As foreign central banks dump $90 billion in US Treasuries and Brent crude convulses near $120, Islamabad’s unlikely role as peacebroker is paying an unexpected dividend on the trading floor.

There is a peculiar kind of optimism that only emerges in the eye of a hurricane. Wednesday morning at the Pakistan Stock Exchange felt exactly like that. At 12:05 p.m., the benchmark KSE-100 Index stood at 156,204.89 — having gained 7,461.58 points, or 5.02%, from the previous close — a move so violent that it triggered a mandatory market halt, suspending all equity-based trading under PSX circuit-breaker rules. ProPakistani The previous session had already closed higher. Tuesday’s KSE-100 session had ended at 148,743.32, up 1,900.34 points, as investors began pricing in whispers of a ceasefire from Washington. Profit by Pakistan Today By Wednesday noon, those whispers had become a roar.

This is not, however, a story only about Karachi. It is a story about a world economy convulsing under the weight of a war in the Persian Gulf, a $30 trillion US Treasury market being quietly liquidated by desperate central banks, and — most improbably — Pakistan sitting at the centre of the most consequential diplomatic negotiation of 2026. The KSE-100’s surge is at once a relief rally, a geopolitical signal, and a referendum on how tightly Pakistan’s financial fate is now knotted to its new role as peacebroker between Washington and Tehran.

Why Karachi Erupted: The Anatomy of a 5% Day

Buying momentum on Wednesday was broad-based, with strong activity across automobile assemblers, cement, commercial banks, fertiliser, oil and gas exploration, oil marketing companies, and power generation firms. Major index-heavyweights — HBL, MCB, MEBL, UBL, MARI, OGDC, PPL, POL, PSO, HUBCO, and ARL — all traded firmly in the green, reflecting renewed investor confidence amid easing geopolitical risk. ProPakistani

The rally follows emerging hopes of de-escalation in the Iran war after US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio signalled that the conflict could end soon, with Washington indicating potential direct talks with Tehran’s leadership and a winding down of hostilities even without a formal deal. Profit by Pakistan Today Trump, speaking from the White House on Tuesday, said the US exit could come “within two weeks, maybe two or three.”

The market context matters enormously here. The rebound follows a brutal first-quarter correction, during which the Pakistan Stock Exchange benchmark declined around 15% amid geopolitical uncertainty and relentless selling pressure. Profit by Pakistan Today That selloff was not irrational. Pakistan’s economy is structurally exposed to Middle East energy prices — the country imports the overwhelming majority of its oil and LNG, and any sustained spike in Brent crude flows directly into inflation, the current account deficit, and State Bank of Pakistan reserves. When the war began on February 28, the PSX reacted the way a patient loses colour when told bad news: quickly, and all at once.

Wednesday’s reversal tells a different story. It tells you that the market had been pricing in far worse than what may now materialise. It tells you that institutional and retail buyers in Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad are not just trading geopolitics abstractly — they are trading Pakistan’s specific role in ending this crisis.

The $90 Billion Treasury Liquidation: A Slow-Motion Earthquake Under Bond Markets

While traders in Karachi were celebrating, bond desks in New York, London, and Tokyo were navigating something far more structurally significant. New York Fed custody data shows that since the week before the conflict broke out — the week of February 25 — foreign monetary authorities have been net sellers of US Treasuries for five consecutive weeks, with the total sell-off exceeding $90 billion, and holdings falling to the lowest level since 2012. All-Weather Media

The Financial Times, citing Federal Reserve data, confirmed that the value of Treasuries held in custody at the New York Fed by official institutions — a group largely made up of central banks but also including governments and international institutions — has dropped by $82 billion since February 25 to $2.7 trillion. X

The mechanics driving this sell-off are not mysterious, even if their consequences are underappreciated. The direct cause of this round of selling is the urgent need for dollar liquidity among countries — from foreign exchange market intervention to paying energy import bills and financing defense spending, the surge in demand for dollars is forcing foreign central banks to liquidate their most liquid dollar assets: US Treasuries. Futu News

The single most striking data point in the disaggregated country-level picture is Turkey’s. Official figures show that since February 27 — the day before the US attacked Iran — Turkey’s central bank sold about $22 billion in foreign government bonds from its reserves, mainly US Treasuries. Turkey also sold or swapped about 58 tons of gold valued at over $8 billion. All-Weather Media

Brad Setser, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and arguably the world’s foremost tracker of sovereign reserve flows, has been clear about who else is in the queue. Setser stated that “many countries are unwilling to let their currencies depreciate further, as this would drive up oil prices denominated in local currencies — either implying more fiscal subsidies or increasing the burden on people’s daily lives. Therefore, many countries have generally decided to intervene in the foreign exchange market to try to limit the depreciation of their currencies.” Futu News India and Thailand, both large oil importers, have also seen foreign reserve drawdowns since the war began, though it remains unclear whether those represent outright Treasury sales or dollar deposit liquidations.

Bank of America US rates strategist Meghan Swiber has been unambiguous: the foreign official sector is selling US Treasuries, and the selling “confirms a more macro narrative — that foreign reserve managers and official accounts are diversifying away from US Treasuries.” All-Weather Media

The structural backdrop is equally sobering. A recent Morgan Stanley report shows the proportion of US Treasuries held by foreign investors has dropped to its lowest since 1997, with the share of coupon-bearing Treasuries held by foreign investors falling steadily since the 2008 peak of 64.4% and now near multi-decade lows. All-Weather Media The Iran war has not created this trend — but it has violently accelerated it. As the Financial Times reported on Tuesday, the bond market’s largest and most stable category of buyer is now, in a period of maximum global stress, a net seller.

This matters for Pakistan in a roundabout but real way. Higher US Treasury yields — the mathematical consequence of this selling pressure — tighten global dollar funding conditions, increase the cost of Pakistan’s external debt servicing, and strengthen the dollar in ways that amplify imported inflation. A faster resolution to the Iran conflict is, in this sense, not just a geopolitical good but a financial one for Islamabad.

The Strait, the Shock, and the Oil Market Nobody Saw Coming

The International Energy Agency has called it the biggest oil supply shock in history. Due to Iran’s selective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the world is losing as much as 20 million barrels of oil per day from Middle East producers. Since the war began five weeks ago, Brent crude has risen more than 50%. CNN

Brent crude was trading at just over $118 per barrel for May deliveries, while the more widely traded June delivery contract was around $103.50. The average price of gasoline in the United States crossed $4 per gallon for the first time since 2022. CBS News For emerging markets that import most of their energy, these numbers translate into something far more corrosive than headline inconvenience: they represent a structural transfer of wealth from oil-importing nations to a geopolitical standoff, mediated by a narrow chokepoint 21 miles wide at its narrowest point.

The Wall Street Journal, citing administration officials, reported that Trump and his aides had concluded that a military mission to reopen the Strait of Hormuz would extend beyond his four-to-six-week timeline, and he had decided to focus on targeting Iran’s missiles and navy before seeking to pressure Iran diplomatically to reopen it. Euronews

That shift — from military maximalism to diplomatic realism — is precisely what equity markets in Karachi, and indeed across emerging Asia, have been waiting for.

Pakistan’s Diplomatic Dividend: The Unlikely Peacebroker

The most remarkable subplot of this crisis is not the Treasury sell-off, nor the oil price spike. It is Islamabad’s transformation, over the past two weeks, from a country wracked by internal protests over the US strikes on Iran into a credible diplomatic interlocutor between Washington and Tehran.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed that “US-Iran indirect talks are taking place through messages being relayed by Pakistan,” adding that Turkey and Egypt were also extending support to the initiative. US envoy Steve Witkoff confirmed presenting a 15-point action list as the framework for a peace deal, which mediator Pakistan gave to Iran. NPR President Trump then paused his deadline for the destruction of Iran’s energy plants by ten days to April 6, citing the ongoing talks. Special envoy Steve Witkoff confirmed at President Trump’s Cabinet meeting that the US has been negotiating with Iran through diplomatic channels with Pakistan as the conduit. CNN

Foreign Policy has described this as a role that makes more geopolitical sense than it initially appears. Pakistan is a rare country that has warm ties with both the United States and Iran and is engaged with the highest levels of both governments. Pakistan also represents Tehran’s diplomatic interests in Washington. Furthermore, Pakistan has dealt closely with the family of a key player on the US side — Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. Foreign Policy

The domestic calculus is equally clear: Pakistan’s mediation push is driven by economic strain, security concerns, and strategic calculation. With energy markets volatile and the country reliant on Gulf oil and LNG imports, any sustained spike in global crude prices could deepen a crisis Pakistan can ill afford. Pakistan’s fragile economic recovery is under renewed stress, with constrained fiscal space and minimal strategic oil reserves. The Researchers

The PSX’s 7,500-point single-session surge is, in a narrow sense, investors pricing in the probability that Pakistan’s diplomatic gamble pays off. A ceasefire, even an imperfect one, would lower oil prices, ease imported inflation, reduce pressure on State Bank of Pakistan foreign reserves, and reopen the possibility of further monetary easing by the SBP — all of which are bullish for Pakistani equities.

Risks: The Rally Is Real, But the Ceasefire Isn’t — Yet

Markets have a well-documented habit of pricing in peace talks before those talks produce peace. The KSE-100’s gain on Wednesday is a bet, not a receipt.

Several credible risks remain. Iran has countered the US 15-point plan with its own five conditions, including recognition of Iran’s legitimate rights, payment of war reparations, and firm international guarantees against future aggression. Al Jazeera Those are not trivial demands from a country that has seen its Supreme Leader killed and its military infrastructure methodically dismantled. Ending the war with Iran retaining effective control of the Strait of Hormuz would be seen internationally as a strategic defeat for the United States — Iran would claim victory and might monetize its position by imposing tolls on transiting tankers, providing revenues to rebuild its military and nuclear programmes. CNN

Secretary of State Rubio has been clearer on the endgame than almost anyone. Rubio told Al Jazeera that “the Strait of Hormuz will be open when this operation is over — one way or another,” and rejected Iran’s demand to maintain sovereignty over the waterway as part of any agreement. Al Jazeera That language, while reassuring to oil markets in the abstract, leaves significant space for a breakdown in negotiations — and a resumption of exactly the kind of escalatory cycle that sent the KSE-100 down 15% in the first quarter.

Oil market participants appear to be processing this nuance already. Bond yields have been steadily rising throughout March as investors race to reprice the chances of rate hikes from central banks, with expectations of rate cuts at the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England having fallen sharply and in many cases being replaced by anticipations of hawkish monetary policy. CNBC That global repricing of central bank paths — driven directly by energy-led inflation — is a structural headwind for emerging market assets, Pakistan included, that does not disappear even if a ceasefire is signed.

Global Macro Implications: When the World’s Safe Asset Isn’t Safe Enough

Beneath the headline drama of the oil price spike and the stock market surge, the most consequential development of this crisis may be the one attracting the least retail attention: the systematic erosion of US Treasury demand at precisely the moment that Washington’s finances require it most.

Stephen Jones, Chief Investment Officer at Aegon Asset Management, described central banks’ actions as countries “raising war funds,” saying, “They are drawing on emergency reserves.” This round of selling is not an isolated event but a microcosm of a longer-term structural shift: global reserve management institutions are systematically reducing exposure to dollar assets. All-Weather Media

If the Iran conflict ends quickly, some of this pressure on the Treasury market will ease. Central banks in Turkey, India, and Thailand that have been intervening in FX markets to defend their currencies will face less pressure to continue liquidating reserves once oil prices fall. That normalisation would provide some relief to US bond yields. But the structural share of foreign holdings — already at a 27-year low — is not a tap that turns back on quickly. The trend that the war has accelerated was years in the making.

For Pakistan’s capital markets, the near-term playbook favours the bulls — as long as the diplomatic process holds. A ceasefire, lower Brent crude, a softer dollar, and resumed SBP rate cuts would be a nearly perfect cocktail for further PSX gains. The index, even after Wednesday’s surge, remains roughly 18% below its all-time high of approximately 189,556 points reached in January 2026. There is significant mean-reversion potential if geopolitical risk genuinely abates.

Outlook: Watch April 6 — and the Address to the Nation

The immediate calendar is unusually consequential. President Trump is scheduled to deliver a prime-time address to the nation on Wednesday evening providing what the White House described as “an important update on Iran.” The April 6 deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — or face strikes on its energy infrastructure — creates a hard binary. Either the diplomatic track delivers a meaningful framework before that date, or markets face the prospect of a sharp escalatory spike.

Secretary of State Rubio, before departing for a G7 foreign ministers meeting in France, confirmed that “there are intermediary countries that are passing messages and progress has been made — some concrete progress has been made,” describing negotiations as “an ongoing and fluid process.” CNN

For investors in Karachi and beyond, the single most important watch item is not the KSE-100 level, nor the US Treasury yield, nor even Brent crude. It is whether Pakistan’s mediation — this extraordinary diplomatic intervention by a country whose consulate in its own largest city was attacked just a month ago — delivers enough of a framework before April 6 to allow both sides to step back from the precipice.

If it does, Wednesday’s 7,500-point surge will look, in hindsight, like the opening chapter of a recovery story rather than a false dawn in a prolonged storm. If it doesn’t, the circuit-breaker that paused trading on Wednesday could, in the weeks ahead, be pointing in the other direction.

Pakistan has been here before — not as a victim of great-power competition, but as its unexpected architect. It was Islamabad that facilitated Nixon’s 1971 opening to China. It may yet be Islamabad that writes the first line of a postwar order in the Persian Gulf. The KSE-100, for one day at least, has decided to believe it.

Bessent and He Lifeng meet at OECD Paris to review the Busan trade truce before Trump’s Beijing summit. Rare earths, Hormuz oil shock, and Section 301 cloud the path ahead.

The 16th arrondissement of Paris is not a place that announces itself. Discreet, residential, its wide avenues lined with haussmann facades, it is the kind of neighbourhood where power moves quietly. On Sunday morning, as French voters elsewhere in the city queued outside polling stations for the first round of local elections, a motorcade slipped through those unassuming streets toward the headquarters of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Inside, the world’s two largest economies were attempting something rare in 2026: a structured, professional conversation.

Talks began at 10:05 a.m. local time, with Vice-Premier He Lifeng accompanied by Li Chenggang, China’s foremost international trade negotiator, while Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent arrived flanked by US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. South China Morning Post Unlike previous encounters in European capitals, the delegations were received not by a host-country official but by OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann South China Morning Post — a small detail that spoke volumes. France was absorbed in its own democratic ritual. The world’s most consequential bilateral relationship was, once again, largely on its own.

The Stakes in Paris: More Than a Warm-Up Act

It would be tempting to dismiss the Paris talks as logistical scaffolding for a grander event — namely, President Donald Trump’s planned visit to Beijing at the end of March for a face-to-face with President Xi Jinping. That reading would be a mistake. The discussions are expected to cover US tariff adjustments, Chinese exports of rare earth minerals and magnets, American high-tech export controls, and Chinese purchases of US agricultural commodities CNBC — a cluster of issues that, taken together, constitute the structural skeleton of the bilateral relationship.

Analysts cautioned that with limited preparation time and Washington’s strategic focus consumed by the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the prospects for any significant breakthrough — either in Paris or at the Beijing summit — remain constrained. Investing.com As Scott Kennedy, a China economics specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, put it with characteristic precision: “Both sides, I think, have a minimum goal of having a meeting which sort of keeps things together and avoids a rupture and re-escalation of tensions.” Yahoo!

That minimum — preserving the architecture of the relationship, not remodelling it — may, in the current environment, be ambitious enough.

Busan’s Ledger: What Has Been Delivered, and What Has Not

The two delegations were expected to review progress against the commitments enshrined in the October 2025 trade truce brokered by Trump and Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Busan, South Korea. Yahoo! On certain metrics, the scorecard is encouraging. Washington officials, including Bessent himself, have confirmed that China has broadly honoured its agricultural obligations under the deal Business Standard — a meaningful signal at a moment when diplomatic goodwill is scarce.

The soybean numbers are notable. China committed to purchasing 12 million metric tonnes of US soybeans in the 2025 marketing year, with an escalation to 25 million tonnes in 2026 — a procurement schedule that begins with the autumn harvest. Yahoo! For Midwestern farmers and the commodity desks that serve them, these are not abstractions; they are the difference between a profitable season and a foreclosure notice.

But the picture darkens considerably when attention shifts to critical materials. US aerospace manufacturers and semiconductor companies are experiencing acute shortages of rare earth elements, including yttrium — a mineral indispensable in the heat-resistant coatings that protect jet engine components — and China, which controls an estimated 60 percent of global rare earth production, has not yet extended full export access to these sectors. CNBC According to William Chou, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, “US priorities will likely be about agricultural purchases by China and greater access to Chinese rare earths in the short term” Business Standard at the Paris talks — a formulation that implies urgency without optimism.

The supply chain implications are already registering. Defence contractors reliant on rare-earth permanent magnets for guidance systems, electric motors in next-generation aircraft, and precision sensors are operating on diminished buffers. The Paris talks, if they yield anything concrete, may need to yield this above all.

A New Irritant: Section 301 Returns

Against this backdrop of incremental compliance and unresolved bottlenecks, the US side has introduced a fresh complication. Treasury Secretary Bessent and USTR Greer are bringing to Paris a new Section 301 trade investigation targeting China and 15 other major trading partners CNBC — a revival of the legal mechanism previously used to justify sweeping tariffs during the first Trump administration. The signal it sends is deliberately mixed: Washington is simultaneously seeking to consolidate the Busan framework and reserving the right to escalate it.

For Chinese negotiators, the juxtaposition is not lost. Beijing has staked considerable domestic political credibility on the proposition that engagement with Washington produces tangible results. A Section 301 investigation, even if procedurally nascent, raises the spectre of a new tariff architecture layered atop the existing one — and complicates the case for continued compliance within China’s own policy bureaucracy.

The Hormuz Variable: When Geopolitics Enters the Room

No diplomatic meeting in March 2026 can be quarantined from the wider strategic environment, and the Paris talks are no exception. The ongoing US-Israeli military campaign against Iran has introduced a variable of potentially severe economic consequence: the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which approximately a fifth of the world’s oil passes.

China sources roughly 45 percent of its imported oil through the Strait, making any disruption there a direct threat to its industrial output and energy security. Business Standard After US forces struck Iran’s Kharg Island oil loading facility and Tehran signalled retaliatory intent, President Trump called on other nations to assist in protecting maritime passage through the Strait. CNBC Bessent, for his part, issued a 30-day sanctions waiver to permit the sale of Russian oil currently stranded on tankers at sea CNBC — a pragmatic, if politically contorted, attempt to soften the energy-price spike.

For the Paris talks, the Hormuz dimension introduces a paradox. China has an acute economic interest in stabilising global oil flows and might, in principle, be receptive to coordinating with the United States on maritime security. Yet Beijing’s deep reluctance to be seen as endorsing or facilitating US-led military operations in the Middle East constrains how far it can go. The corridor between shared interest and political optics is narrow.

What Trump Wants in Beijing — and What Xi Can Deliver

With Trump’s Beijing visit now functioning as the near-term endpoint of this diplomatic process, the outlines of a summit package are beginning to take shape. The US president is expected to seek major new Chinese commitments on Boeing aircraft orders and expanded purchases of American liquefied natural gas Yahoo! — both commercially significant and symbolically resonant for domestic audiences. Boeing’s recovery from years of regulatory and reputational turbulence has made its order book a quasi-barometer of US industrial confidence; LNG exports represent a strategic diversification of American energy diplomacy.

For Xi, the calculus involves threading a needle between delivering enough to make the summit worthwhile and conceding so much that it invites criticism at home from nationalist constituencies already sceptical of engagement. China’s state media has consistently characterised the Paris talks as a potential “stabilising anchor” for an increasingly uncertain global economy Republic World — language carefully chosen to frame engagement as prudent statecraft rather than capitulation.

The OECD itself, whose headquarters serves as neutral ground for today’s meeting, cut its global growth forecast earlier this year amid trade fragmentation fears — underscoring that the bilateral relationship between Washington and Beijing carries systemic weight far beyond its two principals. A credible summit, even one short of transformative, would send a signal to investment desks and central banks from Frankfurt to Singapore that the world’s two largest economies retain the institutional capacity to manage their rivalry.

The Road to Beijing, and Beyond

What happens in the 16th arrondissement today will not resolve the structural tensions that define the US-China relationship in this decade. The rare-earth bottleneck is systemic, not administrative. The Section 301 investigation reflects a bipartisan American political consensus that China’s industrial subsidies represent an existential competitive threat. And the Iran war has introduced a geopolitical variable that neither side fully controls.

But the Paris talks serve a purpose that transcends their immediate agenda. They demonstrate, to a watching world, that diplomacy between great powers remains possible even as military operations unfold and supply chains fracture. They keep open the channels through which, eventually, more durable arrangements might be negotiated — whether at a Beijing summit, at the G20 in Johannesburg later this year, or in another European capital where motorcades slip, unannounced, through quiet streets.

The minimum goal, as CSIS’s Kennedy observed, is avoiding rupture. In the spring of 2026, with the Strait of Hormuz partially closed and yttrium shipments stalled, that minimum has acquired the weight of ambition.

As prices at the checkout line keep climbing, new Federal Reserve data exposes an uncomfortable economic truth: Americans—not China or Europe—are footing the bill for President Trump’s tariff policies.

When Susan Martinez, a small business owner in suburban New Jersey, noticed her wholesale costs for imported electronics jump by 18% last spring, she faced an impossible choice: absorb the hit to her already-thin profit margins or pass the increase to customers still reeling from years of high inflation. She chose survival—raising prices by 12% and watching foot traffic drop.

Martinez’s predicament isn’t unique. It’s the lived experience of businesses across the New York-Northern New Jersey region that have faced difficult decisions about whether to absorb tariffs through lower profits or raise prices to recover higher costs, according to a groundbreaking May 2025 study from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The findings directly contradict the Trump administration’s central claim that foreign nations bear the brunt of import duties.

The Data Doesn’t Lie: Who Really Pays for Tariffs?

The numbers are stark and unequivocal. Roughly three-quarters of manufacturers and service firms passed along at least some of their tariff-induced cost increases to consumers, with nearly a third of manufacturers and almost half of service companies transferring the full cost, the NY Fed’s Regional Business Surveys revealed in June 2025.

But the economic pain doesn’t stop there. More recent analysis from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, published in January 2026, found that Americans are paying 96% of the cost of tariffs, while foreign exporters are absorbing about 4%—a finding based on analyzing over 25 million shipment records from more than $4 trillion in U.S. imports.

Tariff Burden Distribution: Who Pays What?

The progression tells a troubling story: by the middle of 2026, importers will bear only about 8% of tariff costs, with the consumer share rising to 67% and the exporter burden increasing to about 25%. In the end, U.S. consumers will shoulder roughly two-thirds of Trump’s tariffs—a far cry from the “China pays” narrative promoted during campaign rallies.

The Speed of Economic Pain: How Fast Did Prices Rise?

Perhaps most striking is how rapidly businesses translated tariff costs into higher prices for American households. The NY Fed found that over half of both manufacturers and service firms raised prices within a month of experiencing tariff-related cost increases—many within a day or week.

This swift transmission demolished any hope that businesses might absorb costs long enough for trade negotiations to reduce duties. Instead, companies acted decisively to protect profit margins, knowing customers had few alternatives as tariffs hit entire product categories simultaneously.

The Federal Reserve’s real-time monitoring confirms this pattern. The Fed constructed theoretical predictions of tariff effects based on implemented tariff changes and the prevalence of imports in each category, then tracked whether actual price data matched predictions. The answer was a resounding yes—tariffs showed up quickly in consumer prices, adding approximately 0.4 percentage points to the core Personal Consumption Expenditures price index by late 2025.

The Household Tax Americans Didn’t Vote For

Research from the nonpartisan Tax Foundation quantifies the impact in terms every family can understand: Trump’s tariffs amount to an average tax increase per US household of $1,000 in 2025 and $1,300 in 2026. For context, that’s more than many families saved from recent tax cuts—a point not lost on economists tracking real household incomes.

The Tax Policy Center’s analysis goes further, breaking down impacts by income level. The average federal tax rate will rise by 1.9 percentage points for households in the bottom quintile—compared with a 1.4 percentage point increase for those in the top quintile. In other words, tariffs function as a regressive tax, hitting lower-income Americans disproportionately hard.

Household Impact by Income Level (2026 Estimates)

Source: Tax Policy Center, January 2026

While wealthier households pay more in absolute dollars, the burden as a share of income falls heaviest on working- and middle-class families—precisely the demographic Trump promised to protect.

Trump’s Claims vs. Economic Reality

The disconnect between presidential rhetoric and economic evidence has rarely been more pronounced. Throughout 2025 and into 2026, President Trump repeatedly insisted that foreign countries pay U.S. tariffs. “The claim that foreign countries pay these tariffs is a myth,” countered Julian Hinz, research director at the Kiel Institute.

The confusion stems partly from how tariffs technically work. As U.S. Customs and Border Protection bills the U.S. importer directly, it is the importer which pays the tariffs. That importer then faces the same choice Susan Martinez confronted: accept lower profits, negotiate price cuts from foreign suppliers, or raise prices for American consumers.

Economic theory and decades of empirical evidence predict the outcome—and recent data confirms it. A paper by Alberto Cavallo and coauthors, cited by Trump himself to defend his policies, actually undermines his claims. The retail pattern points to higher prices for imported items, with spillovers into domestic prices as well, with the authors emphasizing that retail tariff pass-through is 24 percent, contributing roughly 0.76 percentage points to the all-items Consumer Price Index by October 2025.

The Manufacturing Jobs Mirage

Beyond consumer prices, Trump justified tariffs as essential to reviving American manufacturing and reshoring jobs lost to overseas production. The results? Exactly opposite.

Manufacturing employment has declined by approximately 59,000 jobs since Trump’s April tariff announcement, with durable goods manufacturers—those making cars, appliances, and electronics—bearing the brunt, according to Labor Department figures through late 2025.

The broader employment picture looks similarly grim. U.S. job openings fell to 6.54 million in December, the lowest level in more than five years, while total manufacturing employment has dropped each month since April, according to data compiled by NewsNation from federal sources.

Manufacturing Employment Trends (2025)

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The irony is palpable: policies designed to protect American workers have instead created exactly the job losses they were meant to prevent. A respondent from the petroleum and coal industry reported: “No major changes at this time, but going into 2026, we expect to see big changes with cash flow and employee head count. The company has sold off a big part of the business that generated free cash while offering voluntary severance packages to anyone”, according to the Institute for Supply Management’s November survey.

Inflation’s Unwelcome Return

Just as the Federal Reserve appeared to be winning its battle against post-pandemic inflation, tariffs threw a wrench into monetary policy. Chair Powell said at a panel that “in effect, we went on hold when we saw the size of the tariffs and essentially all inflation forecasts for the United States went up materially as a consequence of the tariffs”.

The inflationary impact manifests across multiple channels:

Direct Price Increases: The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis researchers found that tariffs accounted for 0.5 percentage points of headline inflation and 0.4 percentage points of core inflation between June and August 2025.

Goods Sector Revival: After years of deflationary pressures helping offset sticky services inflation, core goods prices rose by 1.4% year-over-year in late 2025—the highest non-pandemic increase since 2011. Companies exhausting their pre-tariff inventories were forced to pass higher costs directly to consumers.

Broad Category Effects: The Yale Budget Lab estimates that current tariff policies cost each household $1,800 on average in 2025, with apparel prices rising 17% and food prices climbing 2.8% due to tariffs alone.

Looking ahead, PCE inflation is expected to average about 2.6% for 2025, but with businesses passing on more tariff costs to consumers, inflation forecasts show a rise to 2.7% in 2026, according to Morningstar’s analysis.

Sector-by-Sector Breakdown: Where Tariffs Hit Hardest

Not all industries felt tariff impacts equally. The NY Fed’s survey revealed telling patterns:

Automotive Sector: Perhaps hardest hit, with J.P. Morgan estimating car prices would increase by $4,711 with the 25% tariff on imported vehicles. Companies like Stellantis and major European manufacturers faced impossible choices about production location versus market access.

Retail and Consumer Goods: One large retailer’s average costs had increased around 20% year-over-year because of tariffs, and it was trying to determine how it would distribute these increases, according to commentary from the Cleveland Fed.

Technology and Electronics: Supply chain disruptions combined with direct tariff costs to create double-digit cost increases for many tech importers and retailers.

Agriculture and Food: Despite being shielded from some tariff categories, food prices climbed 2.8% due to tariffs alone, as import costs for ingredients and processing equipment rippled through supply chains.

Business Adaptation Strategies: Survival Tactics

Faced with tariff shocks, companies deployed various survival strategies beyond simple price increases:

Supply Chain Reshuffling: A significant share of businesses reported increasing purchases from within the United States and a similar share reported a decline in imported goods, though this proved difficult for products without domestic alternatives.

Inventory Front-Loading: Just under a third of manufacturers and service firms reported increasing their inventory levels, partly to get ahead of rising tariffs and build a buffer against potential supply shortages.

Strategic Pricing: Some businesses raised prices on non-tariffed goods alongside tariffed items, taking advantage of an escalating pricing environment to increase prices more broadly—similar to how firms raised dryer prices when only washers faced tariffs in 2018-19.

Margin Compression: Unable to fully pass through costs, many businesses accepted lower profitability, with Goldman Sachs estimating that companies that use or sell imported goods bear a larger share of tariff costs than the net 22% figure suggests.

The Counterargument: Are There Any Benefits?

Proponents argue tariffs could eventually yield benefits, despite short-term pain:

Domestic Manufacturing Investment: Trump points to announced factory investments and claims of an “American economic miracle” in recent Wall Street Journal commentary, crediting tariffs with creating growth momentum.

National Security: Some industries critical to defense and infrastructure might justify protection from foreign competition, even at economic cost.

Negotiating Leverage: Tariffs as bargaining chips could theoretically yield better trade agreements, though analysts and foreign governments expressed confusion over the administration’s tariff strategies and openness to negotiation.

Trade Deficit Reduction: Import restrictions mechanically reduce trade deficits, though economists debate whether bilateral trade balances matter for overall prosperity.

However, these potential benefits must be weighed against documented costs: manufacturing job losses, higher consumer prices, squeezed business margins, elevated inflation, and strained relationships with trading partners. The evidence through early 2026 suggests costs far outweigh benefits for the American economy.

What This Means for 2026 and Beyond

As the calendar turns to 2026, several economic forces are colliding:

Escalating Consumer Impact: With businesses exhausting pre-tariff inventories, core goods prices rose only about a percentage point cumulatively in 2025, but import prices including tariff-related costs were up nearly 10%, meaning US businesses have been footing almost all the tariff bills—but that pretariff inventory is running out.

Federal Reserve Dilemma: The worsening growth and inflation outcomes leave the Fed with a challenging dilemma—absent labor market deterioration, there is a strong case for rates to be on hold indefinitely, yet the more challenging business environment increases the chances of just such a labor market deterioration.

Legal Uncertainty: The Supreme Court is evaluating the legality of Trump’s use of emergency powers to impose sweeping tariffs, with a decision expected in early 2026 that could reshape or eliminate large portions of the tariff regime.

Election Year Politics: With tariffs emerging as a kitchen-table issue affecting household budgets, the political sustainability of current policies faces growing scrutiny from both voters and some Republican lawmakers who threaten to rebel on Trump tariff votes.

The Bottom Line

The economic evidence is overwhelming and consistent across multiple research institutions: American consumers and businesses are bearing the vast majority of tariff costs—somewhere between 88% and 96%, depending on the study and time period. Foreign exporters are absorbing only a small fraction, contrary to repeated claims from the White House.

For ordinary Americans like Susan Martinez, the data translates into everyday financial stress: higher prices at checkout, reduced purchasing power, and economic uncertainty. For manufacturers, it means job losses rather than the promised renaissance. For the Federal Reserve, it complicates the already-delicate task of managing inflation without triggering recession.

“The claim that foreign countries pay these tariffs is a myth” isn’t just an academic point—it’s the difference between economic policy based on evidence versus wishful thinking. As 2026 unfolds, American households will continue feeling the very real costs of that distinction.