% by 2026 — a more conservative read than Goldman’s. Either way, the consensus across forecasters is the same: exports are carrying more of China’s growth than is healthy for the long run, and Beijing’s policy choices this year suggest it’s betting on technological dominance to eventually solve the demand problem, rather than opening the stimulus taps to solve it directly.


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Analysis

Pakistan Circular Debt Crisis 2026: IMF Deadline Missed, Rs 3.44 Trillion

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There’s a number that keeps showing up in every conversation about Pakistan’s economy, and it keeps getting bigger: circular debt. As of early July 2026, the gas sector’s share of that debt alone has topped Rs 3.44 trillion, and Islamabad has missed a deadline the IMF set for tariff reforms meant to arrest the slide, according to Dawn.

What circular debt actually is, and why it won’t go away

Circular debt is the chain of unpaid obligations that builds up when the price consumers pay for electricity or gas doesn’t cover what it actually costs to produce and deliver it. Someone in the chain — a power producer, a gas utility, a state-owned enterprise — ends up carrying an IOU, and that IOU gets passed down the line. Earlier this year, IMF officials pressed Pakistan on exactly this dynamic, questioning the government’s plan to zero out gas-sector circular debt, according to Aaj English. At the time, officials said around Rs 150 billion remained payable to companies including Oil and Gas Development Company Limited and Pakistan Petroleum Limited.

Islamabad’s proposed fix included a Rs 5-per-unit levy on gas, dividends from state-owned companies redirected toward debt reduction, and the sale of 35 LNG cargoes annually on the international market. The IMF, per that same reporting, raised pointed questions about whether the plan was actually viable.

The commitments Pakistan has already made

Under its Extended Fund Facility, Pakistan has committed to capping circular debt growth at Rs 300 billion for FY2027 and cutting power-sector subsidies from 0.7% of GDP to 0.6%, according to details reported by ProPakistani. The government has also shifted Nepra’s annual tariff-rebasing cycle from July to January, and Ogra now revises gas tariffs twice a year instead of once.

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Structurally, some of this is working. The IMF’s own review in May 2026 credited Pakistan with a primary fiscal surplus of 1.6% of GDP for FY26, broadly in line with program targets, and noted gross reserves had climbed to $16 billion by end-December, up from $14.5 billion six months earlier, according to the IMF’s own press release. That progress unlocked roughly $1.1 billion under the EFF and $220 million under a parallel climate-resilience facility, bringing total disbursements under the two arrangements to about $4.8 billion.

Where the fault lines actually are

The uncomfortable part of this story, laid out by commentary reported in The Hans India, is that revenue targets get IMF scrutiny with great precision, while structural reform of loss-making public enterprises — Pakistan International Airlines and Pakistan Steel Mills chief among them — moves far more slowly. Those enterprises’ losses are absorbed by the national exchequer through subsidies, guarantees, and debt restructuring year after year, and privatization plans keep slipping because the political cost of confronting them is high.

Distribution company inefficiency compounds the problem. In FY25, Discos posted Rs 265 billion in losses, an improvement on FY24’s Rs 276 billion but still a substantial drag, according to Geo News, with Quetta, Peshawar and Hyderabad among the worst-performing utilities.

What happens if the pattern holds

Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio sits between 70% and 80% as of 2026, according to Wikipedia’s economic summary, with debt servicing occasionally consuming two-thirds of government spending. That’s the backdrop against which every circular-debt conversation happens: there is very little fiscal room left to absorb another missed deadline.

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The missed gas tariff deadline doesn’t automatically trigger a program breakdown — Pakistan has weathered similar friction points before during its current EFF arrangement. But with the IMF’s own documentation showing persistent concern about the credibility of debt-reduction plans, and with global energy prices still elevated in the aftermath of the Iran war, the margin for further slippage is thin. The next review will likely hinge less on the rhetoric around reform and more on whether the Rs 5 levy and LNG cargo sales actually show up in the numbers.


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Analysis

Malaysia Bets Its 2026 on “Execution” — And the Semiconductor Upcycle Is Doing the Heavy Lifting

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Malaysia’s government has declared 2026 a year of “execution” and “discipline” as the Anwar Ibrahim administration races to deliver on the 13th Malaysia Plan (RMK13) ahead of elections that could come as early as February 2028, according to Fortune’s interview with economy minister Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir.

A Strong Base to Build From

Malaysia’s economy grew 4.9% in 2025 following 5.1% growth the year before, with unemployment falling to 2.9% — the lowest in a decade — and the ringgit trading at its strongest level in five years. HSBC’s ASEAN economist Yun Liu forecasts 4.6% growth for 2026, citing strength in electrical equipment manufacturing, tourism, and sound government policy, while Nomura economists have projected an even more bullish 5.2%, pointing to infrastructure spending under RMK13.

The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) projects growth moderating slightly to 4.6% from an estimated 4.9% in 2025, describing Malaysia’s performance as reflecting its “entrenched position in global semiconductor and electronics value chains” and the broader global tech upcycle, according to AMRO’s assessment of Malaysia’s investment upcycle.

Navigating Washington Without Picking Sides

Malaysia’s trade relationship with the US has been turbulent. Washington imposed 25% tariffs on Malaysian goods in April 2025, rattling the country’s export-led economy, before a deal reduced US duties to 19% in exchange for Malaysia lowering tariffs on select American products, with exemptions carved out for aviation components and electrical equipment. Malaysia’s trade hit a record high of more than 3 trillion ringgit (roughly $780 billion) last year despite the friction.

Deputy finance minister Liew Chin Tong has framed Malaysia’s positioning explicitly around neutrality: the country is “not China, not the US,” a stance he argues gives Malaysia a strategic advantage in both geopolitical and supply-chain terms, according to Fortune’s reporting from the Forum Ekonomi Malaysia summit.

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Capital Is Flowing In — From Everywhere

Malaysia recorded 22.8 billion ringgit (about $5.8 billion) in foreign direct investment in the first quarter of 2026, a 6.0% year-on-year increase, moderating from the prior quarter’s 48.7% surge. Inflows into information and communication technology services remained particularly strong, with China, Hong Kong, and Singapore serving as the primary capital sources, according to McKinsey’s Southeast Asia quarterly economic review. Bank Negara Malaysia has held its policy rate steady following a pre-emptive 25 basis-point cut in July 2025, with headline inflation projected to average just 2.0% in 2026.

The Long Game: Semiconductors, Rare Earths, and Nuclear Power

Beyond RMK13’s near-term targets, Malaysian officials are positioning the country’s industrial strategy around decades, not years. Minister Akmal has reiterated commitments to eliminate coal use by 2044 and reach net zero by 2050, while confirming Malaysia is actively “exploring the potential” of nuclear power to meet the energy demands of its expanding data-center and semiconductor sectors. AMRO’s structural policy guidance urges Malaysia to develop domestic semiconductor and rare-earth capabilities as a hedge against ongoing US-China “geoeconomic fracturing,” positioning the country as a trusted neutral hub for global manufacturers diversifying away from concentrated exposure to either superpower.


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