Analysis
How to Make Pakistan’s Budget 2026-27 Debt-Proof and Surplus: Well-Researched and Expert Recommendations
At the beginning of 2026, Pakistan stands at one of the most consequential economic crossroads in its 78-year history. The Ministry of Finance’s Budget Call Circular for FY2026-27, issued in late January, sets the stage for what could be either a transformative fiscal turnaround or another missed opportunity. With public debt ballooning to 70.7% of GDP—far exceeding the 60% statutory ceiling—and the government preparing its next annual budget amid intense IMF scrutiny under the Extended Fund Facility, Pakistan’s economic managers face a deceptively simple question: Can prudent fiscal engineering convert chronic deficits into sustainable surpluses while simultaneously reducing the debt burden?
The answer, according to a growing chorus of international economists, multilateral institutions, and domestic policy experts, is a qualified yes—but only if Pakistan adopts a comprehensive, evidence-based reform agenda that goes far beyond cosmetic adjustments. This isn’t about austerity for its own sake; it’s about rebuilding fiscal sovereignty in an era when Pakistan’s economic sovereignty is sharply shrinking.
The Debt Trap: Pakistan’s Current Fiscal Reality
To understand where Pakistan must go, we must first comprehend where it stands. The numbers paint a sobering picture. As of December 2025, Pakistan’s total public debt reached Rs 81.3 trillion, representing 70.7% of GDP—a staggering 14.7 percentage points above the legal threshold mandated by the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation (FRDL) Act. This breach isn’t marginal; it represents Rs 16.8 trillion in excess borrowing that Parliament never authorized.
The composition of this debt tells its own story. Domestic debt dominates at Rs 54.5 trillion, fueled by government securities—Pakistan Investment Bonds (PIBs), Treasury bills, and Sukuk—that crowd out private sector credit and keep interest rates artificially elevated. External debt, though smaller at $91.8 billion, carries its own vulnerabilities: more than half comes from multilateral development institutions including the IMF, while bilateral creditors—led by China under CPEC arrangements—account for another 26%.
The FY2025-26 budget, presented in June 2025, projected 4.2% GDP growth and targeted a 2.4% primary surplus—the first meaningful surplus in over a decade. Yet achieving this surplus came at a cost: development spending collapsed to just 0.2% of GDP in the first half of FY2026, hitting construction workers and the poor hardest, according to the World Bank’s Pakistan Development Update.
The Numbers That Matter
| Fiscal Indicator | FY2024-25 Actual | FY2025-26 Target | FY2026-27 Projection |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDP Growth (%) | 2.7 | 4.2 | 5.1 |
| Inflation (%) | 23.4 | 7.5 | 6.5 |
| Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) | 6.8 | 3.9 | 2.8 (reform scenario) |
| Primary Balance (% GDP) | -0.4 | 2.4 | 3.2 (reform scenario) |
| Public Debt (% GDP) | 68.0 | 70.7 | 68.5 (optimistic) |
| Tax-to-GDP Ratio (%) | 9.6 | 10.2 | 12.5 (target) |
Sources: Ministry of Finance Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan, IMF projections

The IMF Factor: Between Flexibility and Discipline
Pakistan’s fiscal future is inseparable from its relationship with the International Monetary Fund. The $7 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) approved in September 2024, combined with the $1.4 billion Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) for climate adaptation, provides Pakistan with critical breathing room—but at a price.
Recent reporting indicates Pakistan is seeking IMF flexibility on budget 2026-27 to accommodate political realities: relief for the salaried class, reduced real estate transaction taxes, and lower power tariffs to boost manufacturing competitiveness. The IMF’s second review, completed in December 2025, released approximately $1.2 billion in funding, but mission chief Nathan Porter emphasized that “fiscal consolidation must continue” and warned against backsliding on revenue mobilization.
The tension is real. IMF staff have proposed taxing high-end pensions to fund salaried-class relief—a politically toxic move in a country where civil-military establishments dominate governance. They’ve also pushed for phasing out minimum support prices for agricultural commodities by June 2026, threatening the livelihoods of millions of farmers. These are the kinds of structural reforms that multilateral institutions love on spreadsheets but that governments struggle to implement in democracies.
Yet there’s room for cautious optimism. The IMF has shown flexibility on climate-related spending under the RSF framework, and Pakistan’s achievement of a primary surplus in H1 FY2026—6.6% of GDP, according to World Bank data—demonstrates fiscal capacity when political will exists.
Eight Expert Strategies for a Debt-Proof, Surplus Budget
Building on insights from World Bank economists, IMF staff assessments, and Pakistan’s own economic think tanks, here are the evidence-based recommendations that could transform Pakistan’s fiscal trajectory:
1. Tax Base Expansion Through Digital Integration
Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio of 9.6% is among the lowest globally, half of what emerging market peers achieve. The solution isn’t higher rates—it’s digital enforcement. Pakistan economic reforms 2026 must prioritize:
- Mandatory Digital Transaction Trails: Require all business transactions above PKR 50,000 to flow through banking channels with automated tax deduction. Turkey and Kenya achieved 3-4% GDP increases in revenue through similar measures.
- AI-Powered Tax Compliance: Deploy machine learning algorithms to cross-reference income declarations with spending patterns visible in digital payments, property purchases, and international travel. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) has pilots showing 40% improvements in detection of under-reporting.
- Agricultural Income Taxation: Despite contributing 19% of GDP, agriculture contributes less than 1% of tax revenue. A progressive agricultural income tax, starting at PKR 1.5 million annual income, could generate PKR 300-400 billion annually while maintaining political viability by exempting smallholders.
2. CPEC 2.0: From Infrastructure to Export-Led Growth
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is evolving. CPEC 2.0 emphasizes export-oriented manufacturing through Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which have expanded from 7 to 44 since 2019. Pakistan export-led growth 2026 requires:
- SEZ Fiscal Sweeteners with Performance Conditions: Offer 10-year tax holidays only to exporters who export 70%+ of production, creating real dollar inflows rather than import-substitution industries that worsen the trade deficit.
- Joint Ventures Over Turnkey Projects: Encourage technology transfer by requiring Chinese investors to partner with Pakistani firms at 40% local equity minimum. This builds domestic capabilities and reduces profit repatriation.
- Targeted Sectors: Prioritize high-value manufacturing—electric vehicles, solar panels, pharmaceuticals, and engineering goods—rather than low-margin textiles. Analysis from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) shows these sectors have 3-5x higher GDP multipliers.
3. Energy Sector Rationalization: Cutting the Circular Debt
Pakistan’s circular debt in the power sector exceeds PKR 2.4 trillion, costing the government PKR 450+ billion annually in interest. Reducing Pakistan public debt requires confronting this monster:

- Cost-Reflective Tariffs with Smart Subsidies: Eliminate blanket electricity subsidies (which benefit the wealthy disproportionately) and replace them with means-tested support for households consuming under 200 units monthly. This could save PKR 400 billion while protecting the vulnerable.
- Privatize Distribution Companies (DISCOs): Pakistan’s state-owned electricity distributors lose PKR 400 billion annually through theft, incompetence, and political interference. Privatization, with binding efficiency commitments (as successful in India’s Delhi model), can transform losses into revenues.
- Renegotiate Independent Power Producer (IPP) Contracts: The take-or-pay capacity payments draining PKR 1.5 trillion annually were signed under different economic conditions. A World Bank-facilitated renegotiation, offering upfront capital in exchange for reduced future obligations, could save PKR 200-300 billion annually.
4. Green Bonds for Climate-Resilient Infrastructure
Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate shocks—devastating floods in 2022 and 2025 caused losses exceeding $30 billion—necessitates massive infrastructure investment. Rather than adding to conventional debt, Pakistan fiscal surplus strategies should include:
- Sovereign Green Bonds: Issue $2-3 billion in international green bonds targeting ESG-focused investors. Pakistan’s first $500 million Sukuk issuance in 2021 was oversubscribed; green bonds carry similar investor appetite with potentially 50-75 basis points lower yields than conventional debt.
- Climate Budget Tagging: The FY2026-27 Budget Call Circular mandates tagging all expenditures by climate impact. Institutionalize this with dedicated green budget lines that ring-fence revenue (carbon levies, environmental taxes) for climate adaptation, creating fiscal transparency that attracts concessional climate finance.
- Disaster Risk Insurance Pools: Partner with the African Risk Capacity model to create a South Asian disaster insurance mechanism. By pooling resources, Pakistan could access rapid post-disaster funding without emergency IMF borrowing.
5. Subsidy Rationalization: From Blanket to Targeted
Pakistan spends approximately 3% of GDP on subsidies—energy, agriculture, and food—but World Bank research shows 60% of these benefits flow to the richest 40% of households. Pakistan debt crisis solutions include:
- Digital Biometric Subsidy Delivery: Leverage Pakistan’s NADRA database (180 million biometric registrations) to deliver targeted cash transfers rather than price subsidies. Brazil’s Bolsa Família saved 0.5% of GDP while improving poverty outcomes.
- Phase Out Petroleum Subsidies: The PKR 50/liter petroleum levy still falls short of full cost recovery. A gradual 18-month increase to PKR 75/liter, paired with increased Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) transfers, can save PKR 300 billion while protecting the poor.
6. State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Reform and Privatization
Pakistan International Airlines, Pakistan Steel Mills, and dozens of other SOEs lose PKR 500+ billion annually. Pakistan IMF budget flexibility depends partly on demonstrating SOE reform:
- Fast-Track Privatization: Sell PIA, DISCOs, and smaller SOEs within 24 months using investment-first models (accepting lower initial prices for guaranteed investment/efficiency commitments). Turkey’s Turkish Airlines privatization generated $6.3 billion and turned losses into profits within three years.
- Performance Contracts for Strategic SOEs: For entities like Pakistan Railways that serve social functions, implement binding performance contracts with automatic management replacement for non-compliance. Kenya’s Kenya Railways turnaround offers a template.
7. Remittances Monetization and Diaspora Bonds
Pakistan’s 9 million overseas workers sent $32 billion in FY2025. Harnessing this flow more effectively provides non-debt financing:
- Pakistan Prosperity Bonds: Offer diaspora-specific bonds with tax benefits, dual-currency options, and preferential exchange rates. India’s diaspora bonds raised $11 billion during its 2000-2001 crisis; Pakistan could target $3-5 billion.
- Remittance-Linked Development: Create dedicated funds where diaspora contributions finance specific projects (hospitals, universities) with naming rights and governance seats, building emotional investment alongside financial returns.
8. Regional Trade Integration and Tariff Rationalization
Pakistan’s trade-to-GDP ratio (21%) is among the world’s lowest, reflecting economic isolation. Joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and normalizing trade with India could add 2-3% to GDP growth:
- Strategic Tariff Liberalization: The government’s recent tariff policy is a start, but deeper cuts on industrial inputs and machinery could boost manufacturing competitiveness. Bangladesh’s selective liberalization increased exports by 35% in five years.
- Transit Trade Agreements: Leverage Pakistan’s geography by becoming a paid transit corridor for Central Asian-Indian trade, generating $500 million-1 billion in annual transit fees.
The Political Economy of Reform: Why This Time Could Be Different
Fiscal reform ultimately succeeds or fails on political economy, not economics. Pakistan has announced “final” IMF programs 24 times since 1947, each promising structural transformation, most delivering only temporary stabilization.
Three factors suggest this cycle might break differently:
First, the severity of the 2025 floods—affecting 7 million people and causing over $15 billion in damages—has created policy space for climate-focused reforms under the RSF that would normally face resistance. Tragedy can catalyze change.
Second, CPEC 2.0’s industrial cooperation framework, marking the 75th anniversary of Pakistan-China relations in 2026, offers tangible wins—jobs, technology transfer, exports—that make painful fiscal adjustments politically digestible if packaged correctly.
Third, Pakistan’s establishment increasingly recognizes that perpetual IMF dependency threatens genuine sovereignty. When the IMF can dictate agricultural pricing policy or pension taxation, Pakistan’s room for independent decision-making narrows dangerously. Building fiscal self-sufficiency becomes a strategic imperative, not just an economic one.
Scenarios for 2026-27: From Cautious to Transformational
Baseline Scenario (60% Probability)
Modest reforms continue. Tax-to-GDP rises to 10.5%, subsidies decline marginally, some SOE privatizations occur. Fiscal deficit narrows to 3.2% of GDP, primary surplus reaches 2.8%. Public debt stabilizes at 69-70% but doesn’t decline. IMF program continues on track but requires constant renegotiation.
Reform Scenario (30% Probability)
Government implements 6-7 of the eight recommendations aggressively. Tax-to-GDP jumps to 12%, CPEC 2.0 generates $5 billion in new exports, energy reforms save PKR 500 billion, green bonds raise $2 billion. Fiscal deficit falls to 2.2% of GDP, primary surplus reaches 3.5%, debt-to-GDP begins declining toward 65% by 2028. Pakistan “graduates” from IMF dependency.
Crisis Scenario (10% Probability)
Political instability derails reforms, floods or external shocks (oil price spikes, remittance drops) crater revenues, IMF program goes off track. Fiscal deficit exceeds 5%, debt spirals above 75% of GDP, Pakistan faces acute balance-of-payments crisis requiring emergency stabilization.
A Call to Action: The Window Is Narrow
Pakistan’s budget 2026-27 will be prepared over the next four months and presented to Parliament by June 2026. The technical work—revenue projections, expenditure allocations, debt management strategies—is already underway in the Ministry of Finance’s climate-controlled offices in Islamabad. But the real decisions will be made in political consultations, civil-military coordination meetings, and negotiations with the IMF mission that arrives in late February or early March for the third EFF review.
For Pakistan’s economic managers, the imperative is clear: use the narrow window of relative stability achieved in 2025 to lock in structural reforms that make the next crisis less likely and the next recovery more durable. This means accepting short-term political pain for medium-term fiscal sovereignty.
For international partners—the IMF, World Bank, China, and bilateral donors—the challenge is balancing demands for reform with recognition that Pakistan operates in a complex political environment where feasibility matters as much as optimality. The best can be the enemy of the good.
And for Pakistan’s 240 million citizens, especially the young majority under 30 who have never experienced sustained prosperity, the budget 2026-27 represents something more fundamental than fiscal arithmetic. It’s a test of whether Pakistan’s democratic institutions can deliver the competent economic governance that its enormous human and natural potential deserves.
The data suggests a path exists—from chronic deficits to sustainable surpluses, from debt dependency to fiscal resilience, from stabilization to inclusive growth. Whether Pakistan takes that path depends on choices made in the coming months, choices that will reverberate for decades.
The window is narrow. The stakes could not be higher. And this time, failure is not an option Pakistan can afford.
FAQ: Pakistan Budget 2026-27 and Fiscal Sustainability
Q1: What is Pakistan’s current debt-to-GDP ratio, and why does it matter?
Pakistan’s public debt reached 70.7% of GDP in FY2025, exceeding the legal limit of 60% by 10.7 percentage points. This matters because high debt constrains fiscal flexibility, crowds out development spending, and makes Pakistan vulnerable to external shocks.
Q2: Can Pakistan achieve a fiscal surplus in 2026-27?
A primary surplus (revenues exceeding non-interest spending) is achievable and necessary. Pakistan recorded a 2.4% primary surplus in FY2025-26. However, an overall surplus (including debt servicing) remains unlikely given that interest payments consume 40-50% of revenue. The goal should be expanding the primary surplus to 3-3.5% of GDP, which would stabilize and gradually reduce debt.
Q3: How does the IMF program affect Pakistan’s budget flexibility?
The $7 billion EFF comes with conditions including maintaining fiscal targets, limiting subsidies, and advancing structural reforms. However, Pakistan is negotiating flexibility within these parameters, particularly for climate spending under the $1.4 billion RSF facility.
Q4: What is CPEC 2.0, and how does it support fiscal sustainability?
CPEC 2.0 shifts from infrastructure to industrialization, emphasizing export-oriented manufacturing in Special Economic Zones. By boosting exports and creating jobs, it can reduce trade deficits and generate tax revenue—both critical for fiscal sustainability.
Q5: Why are energy sector reforms critical for reducing debt?
Pakistan’s power sector circular debt exceeds PKR 2.4 trillion and grows by PKR 400-500 billion annually. Privatizing distribution companies, renegotiating IPP contracts, and implementing cost-reflective tariffs could save PKR 500-700 billion annually, directly improving fiscal balances.
Q6: How can Pakistan expand its tax base without harming economic growth?
Digital integration, agricultural income taxation (targeting large farmers, not smallholders), property taxes, and AI-powered compliance can expand the tax base while maintaining growth. The focus should be horizontal expansion (bringing more people into the tax net) rather than vertical increases (higher rates on existing taxpayers).
Q7: What role do green bonds play in debt management?
Green bonds allow Pakistan to finance climate adaptation infrastructure while attracting ESG-focused investors who accept lower yields. This can reduce borrowing costs by 50-75 basis points compared to conventional debt while building climate resilience.
Q8: Is it realistic to expect Pakistan to reduce debt while investing in development?
Yes, if done strategically. The key is shifting from consumption subsidies to productive investment, improving tax collection efficiency, and leveraging concessional financing (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, green climate funds) for development. Several emerging markets—Vietnam, Bangladesh, Rwanda—have achieved this balance.
Q9: How long before Pakistan can “graduate” from IMF programs?
If the reform scenario materializes, Pakistan could conclude its current IMF program in 2027 without needing an immediate successor. However, maintaining market access requires 3-5 years of consistent policy implementation to rebuild credibility with international investors.
Q10: What are the biggest risks to fiscal sustainability in 2026-27?
Climate shocks (floods, droughts), political instability, global oil price spikes, or a sharp decline in remittances could derail progress. Building resilience requires foreign exchange reserves of $20+ billion, fiscal buffers of 1-2% of GDP, and rapid disaster response mechanisms.
Discover more from The Economy
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Analysis
Volodymyr Zelenskyy Says Ukraine War is at the ‘Beginning of the End’: Why He’s Urging Trump to See Through Russia’s Peace ‘Games’
Four years ago today, the world held its breath as Russian armor rolled toward Kyiv, expecting a sovereign nation’s rapid collapse. Today, on February 24, 2026, the geopolitical narrative has fundamentally shifted from sheer survival to the brutal, complex mechanics of a resolution. Standing in Independence Square near a makeshift memorial of flags honoring fallen soldiers, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cast a profound look toward the future. But it was his candid, newly published Financial Times Zelenskyy interview that sent immediate ripples through the corridors of power in Washington, Brussels, and Moscow. The Ukraine war end is no longer a distant abstraction. We are, in his exact words, at the “beginning of the end.”
However, this final chapter is fraught with diplomatic landmines. As the world digests the latest Ukraine war updates, Zelenskyy’s core message wasn’t just directed at his weary citizens or European allies; it was a targeted, urgent plea to U.S. President Donald Trump. His goal? To ensure Washington doesn’t fall for the Russia games Trump might be tempted to entertain in his quest for a historic diplomatic victory.
“The Beginning of the End”: Decoding Zelenskyy’s Strategy
In international diplomacy, vocabulary is everything. By declaring the conflict is at the “beginning of the end,” Zelenskyy is signaling a transition from indefinite attrition to the tactical positioning that precedes an armistice. He is acknowledging the realities of a war-weary globe while firmly attempting to dictate the terms of the endgame.
In his extensive interview, Zelenskyy clarified that the “beginning of the end” does not equate to an immediate surrender or a hasty territorial compromise. Instead, it marks the phase where military stalemates force genuine structural negotiations. The recent trilateral Geneva negotiations on February 18, 2026, underscored this shift. Zelenskyy described the talks as arduous, noting that while political consensus remains out of reach, tangible progress was achieved on military de-escalation protocols.
“Putin is this war. He is the cause of its beginning and the obstacle to its end. And it is Russia that must be put in its place so that there is real peace.” — Volodymyr Zelenskyy, February 24, 2026
Seeing Through Putin’s “Games”: A Warning to Washington
The return of Donald Trump to the White House has undeniably accelerated the push for a negotiated settlement. Following the highly scrutinized Trump-Putin summit in Anchorage, Alaska, in late 2025, anxiety has permeated Kyiv. The underlying fear is that Washington might broker a transactional deal over Ukraine’s head, exchanging Ukrainian sovereignty for a perceived geopolitical win against the backdrop of rising U.S.-China tensions.
Zelenskyy’s challenge to the U.S. President is blunt: come to Kyiv. “Only by coming to Ukraine and seeing with one’s own eyes our life and our struggle… can one understand what this war is really about,” Zelenskyy stated during his anniversary address.
He explicitly warned that Trump Russia Ukraine tripartite dynamics are being actively manipulated by Moscow. During Putin peace talks, the Kremlin’s proposals are not olive branches but tactical Trojan horses—designed to weaken Kyiv’s negotiating position and exploit the new U.S. administration’s desire for a swift resolution. “The Russians are playing games,” Zelenskyy noted, stressing that the Kremlin has no serious, good-faith intention of ending the war unless forced by overwhelming leverage.
[Map of the current line of contact in Eastern Ukraine and proposed ceasefire monitoring zones]
The Mechanics of Peace: Security Guarantees and Ceasefire Monitoring
A ceasefire without enforcement is merely a tactical pause for rearmament—a painful lesson Ukraine learned between 2014 and 2022. This is the crux of the current diplomatic deadlock. However, the February 18 Geneva talks highlighted that military pragmatism is slowly taking shape.
Crucially, the sides have reportedly resolved the logistical framework for monitoring a prospective ceasefire, which would include direct US participation ceasefire oversight. This represents a massive geopolitical pivot, particularly given the Trump administration’s historical reluctance to commit American resources abroad, though it stops short of deploying U.S. combat troops.
To prevent a future invasion, Kyiv is demanding ironclad Ukraine ceasefire guarantees before any guns fall silent. As analyzed by foreign policy experts at The Washington Post, vague promises will not suffice.
Proposed Security Frameworks vs. Historical Precedents
| Framework | Core Mechanism | Deterrence Level | Sticking Points in 2026 Negotiations |
| NATO Membership | Article 5 Mutual Defense | Absolute | Russia’s ultimate red line; lingering U.S./German hesitation. |
| “Coalition of the Willing” | Bilateral defense pacts (UK, France, Germany) | High | Robust, but lacks a unified, legally binding U.S. enforcement mandate. |
| U.S.-Monitored Ceasefire | Armed/unarmed monitors along the Line of Contact | Moderate | Highly vulnerable to domestic political shifts in Washington; “mission creep” fears. |
| Budapest Memorandum 2.0 | Diplomatic assurances & promises | Low | Wholly rejected by Kyiv due to the catastrophic failures of 2014 and 2022. |
The Economic Battlefield: Tariffs, Sanctions, and EU Accession
You cannot divorce the geopolitical reality of the conflict’s resolution from the ongoing global macroeconomic shifts. As of February 2026, the international economy is digesting President Trump’s newly implemented 10% global tariff, creating a complex web of leverage and friction among Western allies.
For Ukraine, the endgame is not merely about drawing lines on a map; it is about securing the economic viability required to rebuild its shattered infrastructure and advance its European Union accession. According to insights from The New York Times, Western aid must now transition from emergency military provisions to long-term economic reconstruction capital.
[Chart illustrating the comparative economic contraction and recovery projections of Russia and Ukraine from 2022 to 2026]
Russia, meanwhile, continues to operate a hyper-militarized war economy. While Moscow projects resilience, the structural rot is becoming impossible to hide. The Bloomberg commodities index reflects how Western sanctions have forced Russia to pivot its energy exports to Asian markets at steep discounts, fundamentally restructuring the global energy grid and slashing the Kremlin’s long-term revenue streams.
The Economic Attrition of the War (2022–2026)
| Economic Metric | Ukraine | Russia | Global Macro Fallout |
| GDP Impact | Stabilizing with EU/US aid, but fundamentally altered. | Masked by unsustainable state war production; civilian sector starved. | Lingering supply chain shifts; restructuring of global defense budgets. |
| Energy Exports | Near-total loss of transit revenue; grid heavily damaged. | Forced pivot to Asia at heavy discounts; loss of premium European market. | Accelerated European transition to renewables and U.S. LNG. |
| Labor Force | Severe strain due to mobilization and refugee displacement. | Mass exodus of tech/skilled labor; severe labor shortages across industries. | European demographic shifts due to integration of Ukrainian refugees. |
Expert Analysis: The Realities of Global Geopolitics in 2026
When we analyze the Zelenskyy beginning of the end statement through the lens of geopolitics 2026, it is clear this is a calculated narrative pivot. As international relations researchers at The Economist note, Zelenskyy is preemptively framing the narrative. By calling out Russia’s “games” publicly, he is boxing the Trump administration into a corner where any concession to Putin looks like American weakness rather than diplomatic pragmatism.
Europe, meanwhile, is stepping up. The “coalition of the willing”—spearheaded by the UK, France, and a re-arming Germany—recognizes that the continent can no longer rely solely on the American security umbrella. If the U.S. forces a bitter peace, Europe will be left dealing with the fallout of an emboldened, revanchist Russia on its borders.
Conclusion: Forging a Durable Peace
The fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion is a somber reminder of the staggering human cost of this conflict. As Zelenskyy urges Trump to visit Independence Square and witness the “sea of pain” firsthand, the message is unmistakable: peace cannot be signed on a spreadsheet or dictated from a summit in Alaska. It must be forged in reality, backed by unshakeable security guarantees, and grounded in the acknowledgment that rewarding aggression only guarantees future wars.
The “beginning of the end” is here. The question now is whether the Western alliance, led by a highly transactional U.S. administration, has the strategic patience to ensure that the end results in a lasting, just peace—or merely a countdown to the next conflict.
Discover more from The Economy
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Analysis
Trump’s 2026 State of the Union: Navigating Low Polls, Shutdowns, and Divisions in a Fractured America
Explore President Trump’s upcoming 2026 SOTU address amid record-low approval and political turmoil—insights on the US economy, immigration, and foreign policy shifts.
A year after reclaiming the White House in a historic political comeback, President Donald Trump will step up to the House rostrum on Tuesday at 9 p.m. ET to deliver his State of the Union address. The political climate he faces, however, is one of unusual fragility. Midway between his inauguration and the critical November midterm elections, this 2026 SOTU preview reveals a commander-in-chief confronting a partial government shutdown, rare judicial rebukes, and deep fractures within his own coalition.
When Trump last addressed Congress in March 2025, his approval rating hovered near a career high, buoyed by the momentum of his return to power. Today, he faces an electorate thoroughly fatigued by persistent inflation and systemic gridlock. Tuesday’s address is intended to showcase a leader who has unapologetically reshaped the federal government. Yet, as the Trump State of the Union amid low polls approaches, the spectacle will inevitably be weighed against the stark economic and political realities defining his second act.
Sagging Polls and Economic Realities
Historically, Trump has leveraged economic metrics as his strongest political shield. But the US economy under Trump 2026 presents a complicated picture for international economist researchers and everyday voters alike. According to recent data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, while the stock market has seen notable rallies, 2025 marked the slowest year for job and economic growth since the pandemic-induced recession of 2020.
A recent Gallup tracking poll places his overall approval rating near record lows. Furthermore, roughly two-thirds of Americans currently describe the nation’s economy as “poor”—a sentiment that mirrors the frustrations felt during the latter half of the Biden administration. Grocery, housing, and utility costs remain stubbornly high. Analysts at The Economist note that the US labor market has settled into a stagnant “low-hire, low-fire” equilibrium, heavily exacerbated by sweeping trade restrictions.
| Economic & Polling Indicator | March 2025 (Inauguration Era) | February 2026 (Current) |
| Overall Approval Rating | 48% | 39% |
| Immigration Handling Approval | 51% | 38% |
| GDP Growth (Quarterly) | 4.4% (Q3 ’25) | 1.4% (Q4 ’25 Advance) |
| Economic Sentiment (“Poor”) | 45% | 66% |
Trump has vehemently defended his record, insisting last week that he has “won” on affordability. In his address, he is widely expected to blame his predecessor, Joe Biden, for lingering systemic economic pain while claiming unilateral credit for recent Wall Street highs.
Immigration Backlash and Shutdown Stalemate
Adding to the drama of the evening, Tuesday will mark the first time in modern US history that a president delivers the annual joint address amid a funding lapse. The partial government shutdown, now in its second week, centers entirely on the Department of Homeland Security.
Funding for DHS remains frozen as Democratic lawmakers demand stringent guardrails on the administration’s sweeping immigration crackdown. The standoff reached a boiling point following the deaths of two American citizens by federal agents during border protests in January. This tragic incident sparked nationwide outrage and eroded what was once a core political advantage for the President. An AP-NORC poll recently revealed that approval of Trump’s handling of immigration has plummeted to just 38%. The political capital he once commanded on border security is now deeply contested territory.
The Supreme Court Rebuke and Congressional Dynamics
Trump will be speaking to a Republican-led Congress that he has frequently bypassed. While he secured the passage of his signature tax legislation last summer—dubbed the “Big, Beautiful Bill,” which combined corporate tax cuts and immigration enforcement funding with deep reductions to Medicaid—he has largely governed via executive order.
This aggressive use of executive authority recently hit a massive judicial roadblock. Last week, the Supreme Court struck down many of Trump’s sweeping global tariffs, a central pillar of his economic agenda. In a pointed majority opinion, Trump-nominated Justice Neil Gorsuch warned against the “permanent accretion of power in the hands of one man.”
This ruling has massive implications for global trade. Financial analysts at The Financial Times suggest that the removal of these tariffs could ease some inflationary pressures, though Trump has already vowed to pursue alternative legal mechanisms to keep import taxes active, promising prolonged uncertainty for international markets.
Simultaneously, Trump’s coalition is showing signs of fraying:
- Demographic Shifts: Americans under 45 have sharply turned against the administration.
- Latino Voters: A demographic that shifted rightward in 2024 has seen steep drops in approval following January’s border violence.
- Intra-Party Apathy: Nearly three in 10 Republicans report that the administration is failing to focus on the country’s most pressing structural problems.
Trump Foreign Policy Shifts and Global Tensions
Foreign policy is expected to feature heavily in the address, highlighting one of the most unpredictable evolutions of his second term. Candidate Trump campaigned heavily on an “America First” platform, promising to extract the US from costly foreign entanglements. However, Trump foreign policy shifts over the last twelve months have alarmed both critics and isolationist allies.
The administration has dramatically expanded US military involvement abroad. Operations have ranged from seizing Venezuela’s president and bolstering forces around Iran to authorizing a lethal campaign of strikes on alleged drug-smuggling vessels—operations that have resulted in scores of casualties. For global observers and defense analysts at The Washington Post, this muscular, interventionist approach contradicts his earlier populist rhetoric, creating unease among voters who favored a pullback from global policing.
What to Expect: A Trump Midterm Rally Speech
Despite the mounting pressures, Trump is unlikely to strike a chastened or conciliatory tone. Observers should expect a classic Trump midterm rally speech.
“It’s going to be a long speech because we have a lot to talk about,” Trump teased on Monday.
Key themes to watch for include:
- Defending the First Year: Aggressive framing of the “Big, Beautiful Bill” and an insistence that manufacturing is successfully reshoring.
- Attacking the Courts and Democrats: Expect pointed rhetoric regarding the Supreme Court’s tariff ruling and the ongoing DHS shutdown.
- Political Theater: Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries has urged his caucus to maintain a “strong, determined and dignified presence,” but several progressive members have already announced plans to boycott the speech in silent protest. For details on streaming the event, see our guide on How to Watch Trump’s State of the Union.
Conclusion: A Test of Presidential Leverage
For a president who has built a global brand on dominance and disruption, Tuesday’s State of the Union represents a profoundly different kind of test. The visual of Trump speaking from the dais while parts of his own government remain shuttered and his signature tariffs sit dismantled by his own judicial appointees is a potent symbol of his current vulnerability.
The core question for international markets and domestic voters alike is no longer whether Trump can shock the system, but whether he can stabilize it. To regain his footing ahead of the November midterms, he must persuade a highly skeptical public that his combative priorities align with their economic needs—and prove that his second act in the White House is anchored by strategy rather than adrift in grievance.
Discover more from The Economy
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Analysis
Transforming Karachi into a Livable and Competitive Megacity
A comprehensive analysis of governance, fiscal policy, and urban transformation in South Asia’s most complex megacity
Based on World Bank Diagnostic Report | Policy Roadmap 2025–2035 | $10 Billion Transformation Framework
PART 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK
Karachi is a city in contradiction. The financial capital of the world’s fifth-most populous nation, it contributes between 12 and 15 percent of Pakistan’s entire GDP while remaining home to some of the most acute urban deprivation in South Asia. A landmark World Bank diagnostic, the foundation of this expanded analysis, structures its findings around three interconnected “Pathways” of reform and four operational “Pillars” for transformation. Together, they constitute a $10 billion roadmap to rescue a city that is quietly—but measurably—losing its economic crown.
The Three Pathways: A Diagnostic Overview
Pathway 1 — City Growth & Prosperity
The central paradox driving the entire World Bank report is one that satellite imagery has made impossible to ignore. While Karachi officially generates between 12 and 15 percent of Pakistan’s national GDP—an extraordinary concentration of economic output in a single metropolitan area—the character and location of that wealth is shifting in troubling ways. Nighttime luminosity data, a reliable proxy for economic intensity, shows a measurable dimming of the city’s historic core. High-value enterprises, anchor firms, and knowledge-economy businesses are quietly relocating to the unmanaged periphery, where land is cheaper, regulatory friction is lower, and the absence of coordinated planning perversely functions as a freedom.
This is not simply a real estate story. It is a harbinger of long-term structural decline. When economic activity migrates from dense, serviced urban centers to sprawling, infrastructure-poor peripheries, the fiscal returns per unit of land diminish, commute times lengthen, productivity suffers, and the social fabric of mixed-use neighborhoods frays. Karachi is not alone in this dynamic—it mirrors patterns seen in Lagos, Dhaka, and pre-reform Johannesburg—but the speed and scale of its centrifugal drift are alarming.
Yet the picture is not uniformly bleak. One of the report’s most striking findings is the city’s quiet success in poverty reduction. Between 2005 and 2015, the share of Karachi’s population living in poverty fell from 23 percent to just 9 percent, making it one of the least poor districts anywhere in Pakistan. This achievement, largely the product of informal economic dynamism, remittance flows, and the resilience of its entrepreneurial working class, stands as proof that Karachi’s underlying human capital remains formidable. The governance challenge is not to create prosperity from nothing—it is to stop squandering the prosperity that already exists.
“Karachi’s economy is like a powerful engine running on a broken chassis. The horsepower is there. The infrastructure to harness it is not.”
Pathway 2 — City Livability
By global benchmarks, Karachi is a city in crisis. It consistently ranks in the bottom decile of international livability indices, a fact that reflects not mere inconvenience but a fundamental failure of urban governance to provide the basic services that allow residents to live healthy, productive, and dignified lives.
Water and sanitation constitute the most acute dimension of this failure. The city’s non-revenue water losses—water that enters the distribution system but never reaches a paying consumer due to leakage, illegal connections, and metering failures—are among the highest recorded for any city of comparable size globally. In a megacity of 16 to 20 million people, depending on the methodology used to define its boundaries, these losses translate into hundreds of millions of liters of treated water wasted daily while residents in katchi abadis pay informal vendors a price per liter that is many multiples of what wealthier households in serviced areas pay through formal utilities. This regressive dynamic—where the urban poor subsidize systemic dysfunction—is one of the defining injustices of Karachi’s service delivery crisis.
Green space presents a related but distinct vulnerability. At just 4 percent of total urban area, Karachi’s parks, tree canopy, and public open spaces are a fraction of the 15 to 20 percent benchmarks recommended by urban health organizations. In a coastal city where summer temperatures routinely exceed 40 degrees Celsius and where the Arabian Sea’s humidity compounds heat stress, this deficit is not merely aesthetic. It is a public health emergency waiting to erupt. The urban heat island effect—whereby dense built environments trap and re-radiate solar energy, raising local temperatures by several degrees above surrounding rural areas—disproportionately affects the informal settlements that house half the city’s population and where air conditioning is a luxury few can afford.
Underlying both crises is the governance fragmentation that the report identifies as the structural root cause of virtually every livability failure. Karachi is currently administered by a patchwork of more than 20 federal, provincial, and local agencies. These bodies collectively control approximately 90 percent of the city’s land. They include the Defence Housing Authority, the Karachi Port Trust, the Karachi Development Authority, the Malir Development Authority, and a constellation of cantonment boards, each operating according to its own mandate, budget cycle, and institutional incentive structure. The result is what urban economists call a “tragedy of the commons” applied to governance: because no single entity bears comprehensive responsibility for the city’s functioning, no single entity has the authority—or the accountability—to coordinate a systemic response to its failures.
“In Karachi, everyone owns the problem and no one owns the solution. That is not governance; it is organized irresponsibility.”
Pathway 3 — City Sustainability & Inclusiveness
The fiscal dimension of Karachi’s crisis is perhaps the most analytically tractable, because it is the most directly measurable. Property taxation—the foundational revenue instrument of urban government worldwide, and the mechanism by which cities convert the value of land and improvements into public services—is dramatically underperforming in Sindh relative to every comparable benchmark.
The International Monetary Fund’s cross-country data confirms that property tax yields in Sindh are significantly below those achieved in Punjab, Pakistan’s other major province, and far below those recorded in comparable Indian metropolitan areas such as Mumbai, Pune, or Hyderabad. The gap is not marginal. Whereas a well-functioning urban property tax system should generate revenues equivalent to 0.5 to 1.0 percent of local GDP, Karachi’s yields fall well short of this range. The consequences are compounding: underfunded maintenance leads to asset deterioration, which reduces the assessed value of the property base, which further constrains tax revenues, which deepens the maintenance deficit. This is a fiscal death spiral, and Karachi is caught within it.
Social exclusion compounds the fiscal crisis in ways that resist easy quantification. Approximately 50 percent of Karachi’s population—somewhere between 8 and 10 million people—lives in katchi abadis, the informal settlements that have grown organically on land not formally designated for residential use, often lacking title, rarely connected to formal utility networks, and perpetually vulnerable to eviction or demolition. The rapid growth of these settlements, driven by both natural population increase and sustained rural-to-urban migration, has increased what sociologists describe as social polarization: the geographic and economic distance between the formal, serviced city and the informal, unserviced one.
This polarization is not merely a social concern. It has direct economic consequences. Informal settlement residents who lack property rights cannot use their homes as collateral for business loans. Children who spend excessive time collecting water or navigating unsafe streets have less time for education. Workers who cannot afford reliable transport face constrained labor market options. The informal city subsidizes the formal one through its labor, while receiving little of the infrastructure investment that makes formal urban life possible.
The Four Transformation Pillars
The World Bank’s $10 billion roadmap does not limit itself to diagnosis. It proposes four operational pillars through which the three pathways of reform can be pursued simultaneously. These pillars are not sequential—they are interdependent, and progress on one without the others is unlikely to prove durable.
Pillar 1 — Accountable Institutions
The first and arguably most foundational pillar concerns governance architecture. The report argues, persuasively, that no amount of infrastructure investment will generate sustainable improvement so long as 20-plus agencies continue to operate in silos across a fragmented land ownership landscape. The solution it proposes is a transition from the current provincial-led, agency-fragmented model to an empowered, elected local government with genuine fiscal authority over the metropolitan area.
This is not a technical recommendation. It is a political one. The devolution of meaningful power to an elected metropolitan authority would require the Sindh provincial government—which has historically resisted any erosion of its control over Karachi’s lucrative land assets—to accept a substantial redistribution of authority. It would require federal agencies to cede operational jurisdiction over land parcels they have controlled for decades. And it would require the creation of new coordination mechanisms: inter-agency land-use committees, joint infrastructure planning bodies, and unified development authorities with the mandate and resources to enforce coherent spatial plans.
International precedents for such transitions are encouraging. Greater Manchester’s devolution deal in the United Kingdom, Metropolitan Seoul’s governance reforms in the 1990s, and the creation of the Greater London Authority all demonstrate that consolidating fragmented metropolitan governance into accountable elected structures can unlock significant improvements in both service delivery and economic performance.
Pillar 2 — Greening for Resilience
The climate dimension of Karachi’s transformation cannot be treated as a luxury add-on to more “practical” infrastructure priorities. A city with 4 percent green space in a warming coastal environment is a city accumulating climate risk at an accelerating rate. The 2015 Karachi heat wave, which killed more than 1,200 people in a single week, was a preview of what routine summers will look like within a decade if the urban heat island effect is not actively countered.
The greening pillar encompasses multiple overlapping interventions: expanding parks and urban forests to absorb heat and manage stormwater; restoring the mangrove ecosystems along Karachi’s coastline that serve as natural buffers against storm surges and coastal erosion; redesigning road networks to incorporate permeable surfaces, street trees, and bioswales; and integrating green infrastructure standards into building codes for new development.
These investments are not merely environmental. They are economic. The World Health Organization estimates that urban green space reduces healthcare costs, increases property values in surrounding areas, and improves labor productivity by reducing heat stress. In a city where informal settlement residents have no access to air conditioning, every degree reduction in ambient temperature achievable through urban greening has a direct, measurable impact on human welfare.
Pillar 3 — Leveraging Assets
Karachi possesses one asset in extraordinary abundance: prime urban land controlled by public agencies. The Defence Housing Authority alone controls thousands of hectares in locations that, by any market measure, represent some of the most valuable real estate on the subcontinent. The Karachi Port Trust, the railways, and various federal ministries hold additional parcels of commercially significant land that are either underdeveloped, misused, or lying fallow.
The asset monetization pillar proposes to unlock this latent value through structured Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) that use land as the primary input for financing major infrastructure projects. The model is well-established: a government agency contributes land at concessional rates to a joint venture, a private developer finances and constructs mixed-use development on a portion of the parcel, and the revenue generated—whether through commercial rents, residential sales, or transit-adjacent development premiums—is used to cross-subsidize the public infrastructure component of the project.
This model has been successfully deployed for mass transit financing in Hong Kong (through the MTR Corporation’s property development strategy), in Singapore (through integrated transit-oriented development), and more recently in Indian cities like Ahmedabad (through the BRTS land value capture mechanism). Karachi’s $10 billion infrastructure gap—encompassing mass transit, water treatment, wastewater management, and flood resilience—is too large for public budgets alone. Asset monetization is not optional; it is the essential bridge between fiscal reality and infrastructure ambition.
Pillar 4 — Smart Karachi
The fourth pillar recognizes that technological capacity is both a multiplier of the other three pillars and a reform agenda in its own right. A city that cannot accurately map its land parcels, track its utility consumption, monitor its traffic flows, or measure its air quality in real time is a city flying blind. Karachi’s current data infrastructure is fragmented, inconsistently maintained, and largely inaccessible to the policymakers who most need it.
The Smart Karachi pillar envisions a comprehensive digital layer over the city’s physical fabric: GIS-based land registries that reduce the scope for fraudulent title claims and agency disputes; smart metering for water and electricity that reduces non-revenue losses; integrated traffic management systems that improve the efficiency of Karachi’s chronically congested road network; and citizen-facing digital platforms that allow residents to pay utility bills, register property transactions, and report service failures without navigating physical bureaucracies that historically reward connection over competence.
Beyond service delivery, digital infrastructure enables a new quality of fiscal accountability. When every property transaction is recorded on a unified digital platform, the scope for tax evasion narrows. When utility consumption is metered and billed accurately, the implicit subsidies that currently flow to well-connected large users are exposed and can be redirected to the residents who actually need them.
PART 2: OPINION ARTICLE
The Megacity Paradox: Can Karachi Reclaim Its Crown?
Originally conceived for The Economist / Financial Times | Policy & Economics Desk
I. The Lights Are Going Out
There is a satellite image that haunts Pakistan’s urban planners. Taken at night, it shows the Indian subcontinent as a constellation of light—Mumbai’s sprawl blazing across the Arabian Sea coast, Delhi’s agglomeration pulsing outward in every direction, Lahore’s core radiating upward into Punjab’s flat horizon. And then there is Karachi.
Karachi is visible, certainly. It is not a dark city. But look closely at the World Bank’s time-series nighttime luminosity analysis, and something disturbing emerges: the city center—the historic financial district that once justified Karachi’s sobriquet as the “City of Lights”—is getting dimmer, not brighter. The economic heartbeat of Pakistan’s largest city is weakening at its core while its periphery sprawls outward in an unlit, unplanned, ungovernable direction.
This is not poetry. It is data. And the data tells a story that no government in Islamabad or Karachi seems to want to confront directly: Pakistan’s financial capital is slowly but measurably losing the competition for economic intensity. While Karachi still accounts for an extraordinary 12 to 15 percent of national GDP—more than any other Pakistani city by an enormous margin—the character of that contribution is shifting from high-value, knowledge-intensive activity to lower-productivity, sprawl-dependent commerce. The lights are going out in the places that matter most.
“A city that cannot govern its center cannot grow its future. Karachi is learning this lesson the hard way.”
II. The Governance Trap: Twenty Agencies and No Captain
To understand why Karachi is losing its economic edge, it is necessary to understand something about how the city is actually governed—which is to say, how it is catastrophically not governed.
More than 20 federal, provincial, and local agencies currently exercise jurisdiction over some portion of Karachi’s land, infrastructure, or services. The Defence Housing Authority controls some of the most commercially prime real estate on the subcontinent. The Karachi Development Authority nominally plans land use for the broader metropolitan area. The Malir Development Authority manages a separate zone. Cantonment boards exercise authority over military-adjacent districts. The Sindh government retains overarching provincial jurisdiction. The federal government maintains control of the port, the railways, and various strategic assets.
Together, these agencies control roughly 90 percent of Karachi’s total land area. Separately, none of them has the mandate, the resources, or the incentive to coordinate with the others in service of any coherent vision for the city as a whole. The result is what economists call a “tragedy of the commons” applied to urban governance: because the costs of mismanagement are diffused across all agencies and the benefits of good management accrue to whoever happens to govern the relevant parcel, rational self-interest produces collectively irrational outcomes. Roads built by one agency end abruptly at the boundary of another’s jurisdiction. Water mains installed by one utility are torn up months later by another laying telecom cables. Parks planned for one precinct are quietly rezoned for residential development when a connected developer makes the right request to the right official.
This is not corruption in the traditional sense—though corruption is certainly present. It is something more structurally damaging: the institutionalization of irresponsibility. When no single entity is accountable for the city’s performance, no single entity can be held to account for its failures. Karachi’s governance crisis is not a problem of bad actors. It is a problem of a system designed, whether intentionally or through historical accumulation, to ensure that no one is ever truly responsible.
The analogy that comes to mind is that of a vast corporation with twenty co-equal CEOs, each controlling a different business unit, each reporting to a different shareholder group, and none with the authority to overrule the others on decisions that affect the whole enterprise. No serious investor would put money into such a structure. Yet international capital is expected to flow into Karachi’s infrastructure on exactly these terms.
III. The Fiscal Frontier: The Absurdity of Karachi’s Property Tax
Here is a number that should concentrate minds in every finance ministry from Islamabad to Washington: the property tax yield of Sindh province—which means, in practical terms, largely Karachi—is dramatically lower than that of Punjab, Pakistan’s other major province, and an order of magnitude below what comparable cities in India manage to extract from their property bases.
Property taxation is, as the IMF has repeatedly documented, the bedrock of sustainable urban finance. Unlike income taxes, which are mobile and can be avoided by relocating economic activity, property taxes fall on an asset that cannot move. Land is fixed. Buildings are fixed. The value embedded in a well-located urban parcel—value created not by the owner but by the surrounding city’s infrastructure, connectivity, and economic density—is a legitimate and efficient target for public revenue extraction.
Karachi’s failure to capture this value is not a technical problem. The Sindh government knows where the land is. It knows who owns it, at least formally. The failure is political. Property in Karachi is owned, directly or indirectly, by constituencies that have historically exercised substantial influence over provincial revenue decisions: military-affiliated institutions, politically connected developers, landed families whose wealth is measured in urban plots rather than agricultural hectares, and the 20-plus agencies whose own landholdings are routinely exempt from assessment.
The practical consequence is a city that starves its own maintenance budget. Without adequate property tax revenues, Karachi cannot fund the routine upkeep of its roads, drains, parks, and utility networks. Deferred maintenance becomes structural deterioration. Structural deterioration reduces assessed property values. Reduced assessed values further constrain tax revenues. The spiral tightens. And as the infrastructure degrades, the high-value businesses and residents who might otherwise anchor the formal tax base migrate—precisely to the peri-urban fringe where assessments are even lower and enforcement is even weaker.
The comparison with Mumbai is instructive and humbling. Mumbai’s Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation, despite its own well-documented dysfunctions, generates property tax revenues sufficient to fund a meaningful share of the city’s operating budget. Karachi’s fiscal capacity is a fraction of Mumbai’s, despite a comparable or larger population. This gap is not destiny. It is policy failure, and policy failure can be reversed.
IV. The Human Cost: Green Space, Public Transport, and Social Exclusion
Behind every percentage point of GDP and every unit of property tax yield, there are people. And in Karachi, roughly half of those people—somewhere between 8 and 10 million human beings—live in katchi abadis: informal settlements without formal property rights, reliable utilities, or legal protection against eviction.
The absence of green space, which stands at a mere 4 percent of Karachi’s urban area against a globally recommended minimum of 15 percent, may seem like a quality-of-life concern rather than a governance emergency. But in a coastal megacity where summer temperatures regularly exceed 40 degrees Celsius, green space is not a luxury. It is a survival infrastructure. The 2015 heat wave that killed more than 1,200 Karachi residents in a single week—the vast majority of them poor, elderly, or engaged in outdoor labor—was a preview of what happens when a city builds itself as a concrete heat trap and then removes the last natural mechanisms for thermal relief.
Public transport amplifies the exclusion dynamic. Karachi has one of the lowest rates of formal public transit use of any megacity its size. The city’s primary mass transit project—the Green Line Bus Rapid Transit corridor—has been in various stages of construction and delay for the better part of a decade. In its absence, millions of residents depend on informal minibuses and rickshaws that are slow, unreliable, expensive relative to informal-sector wages, and environmentally catastrophic. Workers in Karachi’s industrial zones who might otherwise access higher-paying employment in the financial district are effectively priced out of mobility. The labor market is segmented not by skill alone but by geography, and geography in Karachi is determined by whether one happens to live near the remnants of a functional transit connection.
Social polarization—the growing distance, geographic and economic, between those who live in the serviced formal city and those consigned to the informal one—is not merely an equity concern. It is a threat to the social contract that makes metropolitan agglomeration economically productive in the first place. Cities generate wealth through density, through the interactions and spillovers that occur when diverse people with diverse skills and ideas occupy shared space. When half a city’s population is effectively excluded from the spaces where those interactions happen—because they cannot afford the transport, because they lack the addresses required for formal employment, because the green spaces that make urban life bearable do not exist in their neighborhoods—the economic dividend of agglomeration is substantially squandered.
“Karachi’s inequality is not an unfortunate side effect of its growth. It is an active drag on the growth that could otherwise occur.”
V. Radical Empowerment: The Only Path Forward
The World Bank report is, appropriately, diplomatic in its language. It speaks of “institutional reform,” of “transitioning toward empowered local government,” of “Track 1 vision” and “shared commitment.” These are the necessary euphemisms of multilateral diplomacy. But translated into plain language, the report’s core argument is blunt: Karachi will not be saved by better planning documents or more coordinated inter-agency meetings. It will be saved only by radical political devolution.
What Karachi needs—what its scale, complexity, and fiscal situation demand—is an elected metropolitan mayor with genuine executive authority over the city’s land, budget, and infrastructure. Not a mayor who advises the provincial government. Not a mayor who chairs a committee. A mayor who can be voted out of office if the roads are not repaired, the water does not flow, and the city continues to dim.
This is not an untested idea. Greater London’s transformation under Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson—whatever one thinks of their respective politics—demonstrated that a directly elected executive with transport and planning powers can fundamentally alter the trajectory of a major global city within a single term. Metro Manila’s governance reforms in the 1990s, imperfect as they were, showed that consolidating fragmented metropolitan authority into a more unified structure produces measurable improvements in infrastructure coordination. Even Pakistan’s own history provides precedent: Karachi’s period of most effective urban management arguably occurred under the elected metropolitan mayor system that prevailed briefly in the early 2000s, before provincial interests reasserted control.
The Sindh government’s resistance to devolution is understandable in terms of short-term political calculus. Karachi’s land is extraordinarily valuable, and control of that land is the foundation of enormous political and economic power. But the calculus changes when one considers the medium-term consequences of continued governance failure. If Karachi’s economic decline continues—if the businesses flee, the tax base erodes, the informal settlements expand, and the infrastructure deteriorates beyond cost-effective rehabilitation—the Sindh government will find itself governing a fiscal and social catastrophe rather than a golden goose.
The international community—the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, bilateral development partners—has a role to play in shifting this calculus. The $10 billion investment framework proposed in the World Bank report should not be made available on the existing governance terms. It should be conditioned, explicitly and transparently, on measurable progress toward metropolitan devolution: the passage of legislation establishing an elected metropolitan authority, the transfer of specific land-use planning powers from provincial agencies to the new metropolitan government, and the implementation of a reformed property tax system with independently verified yield targets.
This is not interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. It is the basic principle of development finance: that large public investments require the governance conditions necessary to make those investments productive. Pouring $10 billion into a city governed by 20 uncoordinated agencies is not development. It is waste on a grand scale.
Karachi was once the most dynamic city in South Asia. In 1947, it was Pakistan’s largest, wealthiest, and most cosmopolitan urban center. The decades of governance failure that followed its initial promise are not irreversible. The city’s underlying assets—its port, its financial markets, its entrepreneurial population, its coastal location—remain extraordinary. The human capital that built Karachi’s original prosperity has not gone anywhere. It is waiting, in informal settlements and gridlocked streets and underperforming schools, for a governance system capable of releasing it.
The question is not whether Karachi can reclaim its crown. The question is whether Pakistan’s political establishment has the will to create the conditions under which it can. The satellite data showing the city’s dimming lights is not a verdict. It is a warning. And warnings, unlike verdicts, can still be heeded.
Key Statistics at a Glance
Economic Contribution: 12–15% of Pakistan’s GDP generated by a single city
Poverty Reduction: From 23% (2005) to 9% (2015) — one of Pakistan’s least poor districts
Governance Fragmentation: 20+ agencies controlling 90% of city land
Green Space Deficit: 4% vs. 15–20% globally recommended
Informal Settlements: 50% of population in katchi abadis without property rights
Infrastructure Investment Gap: $10 billion required over the next decade
Heat Wave Mortality: 1,200+ deaths in the 2015 event alone
Property Tax Yield: Significantly below Punjab, Pakistan and Indian metro benchmarksThis analysis draws on the World Bank Karachi Urban Diagnostic Report, IMF cross-country fiscal data, and global urban governance research. It is intended for policymakers, development finance institutions, and international investors engaged with Pakistan’s urban futur
Discover more from The Economy
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
-
Markets & Finance2 months agoTop 15 Stocks for Investment in 2026 in PSX: Your Complete Guide to Pakistan’s Best Investment Opportunities
-
Analysis2 weeks agoBrazil’s Rare Earth Race: US, EU, and China Compete for Critical Minerals as Tensions Rise
-
Investment1 month agoTop 10 Mutual Fund Managers in Pakistan for Investment in 2026: A Comprehensive Guide for Optimal Returns
-
Banks1 month agoBest Investments in Pakistan 2026: Top 10 Low-Price Shares and Long-Term Picks for the PSX
-
Asia2 months agoChina’s 50% Domestic Equipment Rule: The Semiconductor Mandate Reshaping Global Tech
-
Global Economy2 months agoWhat the U.S. Attack on Venezuela Could Mean for Oil and Canadian Crude Exports: The Economic Impact
-
Global Economy2 months agoPakistan’s Export Goldmine: 10 Game-Changing Markets Where Pakistani Businesses Are Winning Big in 2025
-
Global Economy2 months ago15 Most Lucrative Sectors for Investment in Pakistan: A 2025 Data-Driven Analysis
