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Russia Raised VAT to 22% to Pay for the War. It Still Isn’t Enough

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Russia’s federal budget collected less revenue in 2025 than originally planned for the first time since the pandemic, a shortfall that has pushed the Kremlin to raise its value-added tax rate from 20% to 22% starting January 1 and pull far more small businesses into the VAT system, according to The Moscow Times’ assessment of the country’s 2026 fiscal trajectory.

The Oil Money Is Drying Up

The core of Russia’s budget problem is straightforward: oil and gas revenue, the traditional backbone of Kremlin finances, has fallen by more than 25% as a stronger ruble and tightening Western sanctions squeeze what Moscow can earn from crude exports, according to the New Eurasian Strategies Centre’s analysis. When the 2025 budget was set, revenues were projected at 40.3 trillion rubles; updated forecasts now suggest actual collections closer to 36.6 trillion rubles, a gap of roughly $46 billion at current exchange rates, per The Moscow Times.

The World Bank expects a global oil supply surplus to push Brent crude prices down from an average of $68 a barrel in 2025 to around $60 in 2026, the lowest level in five years, further squeezing the discount Russia must already offer buyers willing to purchase sanctioned crude. With GDP estimated at 217.3 trillion rubles in 2025, total defense spending of around 15.86 trillion rubles, more than $198 billion, now represents a share of the economy that leaves little room for the civilian investment that might otherwise support long-term growth, The Moscow Times reports.

A Central Bank Fighting Inflation on Its Own

Against this fiscal backdrop, the Bank of Russia has pursued an unusually consistent disinflation campaign under Governor Elvira Nabiullina, cutting its key rate eight consecutive times from a record 21% last June down to 14.25% by its June 2026 decision, according to the central bank’s own rate announcement. That June cut of just 25 basis points came in below the market’s median expectation of a 50-basis-point reduction, with the central bank citing persistent pro-inflationary risks tied to higher energy prices from the Middle East war, refinery damage from Ukrainian strikes, and wage growth that continues to outpace productivity, per Trading Economics’ tracking of the decisions.

Annual inflation stood at 5.6% as of mid-June, still well above the Bank of Russia’s 4% target, though down meaningfully from the 9.5% rate recorded in 2025, according to the central bank’s own data. The Moscow Times’ longer analysis of the anti-inflation campaign notes that Russia’s consumer price index rose 39% across the four full wartime years from 2022 to 2025, compared with 61% in Ukraine over the same period, and a staggering 200%-plus in Iran, framing Nabiullina’s inflation-targeting approach as unusually disciplined by wartime standards, per The Moscow Times’ longer profile of the policy.

The Cost of That Discipline

That discipline has not come free. The New Eurasian Strategies Centre describes Russia as moving through the final phase of a familiar economic cycle: downturn, fiscal stimulus, inflation, interest rate rises, downturn again, disinflation, rate cuts, and eventually recovery, a sequence the think tank says has suppressed economic activity across many sectors as interest-rate pressure compounds the drag from sanctions and wartime resource reallocation, according to its analysis of key rate dynamics. Growth forecasts for both 2025 and 2026 now cluster around just 1%, according to Russia’s own Economic Forecasting Institute and the IMF alike, a marked slowdown from the wartime stimulus-driven expansion of earlier years.

A potential end to the war in Ukraine, paradoxically, could increase short-term recession risk by reducing output in defense-related industries and lowering household incomes tied to military production, the New Eurasian Strategies Centre’s analysis notes, underscoring how deeply the war economy has become embedded in Russia’s growth model.

New Taxes on Everything From Laptops to Small Firms

Beyond the VAT increase, Russian authorities are lowering the annual revenue threshold for mandatory VAT registration from 60 million rubles to just 10 million rubles, sweeping far more small and medium-sized enterprises into the tax system, according to The Moscow Times’ January analysis. The government also plans a new levy on finished electronic goods including laptops, smartphones, and lighting products. The head of Russia’s New People party has publicly warned that lowering the VAT threshold will disproportionately hit small and medium-sized enterprises in the regions, according to reporting cited in the same Moscow Times analysis, a rare instance of intra-establishment pushback on fiscal policy.

What to Watch Next

The Bank of Russia’s next key rate decision falls on July 24, with a summary of the prior meeting’s discussion published July 1, according to the central bank’s own communications calendar. Nabiullina has reaffirmed that inflation should return to the 4% target sometime in 2026, a view broadly shared by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, though The Moscow Times notes that even Defense Minister Andrei Belousov has, with some reservations, supported the anti-inflation policy, a rare point of consensus across an otherwise divided Russian economic leadership. Whether that consensus survives a second consecutive year of budget shortfalls and rising consumer taxes is the question shaping Russia’s economic trajectory through the remainder of 2026.


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Pakistan’s Flood Recovery Collides With Rising Spending

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As Pakistan’s 2026 monsoon season continues to claim lives across Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Balochistan, a harder question is coming into focus in Islamabad: whether the country’s fiscal priorities match the scale of the climate risk it now faces year after year — even as defence spending, driven by tensions with India, continues to climb.

The Human Toll Keeps Rising

Pakistan’s death toll from rain-related incidents since June 26 had climbed to 126 as of early August, according to the National Disaster Management Authority’s latest situation report, with Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces bearing the heaviest losses at 47 and 55 deaths respectively. The NDMA has continued to warn of fresh flooding risk across Sindh, Punjab, KP and Balochistan as additional rain spells move through the country.

The federal Emergency Response Committee, chaired by Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal, has stressed the importance of close coordination among stakeholders to ensure a timely and effective response to the unfolding emergency, while NDMA teams continue coordinating relief operations with national and international humanitarian partners.

A Pattern Pakistan Has Seen Before

This year’s floods carry unmistakable echoes of 2022, when record monsoon rains and glacial melt killed more than 1,700 people, affected over 33 million, and caused an estimated $30 billion in economic losses — one of Pakistan’s worst natural disasters on record. While this year’s death toll has so far been far lower, the pattern of institutional response has drawn sharp criticism from Pakistani commentators. A Business Recorder editorial argued that every monsoon exposes the same shortcomings — inadequately maintained drainage systems, encroachments blocking natural waterways, and construction proceeding in flood-prone areas with little regard for long-term risk, with administrative coordination typically strengthening only during the emergency itself rather than before it.

Compounding the risk, the World Meteorological Organization’s July 31 update flagged El Niño’s effect on rising temperatures and drought conditions in the coming months — suggesting Pakistan’s climate volatility is unlikely to ease even once this monsoon season passes.

The Fiscal Trade-off

What distinguishes this year’s flooding from a purely humanitarian story is the fiscal backdrop against which it is unfolding. Despite mounting climate risk, Pakistan raised defence spending by 20% for the 2025-2026 fiscal year, citing ongoing tensions with India, while cutting its overall federal budget by 6.9%, according to analysis of the country’s competing budget priorities.

The scale of the mismatch is stark when set against Pakistan’s long-term climate financing needs. The World Bank estimates Pakistan will require $348 billion by 2030 to address climate impacts, split between $152 billion for adaptation and resilience strategies and $196 billion toward reducing carbon emissions across the economy — a figure that dwarfs the country’s current fiscal capacity even before accounting for the defence-spending increase.

Agriculture Bears the Brunt

The economic exposure runs deep given Pakistan’s reliance on farming. Agriculture accounts for roughly 24% of Pakistan’s GDP and employs half of its labour force, meaning flood damage to Punjab’s farmland — a critical agricultural hub — carries outsized consequences for both rural livelihoods and the broader economy’s growth trajectory, coming just as the country posted its fastest GDP growth in four years for FY26.

Unlike the catastrophic 2022 floods, this year’s disaster has affected an even broader geographic swathe of the country, including areas of Punjab that were less severely hit three years ago — a reminder that flood risk is spreading rather than concentrating in historically vulnerable regions.

Why This Matters for Investors and Policymakers

For a country whose fiscal credibility with the IMF and international creditors already rests on a delicate balance of reform commitments, the collision between climate adaptation needs and defence spending pressures adds a new variable to Pakistan’s macroeconomic outlook. Every flood season that passes without meaningfully upgraded drainage infrastructure or flood-plain zoning enforcement effectively defers costs rather than avoiding them — costs that show up later as emergency relief spending, agricultural output losses, or renewed pressure on the current account through disrupted export crops like cotton.

Key Takeaways

  • Pakistan’s 2026 monsoon death toll has climbed to at least 126 since June 26, with Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa hardest hit.
  • The government raised defence spending 20% for FY26 citing India tensions, while cutting the overall federal budget by 6.9%.
  • The World Bank estimates Pakistan needs $348 billion by 2030 for climate adaptation and emissions reduction — far exceeding current fiscal capacity.
  • Agriculture, which accounts for 24% of GDP and employs half the labour force, remains acutely exposed to repeated flood damage.
  • Commentators warn that recurring institutional shortcomings — poor drainage maintenance and flood-plain construction — are deferring rather than reducing long-term costs.

Frequently Asked Questions

How many people have died in Pakistan’s 2026 monsoon floods? Pakistan’s death toll from rain-related incidents since June 26, 2026 had reached at least 126 as of early August, according to the National Disaster Management Authority.

How much does Pakistan need for climate adaptation? The World Bank estimates Pakistan will require $348 billion by 2030, including $152 billion for adaptation and resilience and $196 billion for reducing emissions across the economy.

Why has Pakistan increased defence spending despite flood risks? Pakistan raised defence spending by 20% for FY26, citing ongoing tensions with India, while simultaneously cutting its overall federal budget by 6.9%, creating a fiscal trade-off with climate adaptation needs.


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Britain’s Fragile Rebound Meets a Budget Deadline and a Trump Ultimatum

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The UK economy is sending genuinely mixed signals heading into autumn 2026, and the next six weeks will determine which signal wins out. Economists expect official data to confirm GDP grew around 0.4% between April and June, building on 0.6% growth in the first quarter, while the Composite PMI climbed to 52.2 in July, its strongest expansion reading in months (CPA).

That is the good news. The complicating news arrives from two directions simultaneously: a first Budget from Chancellor John Healey scheduled for 28 October 2026, and an increasingly public dispute with the Trump administration over North Sea energy policy.

The Budget that businesses are already pricing in

Tax expectations are rising well ahead of the actual announcement, and that anticipatory caution is itself acting as a drag on investment. Small-business growth expectations in England have fallen to 24%, the lowest reading in a 12-year survey history, according to Novuna Business Finance research, with construction, retail and hospitality recording the steepest declines (CPA). The Institute of Directors reported a similar softening in confidence through July, with chief economist Anna Leach warning that renewed Middle East conflict could intensify cost pressures on households before the Budget even lands (CPA).

Private-sector employment has now declined for 22 consecutive months even as headline output expands — a divergence that typically signals firms absorbing higher costs through headcount rather than passing them to customers (CPA).

The North Sea flashpoint

President Trump has escalated rhetoric toward the UK directly, describing the country as “a bankrupt country” and demanding the government authorise new North Sea oil and gas drilling — comments that have intensified international scrutiny of Britain’s energy and fiscal trajectory just as BP has put its own UK North Sea business up for sale (CPA; CPA). The timing is awkward for Westminster: a government trying to signal fiscal discipline ahead of a difficult Budget is simultaneously fielding a demand from Washington that would require reversing years of North Sea licensing policy.

Where the resilience is coming from

Not every signal is negative. Bank of England analysis points to UK firms developing and adopting artificial intelligence beginning to record materially stronger productivity, with software and IT consulting increasing their contribution to annual productivity growth roughly tenfold (CPA). Consumer-facing retailers including Next and Ryanair have benefited from resilient demand, and falling oil prices — while volatile around Strait of Hormuz tensions — have offered some transport and energy-cost relief to businesses (CPA).

Infrastructure is also providing a rare bright spot for regional growth: Gatwick’s expansion plans could accommodate roughly 100,000 additional flights annually, a scale of construction and hospitality opportunity that EY estimates will help the Premier League alone contribute £33bn to the UK economy over the next three seasons, two-thirds of it generated outside London (CPA).

The read for the next quarter

The UK’s Q2 GDP print will be treated as a referendum on whether the recovery is durable or borrowed time before the Budget bites. For businesses, the practical takeaway echoed across credit-risk analysts is to stress-test cash flow against higher finance costs and slower customer settlement now, rather than assume rates fall quickly once October’s fiscal statement lands (CPA).


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Rachel Reeves’s £25 Billion Problem: What the Autumn Budget Gap Means for Britain

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Britain’s economy is growing again — just not fast enough to spare Chancellor Rachel Reeves from another difficult budget. The UK expanded by roughly 0.1% in August, keeping the economy on track for about 0.2% growth in the third quarter, but that modest rebound won’t be enough to close a fiscal hole opening beneath the government’s plans, according to analysis from FXStreet.

Where the £25 billion gap comes from

The Office for Budget Responsibility is expected to downgrade its economic assessment this autumn relative to its Spring Statement forecast, chiefly on weaker productivity assumptions. Combined with higher gilt yields and a series of policy reversals over the past year, that downgrade is projected to blow a roughly £25 billion annual hole in the public finances compared with the position Reeves described in March, per the same FXStreet analysis. A separate assessment attributes some of the UK’s recent resilience to a substantial rise in government spending — departmental budgets have grown roughly 4% in real terms — a tailwind officials do not expect to persist into the next fiscal year.

This follows an already-large tax package. Reeves’s autumn 2025 budget delivered more than £26 billion in new tax measures, according to Allianz Trade’s UK economic outlook, on top of £41.5 billion in tax increases the year before. Much of that revenue is earmarked for higher welfare spending, leaving comparatively little room for growth-focused stimulus.

The government’s counter-narrative

Downing Street has framed its record differently. In its own Spring Forecast presentation, the government pointed to inflation falling faster than expected, GDP per person growing more than projected in the original Budget, and household energy bill relief as evidence its plan is working, according to the UK government’s own Spring Forecast statement. Officials also cite the UK’s growth rate as the fastest in the G7 among European economies in 2025.

The Bank of England, meanwhile, has penciled in third-quarter growth of around 0.4% — a target that already looks difficult to reach given the pace of expansion through August and September, according to FXStreet’s assessment of the BoE forecast gap.

Why global finance is watching

For institutional investors from Singapore to Dubai, the UK’s fiscal trajectory matters beyond domestic politics. Persistently elevated gilt yields make UK sovereign debt more attractive on a relative-yield basis but signal continued fiscal strain — a dynamic that has already accelerated the migration of UK-domiciled wealth toward lower-tax jurisdictions including Singapore and the UAE (see our companion report on the non-dom exodus). A credible autumn budget, or the absence of one, will shape whether that capital flow accelerates further.


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