Analysis
Geopolitical Energy Risks: The Structural Drivers of Greenflation
In late 2025, a massive offshore wind development off the eastern seaboard of the United States quietly collapsed. It wasn’t local opposition that killed it, nor was it a failure of engineering. It was the price of copper, the crushing weight of five percent interest rates, and a fractured global supply chain. The turbines simply became too expensive to build.
For the last decade, the political consensus assumed the march toward net-zero would be relentlessly deflationary. Solar panels would get cheaper, battery densities would improve, and free trade would seamlessly allocate capital to the most efficient producers. That era is over. The energy transition has collided with a balkanised world order, replacing the old volatility of crude oil with a new, heavier burden: the rising cost of going green.
The global economy is now structurally short of the materials required to electrify. To understand why the transition is stalling, one must look beyond the physics of wind and solar. The crisis sits at the intersection of geology, capital markets, and national security. The era of fossil fuels was defined by geographic extraction; the era of renewables is defined by supply chain processing. And right now, that chain is breaking. According to the International Energy Agency, getting the world on track for net-zero emissions by 2050 requires a sixfold increase in mineral inputs by 2040.
Yet, capital expenditure in mining remains paralysed.
The Core Development: Scarcity by Design
We are witnessing an unprecedented collision between climate ambitions and geopolitical energy risks. Western governments have legislated aggressive decarbonisation timelines just as they have initiated a hostile trade war with the world’s dominant supplier of green technology.
China processes roughly 60 percent of the world’s lithium, 80 percent of its cobalt, and nearly 90 percent of its rare earth elements. You cannot build a modern wind turbine or an electric vehicle without Beijing’s tacit approval. When the US and Europe introduced subsidies to onshore these supply chains—such as the US Inflation Reduction Act—they effectively triggered a protectionist arms race. Beijing responded precisely as an incumbent monopolist would: by quietly restricting the export of gallium and germanium, two obscure but vital metals used in solar cells and semiconductors, in late 2023.
This isn’t just a trade dispute. It’s the weaponisation of the net-zero transition. Building alternative supply chains outside of China’s sphere of influence takes time that climate targets do not permit. Permitting a new copper mine in North America or Europe currently takes an average of 16 years. Data published by the World Bank indicates that demand for minerals like graphite, lithium, and cobalt could increase by 500 percent by 2050. The math is brutal. We are legislating demand while structurally constraining supply. The inevitable result is a sharp, persistent upward pressure on the materials needed to save the planet.
The Analytical Layer: The Mechanics of Greenflation
This structural deficit brings us to the central macroeconomic challenge of the decade. In 2022, European Central Bank executive board member Isabel Schnabel warned of a coming era of price instability driven by the climate transition. She was right.
What causes greenflation in the global economy? Greenflation is driven by three intersecting forces: chronic underinvestment in legacy fossil fuels before renewable alternatives are fully scaled, surging demand for critical minerals that suffer from supply-side bottlenecks, and the rising cost of capital required to fund capital-intensive green infrastructure.
The renewable energy inflation we are seeing today is fundamentally different from the oil shocks of the 1970s. When OPEC restricted crude, the price spiked, triggering a race to drill new wells in the North Sea and Alaska. Supply eventually met demand. But you cannot simply drill for processed rare earths. The bottleneck is not extraction; it is refinement. Building a sophisticated processing facility for battery-grade lithium hydroxide requires specialised chemical engineering expertise that the West largely offshored three decades ago.
Furthermore, the transition is inherently capital-intensive upfront. A gas plant is cheap to build but expensive to run. A wind farm is fiercely expensive to build but virtually free to run. Therefore, renewable energy economics are acutely sensitive to interest rates. When central banks hiked rates to combat post-pandemic inflation, they fundamentally damaged the unit economics of the energy transition. The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for offshore wind rose by nearly 30 percent in a single year across key European markets. We are trying to rebuild the global industrial base precisely when money is no longer free.
Implications & Second-Order Effects: The Divided Global Grid
The downstream consequences of these geopolitical energy risks will reshape global capital flows. The most immediate casualty is the developing world.
If Western utilities are struggling to finance green infrastructure at current interest rates, emerging markets face an impossible task. Capital is retreating to safe harbours. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has highlighted that the sovereign risk premiums attached to emerging market green bonds are severely limiting the capital available for their energy transitions. We are building a two-tier global energy system. The rich world will absorb the greenflation impact, subsidising expensive, locally processed supply chains to meet climate targets. The developing world, priced out of Western technology and locked out of capital markets, will simply burn more coal.
For policymakers in Washington and Brussels, the trilemma is becoming acute. They want clean energy, they want cheap energy, and they want secure energy independent of China. They can have two. If they want clean and secure energy, it will be expensive. If they want clean and cheap energy, they must buy it from China, sacrificing security.
Corporate boards are already adapting to this reality. Manufacturers are quietly shifting from “just-in-time” supply chains to “just-in-case” inventory hoarding, particularly for critical mineral supply chains. This stockpiling behaviour ironically exacerbates the very shortages they fear, driving spot prices higher. It’s a classic macroeconomic trap.
Competing Perspectives: The Deflationary Force of Technology
The picture is more complicated, however, when looking at the pure technological curve. Technological optimists argue that greenflation is a transitory illusion. They point to Wright’s Law—the principle that for every cumulative doubling of production, the cost of a technology falls by a constant percentage.
This camp notes that while raw material costs have spiked, engineering efficiencies continue to compound. Solar panel prices, for instance, crashed to record lows in early 2024. According to BloombergNEF, global investment in the low-carbon energy transition surged past $1.7 trillion recently, largely driven by the sheer scale of Chinese manufacturing overcapacity.
The argument here is that human ingenuity always outpaces resource scarcity. If cobalt becomes too expensive, battery chemists engineer it out, pivoting to lithium iron phosphate (LFP) chemistries. If copper is short, grid operators will switch to aluminium lines. From this perspective, geopolitical bottlenecks simply provide the price signal required to force innovation. The current inflation is merely friction—the sound of a 20th-century energy grid grinding its gears as it shifts into a 21st-century architecture.
The New Cartel
That said, engineering out a mineral takes years; political mandates demand results in quarters. We are trapped in the lag between the death of the old system and the maturation of the new one.
The Western world spent the latter half of the 20th century trying to escape the geopolitical gravity of the Middle East, frustrated by the volatile whims of petrostates. In our rush to decarbonise, we have inadvertently traded one vulnerability for another. We have swapped our reliance on those who pump oil for a deeper dependence on those who mine and refine critical minerals. The transition to clean energy was supposed to free us from geopolitics. Instead, it just redrew the map.
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Analysis
China Economy 2026: Export Growth Masks Manufacturing Overcapacity
China’s exports have been the good-news story in an otherwise mixed economic picture. They’re not just holding up; through the first four months of 2026 they were running about 14% to 15% above the same period a year earlier, according to figures cited by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission and Vanguard’s economic outlook. That’s the kind of number that would normally signal a healthy economy. The complication is what’s happening underneath it.
A growth model showing its age
Manufacturing capacity utilization fell to 73.9% in early 2026 — near a decade low outside of the pandemic shutdowns, per the Commission’s bulletin. That’s the tell. China is producing and shipping more, but a growing share of its industrial base is running under capacity, which points to a structural mismatch: the country’s manufacturing engine has outgrown both its domestic consumption and, increasingly, what the rest of the world is willing to absorb without pushback.
Goldman Sachs Research, in a report cited by Goldman Sachs’ own analysis, forecasts 4.8% real GDP growth for 2026 — above consensus expectations of 4.5% — driven substantially by continued export strength and a softening drag from the property downturn. But that same report flags the labor market as a genuine weak spot: hiring, measured across a weighted average of PMI employment sub-indexes, is at its most depressed level in a decade outside Covid, and urban nominal wage growth slowed to just 3.8% year-on-year in Q3 2025.
Why Beijing isn’t reaching for stimulus
Given the export strength, one might expect policymakers to feel less urgency about consumption-side stimulus. That’s roughly what’s happening — and it’s a deliberate choice, not an oversight. Xi Jinping’s government remains committed to dominating high-value manufacturing, which means comprehensive fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers remains unlikely even as domestic demand stays soft, according to the Commission’s bulletin.
The People’s Bank of China is expected to hold its policy rate steady through the rest of the year, preferring targeted structural tools over a broad-based rate cut, per Vanguard’s forecast. That’s a notably cautious stance given how weak the property sector remains — property investment indicators are down 50% to 80% from their 2020–21 peaks, and a “meaningful domestic-demand turnaround remains elusive,” in Vanguard’s own words.
The regulatory push to keep capital at home
Two moves by Chinese regulators in mid-2026 point to where Beijing’s real priority sits: keeping household savings and private capital funneled toward domestic industrial policy rather than flowing overseas. New rules taking effect July 1 restrict outbound investment that could be used to export restricted technology or expertise under the guise of ordinary capital flows, with violations carrying fines, visa restrictions and industry blacklisting, according to the Commission’s bulletin. The regulations follow Beijing’s move to block the founders of AI firm Manus from completing a sale to Meta, even after the company had relocated its headquarters from China to Singapore — a signal that Beijing is willing to reach across borders to keep promising tech assets tethered to domestic or Hong Kong listings.
The currency and trade angle
Goldman’s team makes an out-of-consensus call worth flagging: it expects China’s current account surplus to rise to 4.2% of GDP in 2026, up from 3.6% in 2025, while the broader analyst consensus surveyed by Bloomberg expects a decline to 2.5%. The divergence comes down to export resilience — falling export prices are making Chinese goods more competitive even as the yuan is expected to appreciate slightly, with export-price inflation in dollar terms forecast to turn positive, rising to 0.7% from -2.7% the prior year.
The bottom line
China’s economy in 2026 is a study in contrasts: robust headline export growth sitting on top of underutilized factories, a weak labor market, and a property sector still in its fifth year of decline. The World Bank’s own baseline, published in its country program materials, projects growth moderating toward 4.0% by 2026 — a more conservative read than Goldman’s. Either way, the consensus across forecasters is the same: exports are carrying more of China’s growth than is healthy for the long run, and Beijing’s policy choices this year suggest it’s betting on technological dominance to eventually solve the demand problem, rather than opening the stimulus taps to solve it directly.
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Analysis
Pakistan Circular Debt Crisis 2026: IMF Deadline Missed, Rs 3.44 Trillion
There’s a number that keeps showing up in every conversation about Pakistan’s economy, and it keeps getting bigger: circular debt. As of early July 2026, the gas sector’s share of that debt alone has topped Rs 3.44 trillion, and Islamabad has missed a deadline the IMF set for tariff reforms meant to arrest the slide, according to Dawn.
What circular debt actually is, and why it won’t go away
Circular debt is the chain of unpaid obligations that builds up when the price consumers pay for electricity or gas doesn’t cover what it actually costs to produce and deliver it. Someone in the chain — a power producer, a gas utility, a state-owned enterprise — ends up carrying an IOU, and that IOU gets passed down the line. Earlier this year, IMF officials pressed Pakistan on exactly this dynamic, questioning the government’s plan to zero out gas-sector circular debt, according to Aaj English. At the time, officials said around Rs 150 billion remained payable to companies including Oil and Gas Development Company Limited and Pakistan Petroleum Limited.
Islamabad’s proposed fix included a Rs 5-per-unit levy on gas, dividends from state-owned companies redirected toward debt reduction, and the sale of 35 LNG cargoes annually on the international market. The IMF, per that same reporting, raised pointed questions about whether the plan was actually viable.
The commitments Pakistan has already made
Under its Extended Fund Facility, Pakistan has committed to capping circular debt growth at Rs 300 billion for FY2027 and cutting power-sector subsidies from 0.7% of GDP to 0.6%, according to details reported by ProPakistani. The government has also shifted Nepra’s annual tariff-rebasing cycle from July to January, and Ogra now revises gas tariffs twice a year instead of once.
Structurally, some of this is working. The IMF’s own review in May 2026 credited Pakistan with a primary fiscal surplus of 1.6% of GDP for FY26, broadly in line with program targets, and noted gross reserves had climbed to $16 billion by end-December, up from $14.5 billion six months earlier, according to the IMF’s own press release. That progress unlocked roughly $1.1 billion under the EFF and $220 million under a parallel climate-resilience facility, bringing total disbursements under the two arrangements to about $4.8 billion.
Where the fault lines actually are
The uncomfortable part of this story, laid out by commentary reported in The Hans India, is that revenue targets get IMF scrutiny with great precision, while structural reform of loss-making public enterprises — Pakistan International Airlines and Pakistan Steel Mills chief among them — moves far more slowly. Those enterprises’ losses are absorbed by the national exchequer through subsidies, guarantees, and debt restructuring year after year, and privatization plans keep slipping because the political cost of confronting them is high.
Distribution company inefficiency compounds the problem. In FY25, Discos posted Rs 265 billion in losses, an improvement on FY24’s Rs 276 billion but still a substantial drag, according to Geo News, with Quetta, Peshawar and Hyderabad among the worst-performing utilities.
What happens if the pattern holds
Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio sits between 70% and 80% as of 2026, according to Wikipedia’s economic summary, with debt servicing occasionally consuming two-thirds of government spending. That’s the backdrop against which every circular-debt conversation happens: there is very little fiscal room left to absorb another missed deadline.
The missed gas tariff deadline doesn’t automatically trigger a program breakdown — Pakistan has weathered similar friction points before during its current EFF arrangement. But with the IMF’s own documentation showing persistent concern about the credibility of debt-reduction plans, and with global energy prices still elevated in the aftermath of the Iran war, the margin for further slippage is thin. The next review will likely hinge less on the rhetoric around reform and more on whether the Rs 5 levy and LNG cargo sales actually show up in the numbers.
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Analysis
Malaysia Bets Its 2026 on “Execution” — And the Semiconductor Upcycle Is Doing the Heavy Lifting
Malaysia’s government has declared 2026 a year of “execution” and “discipline” as the Anwar Ibrahim administration races to deliver on the 13th Malaysia Plan (RMK13) ahead of elections that could come as early as February 2028, according to Fortune’s interview with economy minister Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir.
A Strong Base to Build From
Malaysia’s economy grew 4.9% in 2025 following 5.1% growth the year before, with unemployment falling to 2.9% — the lowest in a decade — and the ringgit trading at its strongest level in five years. HSBC’s ASEAN economist Yun Liu forecasts 4.6% growth for 2026, citing strength in electrical equipment manufacturing, tourism, and sound government policy, while Nomura economists have projected an even more bullish 5.2%, pointing to infrastructure spending under RMK13.
The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) projects growth moderating slightly to 4.6% from an estimated 4.9% in 2025, describing Malaysia’s performance as reflecting its “entrenched position in global semiconductor and electronics value chains” and the broader global tech upcycle, according to AMRO’s assessment of Malaysia’s investment upcycle.
Navigating Washington Without Picking Sides
Malaysia’s trade relationship with the US has been turbulent. Washington imposed 25% tariffs on Malaysian goods in April 2025, rattling the country’s export-led economy, before a deal reduced US duties to 19% in exchange for Malaysia lowering tariffs on select American products, with exemptions carved out for aviation components and electrical equipment. Malaysia’s trade hit a record high of more than 3 trillion ringgit (roughly $780 billion) last year despite the friction.
Deputy finance minister Liew Chin Tong has framed Malaysia’s positioning explicitly around neutrality: the country is “not China, not the US,” a stance he argues gives Malaysia a strategic advantage in both geopolitical and supply-chain terms, according to Fortune’s reporting from the Forum Ekonomi Malaysia summit.
Capital Is Flowing In — From Everywhere
Malaysia recorded 22.8 billion ringgit (about $5.8 billion) in foreign direct investment in the first quarter of 2026, a 6.0% year-on-year increase, moderating from the prior quarter’s 48.7% surge. Inflows into information and communication technology services remained particularly strong, with China, Hong Kong, and Singapore serving as the primary capital sources, according to McKinsey’s Southeast Asia quarterly economic review. Bank Negara Malaysia has held its policy rate steady following a pre-emptive 25 basis-point cut in July 2025, with headline inflation projected to average just 2.0% in 2026.
The Long Game: Semiconductors, Rare Earths, and Nuclear Power
Beyond RMK13’s near-term targets, Malaysian officials are positioning the country’s industrial strategy around decades, not years. Minister Akmal has reiterated commitments to eliminate coal use by 2044 and reach net zero by 2050, while confirming Malaysia is actively “exploring the potential” of nuclear power to meet the energy demands of its expanding data-center and semiconductor sectors. AMRO’s structural policy guidance urges Malaysia to develop domestic semiconductor and rare-earth capabilities as a hedge against ongoing US-China “geoeconomic fracturing,” positioning the country as a trusted neutral hub for global manufacturers diversifying away from concentrated exposure to either superpower.
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