Analysis

America’s Carmakers Cannot Escape Chinese EVs Forever

Published

5 months ago

June 19, 2026

A Wuling Hongguang MiniEV rolls off a Liuzhou production line priced at $6,560. A Chevrolet Equinox EV, built four time zones away in Spring Hill, Tennessee, starts above $34,000. The gap between those two numbers is the real story of the global auto industry in 2026, and Chinese EVs are no longer a distant threat to Detroit — they are a wall the United States has built around itself, one that is already cracking at the edges in Mexico and Canada. The 100% U.S. tariff has not solved the competitiveness problem. It has only postponed the reckoning.

The Tariff Wall Is Holding, But the Perimeter Isn’t

Washington’s strategy has been simple: keep Chinese EVs out, buy American manufacturers time to catch up. The result has been a market frozen in place rather than one transformed. A 100% import tariff, first imposed by the Biden administration and kept in place by President Trump, continues to block direct retail competition between Chinese OEMs and U.S.-listed automakers on American soil. Detroit’s response has been retreat, not reinvention — General Motors and Ford have both pared back their near-term EV production targets, and the Big Three’s global market share has slid from 21.4% in 2019 to roughly 15.7% in 2025, according to reporting cited by the Detroit News.

That figure matters because it shows the tariff has protected market share at home while doing nothing to arrest the bigger loss abroad. BYD overtook Tesla as the world’s top-selling EV maker in 2025, delivering 2.26 million units against Tesla’s 1.64 million — a gap that didn’t exist five years ago and that no American tariff schedule touches, because it was won in markets the U.S. doesn’t control.

Meanwhile the wall has a side door. Canada cut its tariff on Chinese-built EVs to 6.1% in January 2026, allowing up to 49,000 vehicles a year in a deal Prime Minister Mark Carney struck directly with Beijing — reportedly in exchange for China easing its own tariffs on Canadian canola oil. The quota is expected to climb roughly 6% annually, reaching 70,000 within five years. BYD now has a partial North American foothold without ever crossing the U.S. border.

The headline number is almost absurd by American standards. Five of China’s best-selling EVs sit in a $10,000 to $12,000 price band, while the average new car in the U.S. now costs roughly $50,000 — more than four times as much. The Wuling Hongguang MiniEV anchors the bottom of that stack at $6,560, and Geely’s EX2 populates the $8,000–$12,000 tier with a full feature set; auto analyst Felipe Munoz has pointed to the EX2’s interior quality and use of cabin space as evidence that the price gap isn’t simply a subsidy illusion.

That price advantage is not a temporary distortion of currency or labor costs. It is structural. China’s three best-selling EV brands — BYD, Wuling, and Geely — received approval for 83 new passenger car models collectively in the twelve months to October 2025. Volkswagen received approval for six. Nissan got two. That isn’t a difference in effort; it’s a difference in industrial architecture — state subsidy, vertical integration across the battery supply chain, and a domestic manufacturing base operating at a scale Western automakers have never built. A 2024 AlixPartners report found Chinese EV models reach market two to three years faster than non-Chinese brands, a velocity gap tariffs delay but cannot erase.

Three numbers explain why this matters beyond price tags:

16 million — electric cars China produced in 2025, roughly 20% more than domestic demand absorbed, according to the International Energy Agency, pushing the surplus into export markets.
75% — China’s share of global EV manufacturing capacity.
40% — China’s share of global EV trade volume.

China isn’t just making cheaper cars. It’s making more of them than its own market can absorb, and that surplus is finding doors the United States hasn’t fully sealed — Mexico, where Chinese vehicles briefly captured a quarter of total sales before a new 50% tariff took effect in January 2026, and Canada, where the door is now deliberately ajar.

Why a 100% Tariff Hasn’t Produced American Competitiveness

Does the US tariff on Chinese EVs actually protect American carmakers long-term?

The tariff protects domestic sales volume in the short term but does not address the underlying cost and innovation gap. It has allowed GM, Ford, and Tesla to avoid building lower-priced models, leaving them structurally unprepared for competition whenever the tariff wall is lowered, bypassed regionally, or rendered irrelevant by Chinese manufacturing on North American soil.

That’s the uncomfortable analytical truth underneath the trade statistics. A protective tariff only works if the protected industry uses the breathing room to close the gap it’s being shielded from. Instead, the opposite has happened. Without Chinese competition forcing their hand, U.S. manufacturers — even Tesla, the supposed EV pioneer — have concentrated on affluent buyers rather than developing the lower-priced, lower-margin vehicles that would broaden the market. Tesla has, by its own public framing, become more focused on robotaxis and humanoid robots than on delivering new affordable models.

That’s a strategic choice with consequences. EV sales in the U.S. have softened since Biden-era tax credits expired, and the national charging buildout has underdelivered. Ford and GM have both announced significant pullbacks to their EV ambitions — not because Chinese cars are competing with them directly, but because the broader market the tariff was meant to nurture hasn’t matured the way policymakers hoped.

There’s also a quieter erosion happening through software, not steel. Volvo recently received U.S. government approval to continue selling vehicles running Chinese-developed and maintained software, even after a Biden-era rule targeting companies with significant Chinese ownership took effect in March 2026. The tariff wall was built for hardware. It was never designed for code.

The next phase of this story isn’t about whether Chinese EVs reach North America — they already have, through Mexico and now Canada. It’s about whether they reach the United States, and how.

Direct imports of Chinese-made EVs into the U.S. remain highly unlikely in the near term given the political weight the United Auto Workers carries in swing-state politics, and given the bipartisan security concerns that have hardened, not softened, since 2024. But a joint-venture manufacturing arrangement — Chinese EVs built on U.S. soil, with U.S. labor, under licensing or partnership structures — is increasingly treated as plausible by industry analysts. Ford has reportedly explored ties with Geely, and the Trump administration’s rhetoric toward Chinese EV plants in the U.S. has at times sounded more welcoming than the tariff policy it inherited suggests.

For policymakers, the second-order effect is a credibility problem. Stellantis, which owns Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, and Ram alongside several European brands, now competes in a hemisphere where its northern and southern neighbors are taking opposite approaches — Canada opening a narrow channel, Mexico closing one. A North American auto market that operated for three decades as a single integrated zone under NAFTA and its successor is fragmenting into three different tariff regimes for the same category of vehicle. That complicates supply chains for every automaker with cross-border plants, not just the ones trying to sell EVs.

For American consumers, the implication is more direct and less abstract: continued exclusion from a global product category that is, by most independent measures, cheaper, more feature-rich, and evolving faster than its domestic alternative. The Council on Foreign Relations has framed this gap in stark terms — China’s EV producers have “taken the world by storm” in a way that poses a structural threat to an American auto industry still organized around a century-old product architecture.

Not everyone agrees the tariff is a mistake. The dominant counter-argument, voiced consistently by the UAW and echoed across both political parties, rests on national security and industrial-base preservation: allowing subsidized Chinese EVs unrestricted access to the U.S. market wouldn’t just compress American automaker margins — it could hollow out domestic manufacturing employment in a politically and economically sensitive sector, the way Japanese and South Korean competition reshaped Rust Belt manufacturing in the late twentieth century, but compressed into a far shorter timeline.

There’s also a more technical objection. Critics of liberalization point to the gap between the 100% tariff’s stated justification — countering Chinese state subsidies — and the scale of the subsidies themselves. Trade economists at Bruegel have noted the tariff rate implies that half the cost of a Chinese EV is government-funded, a claim that exceeds most independent estimates of actual subsidy levels, suggesting the policy may be doing more political signaling than precise economic correction.

Energy economist James Sallee of UC Berkeley represents the opposing camp most bluntly: he argues the Canada-China deal demonstrates that simply allowing the world’s most popular EVs to compete directly in North America would expand consumer access and accelerate decarbonization, without the U.S. needing to wait for Detroit to catch up on its own.

The contest over Chinese EVs was never really about a single number on a customs form. It’s about whether an industrial strategy built on exclusion can substitute for one built on competitiveness — and five years into the experiment, the evidence is uneven at best. The tariff has done exactly what it promised: it has kept Chinese-badged cars off American driveways. It has not done what its architects implied it would: force U.S. automakers to build something that could win on price, speed, or software if the wall ever came down.

That wall is no longer airtight. It has a 49,000-vehicle gap in Canada, a software loophole at Volvo, and a Mexican border where tariff rates are being renegotiated under pressure rather than settled by policy. None of those cracks amount to collapse. But they are the shape of how trade walls usually fail — not all at once, but at the edges, until the center can no longer hold the line it was built to protect.

America’s carmakers don’t have to compete with Chinese EVs today. That is not the same as being able to avoid it indefinitely.

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Opinion

The Sandbox Imperium: Why Beijing’s Digital Yuan Needs Hong Kong

Published

6 days ago

November 1, 2026

Abdul Rahman

For decades, the global dominance of the U.S. dollar has rested on two primary pillars: deep, unencumbered liquid capital markets and an indispensable global financial messaging protocol known as SWIFT. When Beijing launched its e-CNY initiative, Western observers initially framed it as a central bank digital currency (CBDC) designed primarily for domestic surveillance, retail convenience, and financial inclusion.

However, recent strategic moves highlight a far more ambitious objective. As documented by the South China Morning Post, Beijing is actively leveraging Hong Kong as its central offshore laboratory to establish the infrastructure required for international cross-border digital yuan adoption.

The crucial strategic question is no longer whether China can engineer robust distributed ledger architecture, but whether an offshore financial hub operating under “One Country, Two Systems” can bridge the gap between rigid domestic capital controls and global institutional acceptance. To succeed, China must resolve the fundamental tension between absolute monetary sovereignty and the open networks required for international currency adoption.

1. The Paradox of the Offshore Laboratory

China’s monetary expansion faces a well-documented structural paradox. According to macroeconomic research from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, no currency can achieve true international reserve status without offering open capital accounts and deep, freely convertible liquidity. Yet, completely relaxing capital controls would expose China’s domestic banking system to volatile international capital flows and speculative pressures.

Hong Kong serves as the pressure valve and testing ground for this paradox:

Legal & Regulatory Buffer: Hong Kong maintains a trusted common law judicial system and an independent monetary authority (Hong Kong Monetary Authority).
Convertibility Bridge: It allows mainland authorities to test e-CNY settlement, cross-border retail links, and digital asset integration without opening mainland financial markets directly to global speculative shocks.
Institutional Liquidity: As the world’s premier offshore renminbi hub, Hong Kong provides the institutional counterparties necessary to build real-world transaction volume.

“The digital yuan’s true test lies not in domestic retail adoption, but in whether foreign counterparties can settle cross-border trade without taking on unacceptable regulatory or capital risks.”

2. Wholesale Settlement and Project mBridge

While retail consumer wallets attract considerable media attention, the real geopolitical shift is occurring at the wholesale institutional level. Strategic initiatives like Project mBridge—developed in partnership with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the People’s Bank of China, and regional central banks—demonstrate how multi-CBDC platforms can streamline international trade.

As reported in market analyses by Bloomberg and trade finance studies covered by Reuters, multi-lateral CBDC platforms offer significant operational advantages:

Elimination of Intermediaries: Direct ledger-to-ledger transactions bypass traditional correspondent banking networks.
Speed and Efficiency: Cross-border settlement times are reduced from days to seconds.
Cost Reduction: Transaction costs and foreign exchange spreads across regional trade corridors in Asia and the Middle East are dramatically lowered.

If commercial enterprises operating in Hong Kong can settle trade directly in e-CNY with instant finality, Beijing creates a compelling economic incentive for trade partners that operates independently of Western clearing networks.

3. Geopolitical Implications & The Road Ahead

Western policymakers and central bankers are monitoring these developments closely. Recent congressional testimony and Treasury reviews highlighted by Reuters reflect growing concern in Washington that alternative settlement rails could gradually erode the reach and enforcement of Western financial sanctions.

However, technological capability alone does not guarantee global currency dominance. Until foreign corporate treasuries and central banks have full confidence in converted currency liquidity, property rights, and transparent legal protections, the digital yuan will serve primarily as an efficient alternative mechanism for bilateral trade rather than an immediate replacement for the U.S. dollar.

Institutional Summary & Comparison

Dimension	Conventional Retail Focus	Wholesale / Strategic Reality
Primary Mechanism	Retail e-CNY wallets for tourists & merchants	Multi-CBDC corridors (Project mBridge) & Project Ensemble
Core Objective	Domestic payments & payment app competition	Disintermediation of correspondent banking and SWIFT rails
Primary Barrier	Consumer habituation & merchant readiness	Capital controls, currency convertibility, and institutional trust

Sources & Citations

South China Morning Post: Beijing wants Hong Kong to sow the seeds for the digital yuan
Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) & Cross-Border Payments Research
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: China’s Financial System and Capital Account Dynamics
Bloomberg Financial Analysis: Global Macro & Digital Currency Integration
Reuters News & Analysis: Cross-Border Settlement and Global Trade Finance

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Analysis

Tokyo Disneyland Peter Pan’s Flight Closure: January–February 2027 Guide

Published

1 week ago

October 29, 2026

Abdul Rahman

Guests planning a visit to Tokyo Disneyland in early 2027 should put one easily missed detail on their itinerary: Peter Pan’s Flight is scheduled to be temporarily closed from January 6 through February 2, 2027. The operator lists the dates both on its official attraction page and in the Tokyo Disneyland closure schedule. This is a scheduled interruption, not an announcement that the classic ride is being removed permanently. Travelers visiting on dates inside that window should assume the attraction will not be available unless Tokyo Disney Resort publishes a change.

The distinction matters because online references to “Peter Pan closing at Tokyo Disney” can confuse two different parks and two different experiences. Tokyo Disneyland’s Peter Pan’s Flight is a compact Fantasyland ride. Tokyo DisneySea has a separate, newer attraction called Peter Pan’s Never Land Adventure, with its own planned March 2027 maintenance period. The first planning step is making sure the information applies to the ticket you actually bought.

At a glance: what the operator currently says

Planning question	Verified answer
Which attraction?	Peter Pan’s Flight
Which park?	Tokyo Disneyland, Fantasyland
Scheduled closure starts	January 6, 2027
Scheduled closure ends	February 2, 2027
Reopening expectation	After the listed closure window, subject to operator changes
Type of notice	Temporary closure; not announced as permanent
Where to recheck	Official attraction listing

The dates are explicitly labeled as a temporary closure by Tokyo Disney Resort. Do not treat February 3 as an unconditional reopening guarantee: an operator may update maintenance information or temporarily suspend operations for other reasons. Check again shortly before travel and on the day you enter the park.

What is Peter Pan’s Flight?

Peter Pan’s Flight is a dark ride based on the familiar journey from London to Never Land. Guests sit in a flying pirate-ship vehicle that travels through a storybook environment. According to the operator’s ride information, it is in Fantasyland, lasts about two and a half minutes and carries two people per vehicle. It operates indoors and includes dark spaces. These details make it particularly appealing to families who want a gentle, classic Disney experience rather than a high-speed thrill ride.

There are restrictions worth noting even on operating days. The published guidance says a guest must be able to maintain a stable seated position independently and that children may not be held on an adult’s lap during the ride. If your group includes young children, anyone needing seating assistance or visitors uncomfortable with darkness, read the official description and accessibility guidance rather than assuming that the attraction suits everyone because it is short.

Short ride duration is not the same as short waiting time. Demand for well-known classics can vary with crowds, operating conditions and holiday schedules, so it is unwise to schedule a tight sequence of unrelated bookings around a predicted queue. The operator’s app and in-park staff can provide current operating information when the ride is available.

The dates around the closure are not interchangeable

A guest visiting January 5 has a fundamentally different planning position from someone arriving January 6. January 5 falls before the currently listed closure, while January 6 is its opening day. A February 2 visit falls on the final listed day of the maintenance window; February 3 is the earliest day after that window, not a contractual promise that the ride will run.

For a family staying at the resort for multiple days, the difference might be worth changing which day is assigned to Tokyo Disneyland. If one day is before January 6 and another is inside the closure, put Disneyland first if the classic Peter Pan ride is a must-do. But do not swap a park ticket or hotel reservation until you understand the applicable change and cancellation conditions. The economic cost of reshuffling an entire trip can exceed the benefit of experiencing one short ride.

A visitor traveling from overseas may be choosing between a single Disneyland day and a DisneySea day. In that case, consider the trip’s overall priorities. Someone who values vintage Fantasyland attractions may still prefer Disneyland even during the closure. Someone traveling expressly for an immersive Peter Pan adventure could be more interested in the DisneySea attraction—but must buy admission to that different park and verify its own operating schedule.

Other Tokyo Disneyland closures during the same period

The official park maintenance listing shows other attractions with early-2027 closure windows that may overlap your visit. At the time of this review, it lists Jungle Cruise: Wildlife Expeditions from January 6 through March 31, Splash Mountain from January 7 through February 4, and Haunted Mansion from January 8 through February 4. These are operator-published schedules, not independent predictions about refurbishment completion.

This makes the Peter Pan closure more significant for certain visitors than a single unavailable ride might suggest. A group that expected several classic experiences in one afternoon could find multiple priorities temporarily inaccessible. Conversely, the park contains many other attractions and entertainment offerings, and the attractions that remain open should be evaluated on their own current descriptions rather than guessed from historical schedules.

It is worth making a small “must ride / would enjoy / optional” list. Mark each attraction against the closure page. Then build flexibility around weather, performance calendars and queue variation. A plan with alternatives is more resilient than a rigid minute-by-minute schedule.

Better alternatives for different kinds of visitors

If the attraction’s appeal is gentle fantasy storytelling, explore other Fantasyland offerings listed in the official Tokyo Disneyland attraction directory. Filter for ride type and height or access restrictions, and read the current operating details. Do not assume that a neighboring attraction will be open merely because it is not listed in an older travel blog.

If the main attraction is Disney character immersion, devote time to character experiences, themed areas, shopping or scheduled entertainment that is actually available on your day. These can preserve the spirit of the trip without pretending they are substitutes for the ride itself. Some guests will prefer to spend the recovered time on a longer headliner; others may value an unhurried lunch and a park exploration that is less vulnerable to queues.

If the trip is built around Peter Pan specifically, Tokyo DisneySea’s Never Land Adventure may appear attractive. But it is not the same ride: it is a 3D boat-based experience in Fantasy Springs, with different restrictions and a different length. Tokyo Disney Resort’s DisneySea attraction page is the reliable way to compare them. Admission, access arrangements and the day’s capacity remain separate questions.

Parents should also avoid overstating the value of a replacement to children. “Another attraction has pirates” does not make it the planned Peter Pan experience. Setting expectations before entering the park is often more effective than negotiating disappointment in a crowded queue area.

Are refunds or ticket changes automatic?

The announcement of an attraction’s temporary closure does not itself demonstrate that every guest is entitled to a ticket refund or a date change. Theme-park tickets ordinarily grant admission subject to operating conditions, not a binding guarantee that every individual ride will operate. Actual ticket terms, package conditions and any operator-specific accommodation policy govern what can be changed.

Before buying or modifying a pass, review the official Tokyo Disney Resort ticket and reservations guidance and any reseller’s terms. A third-party package might combine transport, hotel rooms and tickets under separate cancellation rules. You should not rely on the statement “ride closed” as a universal reason for a penalty-free cancellation.

If your booking is complex, write down the name of the supplier, reservation reference, exact park date and type of admission. Seek a written answer before paying a change fee. This is particularly important if you plan to move only one day of a multi-day trip and keep the remainder unchanged.

Does Disney Premier Access help during the closure?

No paid queue-management product can make an attraction operate while it is closed. Disney Premier Access is a separate, paid tool for eligible operating experiences; eligibility and availability can change. The official Premier Access guide explains that places may sell out and that the price does not include park admission. It should not be marketed to families as a guaranteed workaround for a published maintenance closure.

The app can nevertheless be useful for other attractions and live operating information. If a ride is unavailable, remove it from the day’s queue-management plan and redirect attention to attractions genuinely offered that day. Check the current product terms before purchasing any additional access.

How to build a more reliable 2027 itinerary

Start with the official attraction closure list rather than the social-media version of it. Choose a date, read the list for the correct park, then check the pages for the two or three attractions most important to your group. If several favorites overlap with closures, compare another travel day, but preserve buffer time and cost limits.

Once you have a provisional itinerary, check whether your whole group can experience the alternatives. A family with a toddler and grandparents may have different needs from a group of teenagers. Ride seating rules, dark environments, height restrictions and walking distances deserve attention before buying optional upgrades.

A week before departure, look at the operator’s park calendar and attraction pages again. On the morning of your visit, follow current app information and staff instructions. Write down a backup plan that does not depend on a single ride reopening on the first conceivable day.

Quick visitor questions

Is Peter Pan’s Flight shutting permanently? The published notice says temporary closure January 6–February 2, 2027. It does not announce permanent removal.

Is it in Tokyo Disneyland or DisneySea? Peter Pan’s Flight is in Tokyo Disneyland’s Fantasyland. DisneySea has the separate Never Land Adventure.

Can I ride on February 2? The current listing includes February 2 in the closure window. Do not plan on riding that day.

Is February 3 the official reopening day? It is the first day after the presently announced closure period, assuming the dates are unchanged. Confirm the park’s live information rather than treating operation as guaranteed.

Should I change my trip? That depends on how important this specific ride is compared with hotel, flights, admission and other attractions. For most travelers, adjusting priorities within the same park is the lower-risk first option.

Final planning advice

This news is not a farewell to Peter Pan’s Flight. It is a defined, temporary gap in the operating calendar. The useful response is to check your exact visit date, compare the rides your family actually cares about and keep a realistic alternative ready. Tokyo Disneyland can still be an appealing destination during the listed closure; the difference between an enjoyable trip and a frustrating one may simply be accurate expectations.

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Opinion

Rolex Perpetual Market Value 2026: Why Luxury Watches Remain a Top Alternative Asset

Published

2 months ago

September 17, 2026

Abdul Rahman

Key Takeaways

Rolex’s secondary market rose approximately 7.9% year-over-year as of 2026 (per WatchCharts data) — trailing Patek Philippe (+16.2%) and Tudor (+11.4%) but still outperforming Audemars Piguet (+3.4%).
Rolex raised U.S. retail prices 4–9% in January 2026 (steel models ~5.6%, gold models ~8.7%), narrowing the historical gap between retail and pre-owned pricing.
Not every model appreciates: steel sports references (Submariner, GMT-Master II, Daytona) have held value far better than two-tone or widely available dress references like the standard Datejust.
The Lady-Datejust posted the sharpest 2026 gain among tracked collections — up 22.73%, from roughly $9,269 to $11,376 — driven by demand for smaller, “everyday luxury” watches.
Gold’s rise past $2,400/oz has directly lifted the investment case for Rolex’s precious-metal references (Day-Date, Sky-Dweller, Yacht-Master).

The Model-by-Model Picture

Category	2026 Trend
Lady-Datejust	+22.73% (strongest performer among tracked collections)
Steel sports models (Submariner, GMT-Master II)	Held value well; corrected from 2022 peak but stabilized above retail
Daytona	Corrected from highs above $50,000 to the mid-$30,000s; still among the most sought-after references
Two-tone/widely available Datejust	Flat to negative — “holds value” is an overstatement for this category
Gold references (Day-Date, Sky-Dweller)	Lifted by gold’s rise above $2,400/oz

Why the “Rolex Always Appreciates” Myth Is Fading

The pandemic-era boom pushed some references — the Daytona above all — to speculative highs disconnected from historical norms. Since the March 2022 peak, steel sports models have compressed meaningfully, and dealers who bought inventory near the top have in some cases faced 20–40% markdowns on liquidation. The lesson for 2026 buyers: Rolex as a category is not a monolith. Value retention depends heavily on specific reference, condition, and whether the piece comes with box and papers (“full set”).

What’s Actually Driving 2026 Strength

Retail price increases raise the floor. When a new Submariner retails at $10,050 (up from $9,500), a pre-owned example at $11,000–$12,000 suddenly represents a smaller premium — narrowing the gap without secondary prices actually moving.
Supply discipline remains Rolex’s core lever. The brand has never confirmed production numbers, and secondary-market premiums remain entirely a function of Rolex’s own manufacturing decisions — a risk factor as much as a support.
Certified Pre-Owned rollout. Rolex’s now fully rolled-out CPO program has changed how buyers transact in the used market, adding a layer of brand-verified legitimacy that supports pricing.

The Case for Rolex as a Portfolio Diversifier

Financial advisors increasingly frame luxury watches not as a replacement for equities or bonds, but as a tangible, historically low-correlation diversifier — one that carries its own risks (illiquidity, condition-dependent pricing, no yield) but has demonstrated multi-decade resilience for specific references.

Is Rolex a good investment in 2026?

It depends heavily on the specific reference. Steel sports models like the Submariner and Daytona have held or grown in value; two-tone and widely available dress models generally have not. Overall, Rolex’s secondary market rose about 7.9% year-over-year in 2026, trailing Patek Philippe but ahead of Audemars Piguet.