Connect with us

Analysis

Indonesia’s 150-Million-Barrel Russian Oil Deal Explained

Published

on

Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, has committed to importing up to 150 million barrels of Russian crude oil through the end of 2026, a deal that goes well beyond emergency crisis management and increasingly resembles a deliberate, multi-year repositioning of the country’s energy security architecture away from a Middle East supply base that the Strait of Hormuz conflict has exposed as dangerously concentrated.

The agreement, finalized after President Prabowo Subianto‘s April visit to Moscow for direct talks with President Vladimir Putin, involves Russia supplying 100 million barrels of oil at a preferential price, with a further 50 million barrels available if Indonesia’s needs escalate, according to reporting from The Moscow Times. Hashim Djojohadikusumo, the president’s brother and a senior economic adviser, confirmed Indonesia has also secured Russian government commitment to store up to 150 million barrels domestically as a buffer against future volatility.

Why Indonesia Cannot Wait Out the Crisis

Indonesia’s exposure to Middle East supply disruption is structural rather than incidental. The country produces roughly 577,000 barrels of crude per day, according to May 2026 figures — well below the government’s 610,000 barrel target and a fraction of the roughly 1.5 million barrels per day the country produced in the 1990s, before mature field decline eroded domestic output, according to analysis published by OilPrice.com. Against consumption running near 1.6 million barrels per day, Indonesia faces a persistent daily supply deficit approaching one million barrels, forcing continuous reliance on imports for both crude and refined products.

Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Bahlil Lahadalia has been explicit about the scale of this dependence, noting Indonesia requires roughly 300 million barrels of imported crude annually while holding strategic reserves sufficient for only 21 to 23 days of consumption — a dangerously thin buffer for an economy of Indonesia’s size, according to reporting cited by OilPrice.com’s earlier coverage. Roughly 20-25% of Indonesia’s crude imports have historically transited the Strait of Hormuz, a route the ongoing conflict has rendered unreliable at precisely the moment global oil markets can least absorb additional supply shocks.

From Emergency Waiver to Structural Partnership

The diplomatic and commercial mechanics enabling this shift trace back to a US sanctions waiver for Russian crude issued on March 12, 2026 — a decision that, according to OilPrice.com’s analysis, effectively acknowledged that Asia could not balance its oil market without Russian barrels during a major Middle Eastern supply disruption. Successive extensions of that waiver have since encouraged regional buyers to treat Russian crude not merely as emergency supply, but as a legitimate, ongoing tool of energy security — a reframing with significant implications for how Asian governments approach sanctioned commodities going forward.

Indonesia’s pivot did not emerge in isolation. Rystad Energy analyst Prateek Panday characterized the country’s strategy as grounded in supply economics, refinery compatibility, and medium-term energy security logic rather than opportunistic crisis response, a framing echoed by analysts at Indonesia’s own Strategic and Economics Action Institution, who described the approach as a deliberate effort to reduce exposure to a single, highly escalation-sensitive supply cluster. Indonesia became a full BRICS member in January 2025 and subsequently signed a free-trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, diplomatic groundwork that made the current energy partnership commercially and politically easier to execute than it would have been even eighteen months earlier.

Indonesia is far from alone in this recalibration. The Philippines began importing Russian crude under the same US waiver in March 2026, with state oil company Petron purchasing 2.5 million barrels in its first such deal since 2021 and receiving three cargoes across March and May. Vietnam has reportedly held its own talks with Moscow since March regarding a potential start to Russian oil imports — suggesting a broader regional realignment is underway across Southeast Asia rather than an isolated Indonesian policy choice.

Refinery Compatibility Remains the Critical Variable

Indonesia’s state oil company Pertamina has signaled openness to the deepening relationship while flagging a genuine technical constraint: compatibility between Russian crude grades and Pertamina’s existing refinery configuration. Pertamina spokesperson Fadjar Djoko Santoso (“Baron”) confirmed the company would conduct further studies on processing Russian crude, noting that refinery modernization efforts are expected to eventually give Pertamina’s facilities the flexibility to handle a broader range of crude types, according to reporting from the New Straits Times.

Early shipments offer a preview of the compatibility challenge. Only two vessels carrying Russian crude reached Indonesia in the six months preceding the Moscow summit, each transporting roughly 700,000 barrels of Sakhalin Blend — a light, sweet crude with an API gravity around 45 degrees and low sulfur content that makes it well suited to gasoline-oriented refining, according to OilPrice.com’s analysis. Scaling from two modest cargoes to a 150-million-barrel annual commitment will require substantially more logistics infrastructure, refinery testing, and shipping capacity than the current relationship has yet demonstrated.

Beyond Oil: A Broader Energy Alignment With Moscow

The Prabowo-Putin summit extended well beyond crude oil supply. Indonesia is separately exploring the development of floating nuclear power plants in partnership with Russian state nuclear company Rosatom, with CEO Alexey Likhachev describing commercial discussions following what he characterized as strong Indonesian interest in nuclear technology, according to reporting from Tempo. Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono has framed nuclear cooperation with Russia as part of a broader push toward energy self-sufficiency within three years, while stressing that any partnership must prioritize technology transfer and adherence to international safety standards.

Indonesia is also negotiating liquefied petroleum gas imports from Russia to address a widening domestic supply gap — LPG demand is projected to reach 10 million tons in 2026 against domestic production capacity of just 1.6 million tons, according to Minister Lahadalia, a gap previously filled predominantly by US and Middle Eastern suppliers whose reliability the current conflict has called into question.

What This Means for Global Energy Diplomacy

Indonesia’s pivot illustrates a broader pattern reshaping global energy trade in 2026: sanctions architecture designed around a binary compliant-versus-non-compliant framework is proving less durable when a major regional supply disruption forces large importing economies to weigh energy security against geopolitical alignment. What began as an exceptional, waiver-dependent response to the Middle East crisis is increasingly hardening into formal government-to-government infrastructure — storage agreements, refinery studies, and nuclear cooperation — that will likely persist well beyond whatever timeline the underlying Strait of Hormuz disruption eventually follows.


Discover more from The Economy

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Analysis

Malaysia’s Economy Grew 6% in Q2, Beating Forecasts on Record Trade Surplus

Published

on

Malaysia delivered one of the standout growth surprises among Southeast Asian economies this year, with confirmed second-quarter GDP data showing the economy accelerated to 6% — comfortably ahead of consensus and its own first-quarter pace — powered by a record trade surplus and a semiconductor and AI-hardware export boom that has become the defining theme of the region’s 2026 growth story.

Growth Accelerates, Beating Consensus

Bank Negara Malaysia confirmed that the Malaysian economy grew 6% in the second quarter of 2026, up from 5.4% in the first quarter, driven by continued domestic demand and robust exports. The print beat consensus estimates of 5.8%, a margin significant enough to move currency markets on the announcement.

On the external side, exports accelerated on continued strength in electrical and electronics products and sustained expansion in services, alongside a rebound in liquefied natural gas exports and non-E&E manufacturing products. Household spending was supported by steady income growth and ongoing policy support, while investment growth was underpinned by continued spending on structures, machinery and equipment.

A Record Trade Surplus

The external numbers are, if anything, even more striking than the growth print. Malaysia’s exports surged 27.5% in the first half of 2026 while imports rose 16.9%, widening the trade surplus to RM147.1 billion from RM56.6 billion a year earlier. First-half trade rose 22.4% to a record RM1.8 trillion, according to separate commentary citing government data — a scale of expansion that puts Malaysia among the fastest-growing trade economies in Asia this year.

Kenanga Investment Bank attributed the resilience directly to the AI investment cycle, noting that Malaysia’s exposure to softer global demand is cushioned by the electrical and electronics and AI upcycle, particularly semiconductors, servers, and data-centre infrastructure. The bank added that hyperscaler capital expenditure and inventory normalisation across advanced economies should keep Malaysia’s export demand supported through the rest of 2026.

What This Means for the Ringgit

Currency strategists moved quickly to recalibrate their near-term ringgit forecasts on the data. One analyst told Bernama the ringgit is expected to trade around RM4.07 to RM4.08 with an upside bias in the immediate aftermath of the GDP release, while a separate analysis projected the ringgit trading within a 3.90-4.20 range against the US dollar through the second half of 2026, underpinned by Bank Negara Malaysia’s decision to hold its Overnight Policy Rate steady at 2.75%.

Juwai IQI global chief economist Shan Saeed argued the ringgit’s case rests less on raw momentum and more on policy credibility and external ballast — Bank Negara’s consistency in balancing price stability, domestic growth, and orderly financial conditions without defending an explicit exchange-rate target.

That said, the ringgit’s year-to-date performance has been more modest than the trade data alone might suggest: on a year-to-date basis through mid-August, the ringgit was down about 0.9% against the US dollar, with its nominal effective exchange rate down roughly 1%, reflecting the broader tug-of-war between Malaysia’s strong fundamentals and global factors including shifting US monetary policy expectations and Middle East-linked risk aversion.

Current Account Set to Stay Comfortably in Surplus

Looking further ahead, Kenanga IB projects Malaysia’s current account surplus will remain firm at 2.1% of GDP in 2026, with tourism and digital-infrastructure spending expected to lift services exports even as costlier energy and softer global demand crimp some parts of world trade. The bank cautioned that a firmer ringgit could nudge imports higher and that energy costs remain a “swing factor,” but expects the external balance to stay comfortably positive regardless.

Inflation Pervasiveness on the Rise

Not every indicator in the release was unambiguously positive. Inflation pervasiveness — the share of CPI items registering monthly price increases — rose to 45.5% in the second quarter from 38.3% in the first, close to its historical average of 45.6%, driven mainly by a sharp increase in April before moderating in May and June. That pattern suggests price pressures broadened out even as they moderated somewhat by quarter-end — a dynamic the central bank will need to watch closely alongside its currently steady policy stance.

Key Takeaways

  • Malaysia’s economy grew 6% in Q2 2026, up from 5.4% in Q1 and beating the 5.8% consensus estimate.
  • Exports surged 27.5% in H1 2026, pushing the trade surplus to a record RM147.1 billion and H1 trade to RM1.8 trillion.
  • The AI-hardware and semiconductor export cycle, alongside a rebound in LNG shipments, is the key driver behind Malaysia’s outperformance.
  • The ringgit is expected to trade in a 3.90-4.20 range against the US dollar through 2H26, supported by Bank Negara Malaysia’s steady policy stance.
  • Inflation pervasiveness rose to 45.5% in Q2, a metric worth watching even as headline growth impresses.

Frequently Asked Questions

How fast did Malaysia’s economy grow in Q2 2026? Malaysia’s GDP grew 6% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, up from 5.4% in the first quarter and above the 5.8% consensus forecast.

What is driving Malaysia’s trade surplus to record levels? A 27.5% surge in exports in the first half of 2026 — led by electrical and electronics products, semiconductors, and a rebound in LNG shipments — pushed the trade surplus to a record RM147.1 billion.

What is the ringgit’s outlook for the rest of 2026? Analysts expect the ringgit to trade within a 3.90-4.20 range against the US dollar through the second half of 2026, supported by Malaysia’s strong export performance and Bank Negara Malaysia’s steady policy rate.


Discover more from The Economy

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Continue Reading

Analysis

UAE Demands Hormuz Reopening After 15 ADNOC Vessels Attacked Since War Began

Published

on

The human and commercial toll of the conflict choking the Strait of Hormuz came into sharp focus this month as the UAE’s state oil company confirmed a mounting tally of attacks on its shipping fleet — and Emirati officials took their case for reopening the waterway to the international stage in Jaipur.

Fifteen Vessels, One Fatality, Twenty Injuries

The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company said it “continues to be significantly impacted by unprovoked attacks on its assets and employees,” disclosing that 15 of its vessels have been attacked by missiles and drones while transiting the Strait of Hormuz since the conflict began, including three vessels in a single week. The company said the attacks have resulted in one fatality and 20 injuries among crew members.

The pattern has escalated sharply in recent days. On the evening of August 13, two ADNOC vessels were attacked while transiting the strait, with no injuries reported, according to the UAE’s state news agency WAM. That followed an incident days earlier in which the UAE accused Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps of striking an ADNOC tanker with a missile, an act Abu Dhabi’s foreign ministry labelled “piracy” and a “direct threat to the stability of the region, its peoples, and the global energy supply”.

Diplomatic adviser to the UAE president Anwar Gargash said Abu Dhabi would defend its sovereignty and interests while continuing to prioritise diplomatic options, a balancing act between deterrence and de-escalation that has defined the UAE’s posture throughout the conflict.

Taking the Case to BRICS

The UAE elevated its concerns onto a multilateral stage at the 2026 BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting in Jaipur, India. Minister of Foreign Trade Dr Thani Al Zeyoudi underscored the UAE’s grave concerns over Iran’s attacks on commercial shipping and reiterated the call for the strait’s immediate and unconditional reopening, invoking the protection of freedom of navigation under international law. Notably, trade ministers at the summit were unable to reach consensus on a joint declaration — a sign of how divisive the Iran conflict has become even within a bloc that includes Russia and China, both of which maintain complex relationships with Tehran.

Regional solidarity has been swift and vocal. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Secretary-General Jassim Mohammed al-Budaiwi condemned one of the recent strikes as a “dangerous and unacceptable escalation”, while Qatar separately rejected the use of the strait as a “bargaining chip.”

Why the Strait Still Matters

About a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passed through the Strait of Hormuz before the conflict began, a chokepoint for a large share of the world’s seaborne oil. Since the outbreak of the US-Israeli war with Iran on February 28, shipping through the corridor has been repeatedly disrupted, and freight and insurance costs for tankers transiting the route have climbed accordingly.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations agency has also logged separate incidents, including a bulk carrier struck by an unknown projectile in the strait — a reminder that ADNOC’s fleet, while the most visible target given the UAE’s high public profile in the dispute, is not the only shipping affected.

The Economic Stakes for Abu Dhabi and Dubai

The disruption arrives at an inconvenient moment for the UAE, whose non-oil economy has otherwise been a standout performer this year. Dubai’s preliminary Economic Survey 2026 showed GDP rising to roughly $264.7 billion in 2025, with employment reaching 4.69 million, while forecasters including Emirates NBD have projected Dubai’s economy will expand 4.5% in 2026, powered by tourism, population growth, and private-sector investment.

But the oil side of the ledger tells a more troubled story. Economists at FocusEconomics have noted that UAE crude output fell by about a third annually during the worst months of the Hormuz disruption, before partially rebounding on a temporary US-Iran truce. Continued attacks on the strait threaten to reopen that wound just as the non-oil economy has been carrying growth largely on its own.

What Comes Next

With a seventh round of separate US-mediated diplomacy already underway on the Israel-Hezbollah front and no resolution yet in sight on Hormuz specifically, the UAE finds itself managing a war economy on two fronts: absorbing direct attacks on its national oil champion while its diplomats work multilateral channels — from BRICS to the GCC — to build pressure for a reopening that has so far proven elusive.

Key Takeaways

  • ADNOC reports 15 vessels attacked since the conflict began, with one crew fatality and 20 injuries.
  • The UAE raised the issue at the 2026 BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting in Jaipur, calling for the strait’s immediate, unconditional reopening.
  • Trade ministers failed to reach consensus on a joint BRICS declaration, reflecting divisions over the Iran conflict.
  • About a fifth of global seaborne oil and LNG normally transits the strait, and continued attacks threaten to reverse UAE oil-output gains made during a temporary truce.

Frequently Asked Questions

How many ADNOC vessels have been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz? ADNOC has reported 15 vessels attacked by missiles and drones since the start of the conflict, resulting in one fatality and 20 injuries among crew members.

What did the UAE ask for at the BRICS summit? UAE Minister of Foreign Trade Dr Thani Al Zeyoudi called for the immediate and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and reaffirmed the need to protect freedom of navigation under international law.

How important is the Strait of Hormuz to global oil supply? Before the conflict, roughly a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas passed through the strait, making it one of the most critical chokepoints in global energy trade.


Discover more from The Economy

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Continue Reading

Analysis

Canada Faces an August 19 Tariff Cliff as CUSMA’s Future Hangs in the Balance

Published

on

Canada is racing against a hard deadline. On August 19, 2026, a fresh round of 50% US tariffs on nearly $20 billion of Canadian goods is scheduled to take effect — and unlike almost every other tariff Washington has imposed this year, this one carries no exemption for goods that comply with the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement, the trade pact that has underpinned North American commerce for years.

What’s About to Change

The new tariffs apply across three separate lists of Canadian imports: dairy products including milk, cream and whey; a broad “Motor Vehicles” category that despite its name covers electronics, furniture, building materials, plastics, clothing, footwear, machinery, cosmetics and agricultural goods; and other targeted sectors. In total, the list touches well over a dozen distinct Canadian industries, from honey and plywood to hyacinth bulbs — products that collectively make up about five percent of Canada’s exports to the United States.

Canada’s Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc and chief negotiator Janice Charette have been working through the weekend in Washington, meeting repeatedly with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer as officials on both sides try to close a gap that reportedly remained substantial as of late last week. Canadian negotiators have so far rejected Washington’s latest offer, judging the proposed tariff reductions insufficient to meet Ottawa’s demands.

The Stakes for CUSMA Itself

This deadline is not just another tariff skirmish — it cuts to the credibility of CUSMA as an institution. At the pact’s mandated 2026 joint review, the United States declined to extend the agreement in its current form, though USTR has stated the pact remains formally in force while the three governments continue negotiating. Under CUSMA’s review structure, the absence of a three-country extension pushes the parties into a cycle of annual reviews, with the agreement technically able to continue until 2036 unless terminated earlier.

The economic stakes of a genuine breakdown are significant. A recent analysis modelled three scenarios — status quo, CUSMA breakdown, and successful renegotiation — and found that a full breakdown would cost roughly 214,000 American jobs and 102,000 Canadian jobs relative to the status quo. Conversely, a successful renegotiation could add 137,000 US jobs and 98,000 Canadian jobs. That asymmetry — bigger job losses in the US under a breakdown scenario than gains for Canada under renegotiation — illustrates just how intertwined the two economies remain more than three decades after the original NAFTA was signed.

Businesses Are Betting on a Deal

Despite the looming deadline, Canadian firms have largely avoided the kind of front-loaded shipping rush that typically precedes a tariff implementation date. Industry groups report that companies are opting to wait and see rather than rushing shipments across the border to beat the deadline, a sign that many exporters are betting Washington will ultimately soften its position, as it has at several points earlier in the year.

That confidence is not universal. Analysts at the Atlantic Council have characterised the broader pattern differently, describing Washington’s approach as rebuilding tariffs “brick by strong brick” through more durable, court-tested legal authorities after the US Supreme Court struck down the earlier “Liberation Day” tariff regime in February. One industry source went further, suggesting the country is “at the end of the beginning” of the Trump tariff agenda, with large portions of the policy expected to be fully entrenched by the end of summer.

Carney’s Position

Prime Minister Mark Carney has kept Canada’s response deliberately ambiguous, declining to rule out retaliation after a four-hour meeting with provincial premiers in Charlottetown in late July, stating that “everything is on the table” while adding that responding pre-emptively would be counterproductive. Provincial leaders themselves remain split on how forcefully to push back, reflecting the uneven exposure different provinces face to the specific goods targeted by the new tariff lists.

Separately, a business-confidence survey found that 73% of member firms expect a failure to renew CUSMA to weaken their overall confidence and outlook, regardless of whether the August 19 tariffs specifically hit their sector — a sign that the uncertainty itself, not just the tariffs, is already dampening investment decisions.

Key Takeaways

  • A new 50% US tariff on nearly $20 billion of Canadian goods takes effect August 19, 2026, with no CUSMA exemption.
  • Canadian and US negotiators worked through the weekend in Washington but had not closed the gap as of Friday.
  • A modelled CUSMA breakdown scenario would cost roughly 214,000 US and 102,000 Canadian jobs versus the status quo.
  • Canadian businesses have largely avoided pre-deadline shipping surges, betting Washington will soften its stance.
  • PM Mark Carney has kept retaliation “on the table” without committing to a specific response.

Frequently Asked Questions

What happens on August 19, 2026 for Canada-US trade? A new 50% US tariff takes effect on nearly $20 billion of Canadian goods across dairy, electronics, furniture, building materials and other sectors, with no exemption for CUSMA-compliant products.

Is CUSMA ending? No. CUSMA remains formally in force. The US declined to extend it in its current form at the 2026 review, which triggers a cycle of annual reviews rather than an automatic termination.

How many jobs are at risk if CUSMA breaks down? One modelled scenario projects roughly 214,000 US job losses and 102,000 Canadian job losses if CUSMA were to fully break down, compared with the status quo.


Discover more from The Economy

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Continue Reading
Advertisement
Advertisement

Trending

Copyright © 2026 The Economy, Inc . All rights reserved .

Discover more from The Economy

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading