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Economic Costs of Wars

Russia Overspends on Putin’s War in Ukraine by $28bn

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The War Economy Blows Its Own Budget

Russia entered 2025 with a plan. The Kremlin’s finance ministry had set a ceiling of 13.5 trillion rubles — roughly $162 billion at prevailing exchange rates — for national defence. That was already a record, already nearly a third of everything the state intended to spend. By year’s end, actual military expenditure had blown through that ceiling by the equivalent of $28 billion, finishing closer to $190 billion and consuming 7.5 percent of Russia’s entire GDP. That’s the highest share of economic output directed at war by any major power since the Soviet Union’s collapse. The numbers don’t just reveal the price of Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. They describe a state that has lost control of its own fiscal arithmetic.

A Budget Built for a War Moscow Didn’t Plan to Last This Long

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin’s inner circle appeared to assume Kyiv would fall within days. The 2022 federal budget had been drafted without any visible preparation for prolonged conflict — military allocations that year tracked the long-established pre-war trend, reflecting an exercise in strategic deception as much as fiscal planning.

That confidence collapsed within a week. What followed was a four-year escalation in which each successive budget has broken the last year’s record.

Russia’s military spending grew by 5.9 percent in real terms in 2025, reaching $190 billion, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s April 2026 annual survey — the most authoritative independent dataset on global defence expenditure. At 7.5 percent of GDP, this exceeds three times the global average of 2.5 percent. By comparison, the United States spent around 3.4 percent of GDP on defence in the same year.

The war’s cumulative toll on Russia’s treasury is staggering. From 2022 through 2025, total Russian war-related expenditures reached an estimated $522 billion in taxpayer funds — a sum that, according to analysts at United24, could have financed Russia’s entire higher education system for 24 years. Social spending, meanwhile, has fallen to just 25.1 percent of the federal budget, its lowest share in two decades.

The $28 Billion Overrun: What the Numbers Actually Mean

Russia’s military budget overrun is not a rounding error. It reflects a structural feature of wartime fiscal management: the gap between what Moscow publishes and what Moscow spends keeps widening with each passing quarter.

The mechanism is partly deliberate opacity. Roughly 84 percent of Russia’s defence-related spending sits in classified budget lines, a fact confirmed by SIPRI’s March 2026 analysis of the federal budget draft. Official “national defence” figures capture only the visible layer. The real number emerges from total federal expenditure, GDP estimates from Rosstat, and cross-referencing with the central bank’s monetary aggregates.

What those methods reveal is an economy that spent $2.7 billion per week on its war effort in 2025. According to year-end estimates, Russia’s military expenditures ran nearly 20 percent above initial plans for the year. The Center for Countering Disinformation in Kyiv, drawing on Russian Ministry of Defence disclosure and independent cross-checks, put total expected spending for the year at $198.8 billion — around $30 billion above the approved budget line.

The gap also reflects the brute economics of war inflation. Ammunition, drone components, soldier pay, and the mobilisation bonuses Moscow now offers to attract volunteers all carry price tags that budgeters set months in advance and actual combat burns through at a pace no spreadsheet predicted. Russia has been running the equivalent of a wartime procurement auction — and the prices keep rising.

In the first nine months of 2025 alone, Russia spent $146.4 billion from its federal budget on military needs. That is four times the level of 2021, accounting for 39 percent of total government outlays. The pre-war average, spanning 2019 to 2021, was roughly 15 percent.

Why Can’t Moscow Simply Stop?

This is the question that defines the strategic landscape — and the answer is more economically constrained than it might appear.

What does Russia’s war overspending mean for its domestic economy? In short: sustained overheating, rising debt servicing costs, and a structural squeeze that is redirecting resources away from civilian consumption faster than official commentary acknowledges. The Russian economy is not collapsing. But it’s running a temperature that no central banker can easily bring down.

In October 2024, the Bank of Russia raised its key policy rate to 21 percent in an attempt to choke inflation. The rate has since been reduced in stages to 17 percent, but borrowing costs remain prohibitive for businesses and consumers. The IMF forecast Russian GDP growth at just 0.6 percent in 2025 and 1.0 percent in 2026 — barely above stagnation. The Economic Forecasting Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences was only marginally more optimistic.

Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has acknowledged the bind: revised GDP growth forecasts have been marked down repeatedly, credit demand has weakened under the weight of high interest rates, and oil and gas revenues — the Kremlin’s traditional fiscal shock absorber — fell 19.4 percent in ruble terms in the 12 months through November 2025. The National Welfare Fund, the sovereign savings buffer that Moscow spent years building as a hedge against oil price volatility, has been drawn down by 59 percent since the invasion began.

What follows, however, is the structural paradox that makes the spending unlikely to stop: the war economy has become self-sustaining in the worst possible way. Military production and military pay are now significant drivers of household income and regional employment in parts of Russia. Unwinding them would cause exactly the kind of visible economic pain that the Kremlin most fears — not invisible fiscal deterioration, but localised unemployment and wage deflation in communities that have organised around war contracts.

The Downstream Consequences: Markets, Sanctions, and Europe’s Calculation

The fiscal picture matters well beyond Moscow’s budget office. Russia’s defence spending trajectory carries second-order effects that are already reshaping decisions in European capitals, in bond markets, and in the corridors of international financial institutions.

For Western policymakers, the $28 billion overrun is simultaneously evidence of strain and evidence of resilience. Russia has overspent its plans — but it has, so far, found ways to fund the excess. The National Welfare Fund provided cash in earlier years. Now the vehicle is domestic debt. Yields on 10-year Russian state bonds (OFZ) have exceeded 15 percent, making meaningful borrowing from capital markets nearly impossible — the net debt raised in recent quarters barely exceeded $4 billion, or 0.16 percent of GDP. Yet the government continues to spend. The implication is a growing reliance on monetary financing — a path that historically ends in accelerating inflation, not managed fiscal consolidation.

For European NATO members, Russia’s spending trajectory has been a forcing function. Europe’s combined defence budgets surpassed Russia’s in 2025 only when measured at market exchange rates — $457 billion versus $462 billion when Russia’s spending is converted at purchasing power parity, according to IISS data cited by the Financial Times. Germany’s defence budget climbed 23 percent last year to $86 billion. The logic is clear: Russia has demonstrated a willingness to dedicate a share of economic output to its military that no European democracy has matched outside wartime.

For sanctions architects in Washington and Brussels, the overrun raises an uncomfortable question. Russia’s export earnings from goods sales ran at approximately $413 billion in 2025 — slightly below 2024’s $434 billion, but not dramatically so. The oil price cap and sanctions regime have trimmed revenues at the margins without yet reaching the structural chokepoint that would force Moscow to choose between guns and basic government functions.

That chokepoint may still come. Independent analysts estimate that tighter sanctions enforcement could reduce Russia’s oil revenues to as low as $46 billion in 2026, down from $155 billion in 2025 — a shock of that magnitude would render the current spending trajectory genuinely unsustainable. But that scenario requires political will in sanctioning capitals that has, so far, remained incomplete.

The Counterargument: Russia Has Surprised Before

It’s worth pausing before declaring the trajectory unsustainable.

Russia’s wartime fiscal position has been described as untenable by credible analysts at multiple points since February 2022 — and each time, Moscow has found a path forward. Energy revenues proved more durable than predicted. Inflation, though elevated, has not spiralled into the kind of hyperinflationary collapse that some early models forecast. The domestic banking system, dominated by state-owned institutions, has absorbed shocks through mechanisms that don’t translate neatly to Western financial frameworks.

SIPRI’s March 2026 analysis explicitly notes that higher oil prices resulting from the Iran war launched by Israel and the United States in early 2026 are likely to ease Russia’s budget position — potentially significantly. A $20 per barrel increase in Urals crude translates to tens of billions in additional revenue, which reshapes the deficit arithmetic in Moscow’s favour almost immediately.

There’s also the question of what “unsustainable” means politically. The Atlantic Council’s analysis of Russia’s wartime economy noted in December 2025 that Moscow does not appear willing to direct the share of resources toward defence that the Soviet Union did during the Cold War — suggesting the Kremlin is deliberately managing below its theoretical maximum, preserving political cushion. That judgement has since been complicated by the 2026 budget, which for the first time since the invasion nominally reduced national defence allocations to 14.9 trillion rubles, even as analysts universally expect the budget to be amended upward as the year progresses.

The picture is more complicated, in other words, than either “Russia is running out of money” or “Russia can absorb anything.” The truth lives in the narrow, uncomfortable band between those two claims.

The Reckoning Moscow Can’t Defer Forever

The $28 billion overrun is not the story’s headline. It’s the symptom. The story is that Russia has been conducting a war whose costs it systematically underestimated — in lives, in rubles, and in the slow erosion of the economic architecture it built during the 2000s oil windfall.

Putin signed the 2026 federal budget in December 2025, allocating nearly 40 percent of all expenditures to the military and security sector. The 2026 defence figure is nominally lower than 2025’s. Analysts don’t believe it will stay that way. They’ve been right before.

What’s changing — slowly, unevenly, but unmistakably — is the quality of the trade-offs Moscow is making. Debt servicing costs that ran at 0.9 percent of GDP before the war are heading toward 2 percent. Tax rates on corporations and individuals have been raised twice in recent years to plug gaps that oil revenues once papered over. Social spending is at a 20-year low. The National Welfare Fund is 59 percent depleted.

Russia can, as its officials insist, keep fighting. The more precise question — the one that neither the Kremlin’s propagandists nor the West’s most optimistic analysts have answered convincingly — is at what cumulative cost to the economic foundations that make sustained power projection possible in the first place.

Every $28 billion overrun brings that reckoning one budget cycle closer.


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Analysis

Strait of Hormuz Crisis 2026: How Trump’s Toll U-Turn Exposes Global Economic Risk

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Oil markets spent Tuesday whipsawing between a one-month high and a partial retreat after President Donald Trump first threatened a 20% “reimbursement fee” on all cargo transiting the Strait of Hormuz, then abandoned the levy hours later in favour of bilateral investment pledges from Gulf states. Brent crude settled near $84–85 a barrel, roughly a third below April’s war peak but well above the pre-conflict baseline, as the US Navy reimposed a blockade on Iranian ports and Tehran’s Revolutionary Guard struck tankers with their transponders switched off (CNBC; Washington Post).

What most coverage has missed is that the toll episode, however short-lived, has functioned as a live stress test of exactly how exposed nine very different economies are to a chokepoint that carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and gas in peacetime. Vessel traffic through Hormuz collapsed from 37 ships a week earlier to just 14 on the Sunday before Trump’s announcement, according to Kpler tracking data, and the International Energy Agency’s hoped-for return to surplus by year-end now looks conditional on a durable ceasefire that has already broken down twice (CNBC; Al Jazeera).

The Toll That Never Was — But the Precedent That Might Be

The International Maritime Organization rejected the fee outright, calling mandatory transit tolls illegal under international law, while the US Treasury simultaneously warned that any shipper paying Iran for safe passage would be exposed to sanctions (NBC News). Shipping executives, including Chevron’s leadership, warned that a US-imposed toll would set a precedent allowing any country bordering an international strait — the Malacca Strait among them — to demand transit payments, a risk with direct relevance to Malaysia and Singapore’s shipping-dependent economies.

Asia’s Buffer Is Thinner Than Last Time

The South China Morning Post’s Hong Kong desk notes that Asian economies are “better placed to absorb the blow” than during April’s peak, but the buffer has eroded. Analysts at Sparta Commodities in Singapore flagged that strategic reserves drawn down during the earlier phase of the conflict leave less room to smooth a renewed shock (SCMP). For Singapore, whose Q2 growth already decelerated to 5.7% from a stronger prior quarter as AI-driven electronics exports failed to fully offset Middle East uncertainty, the mathematics are unforgiving (Free Malaysia Today).

Pakistan’s Remittance Channel Is the Overlooked Transmission Line

Pakistan receives roughly 9% of GDP in annual remittances, with 55% originating from the Gulf Cooperation Council states, according to the IMF’s most recent country report. A sustained disruption to GCC economies, or a return migration of workers amid regional instability, would strike directly at one of Pakistan’s most important financing sources for consumption and the balance of payments — a risk the Fund flags explicitly alongside compressed capital inflows from GCC banks, Pakistan’s largest source of short-term commercial financing (IMF Country Report 26/101). Islamabad’s current account is projected to worsen by 0.2 percentage points of GDP in FY26 and 0.4 points in FY27 under the Fund’s baseline, with the adverse scenario nearly doubling that hit.

The UK’s Energy Bill Arrives Months Late

British households and industry are only now absorbing the inflationary tail of the spring shock. The Bank of England’s Andrew Bailey has warned that higher energy costs already “in the pipeline” will keep headline inflation elevated into the fourth quarter even as spot oil prices ease, while the House of Commons Library estimates the indirect pass-through could add roughly a third of a percentage point to UK CPI through supply chains alone (UK Finance; Commons Library).

Why This Matters Beyond the Headline Number

The pattern across markets is consistent: the direct oil-price shock is only the first-order effect. The second-order effects — remittance flows, strategic reserve depletion, freight and insurance premiums, and the precedent risk to other global chokepoints — are where the durable economic damage is likely to concentrate, and where most competitor coverage has stopped short.


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Analysis

Strait of Hormuz Blockade 2026: Oil Prices Surge 9% as US-Iran Conflict Reignites

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Brent crude posted its steepest one-day gain since May 2020 on July 13, 2026, after President Donald Trump announced the United States would reimpose a naval blockade on Iranian shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and impose a 20% toll on cargo transiting the waterway, shattering the fragile ceasefire that had held since June and reopening one of the biggest tail risks facing the global economy in 2026.

What Happened: The Blockade Announcement

Trump said on Truth Social that the U.S. would restore what he called the “Iranian Blockade,” stopping only Iranian vessels and their customers from entering or leaving Gulf waters, while declaring the Strait itself would remain open to all other nations. The blockade took effect at 4 p.m. ET on July 14, 2026, with U.S. Central Command authorized to intercept, board, and seize any vessel calling at Iranian ports without American clearance, according to The Street. The move followed a weekend in which U.S. forces struck more than 80 targets inside Iran and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps responded by attempting to close the strait to shipping.

Brent futures jumped roughly 9.5% to trade above $83 a barrel, while U.S. benchmark WTI topped $78, levels not seen in weeks, based on data reported by Yahoo Finance. CNBC confirmed Brent’s 9.6% surge to $83.30 marked its best daily performance since May 2020, even as U.S. Central Command disputed Iranian claims that the strait had actually been closed, insisting traffic continued flowing to vessels “seeking to lawfully transit,” per CNBC.

Why the Strait of Hormuz Matters to the Global Economy

The Strait of Hormuz carries close to a fifth of global oil and gas shipments, making it the single most consequential chokepoint in energy markets. The International Maritime Organization pushed back on the legality of a mandatory transit toll, telling CNBC there is no legal basis for charging fees simply to pass through a strait recognized under international navigation law, a dispute reported by Motley Fool. Vessel traffic through the strait has already thinned dramatically, with maritime trackers noting only a handful of ships completing the transit in recent 12-hour windows.

Market Fallout: Equities, Chips, and Currency Moves

U.S. equities sold off on the news. The S&P 500 fell 0.79% to 7,515.34, the Nasdaq Composite dropped 1.55% to 25,873.18, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average slipped 138 points, according to CNBC’s markets desk. Asian chip stocks were caught in the crossfire as well, with South Korean semiconductor shares tumbling on renewed Middle East risk. Oil-importing economies across Asia — including Pakistan, Indonesia, and Singapore — face immediate pass-through pressure on fuel subsidies, current account balances, and inflation targets, compounding challenges already flagged by the IMF for the region.

What Comes Next for Oil Markets and Investors

Analysts caution that with global oil inventories already drawn down after five months of intermittent conflict, any sustained disruption to Hormuz traffic could push prices meaningfully higher than the July 13 spike. China’s refiners have reportedly stepped up crude imports even amid the volatility, signaling Beijing sees a buying opportunity rather than a reason to retreat, a dynamic also noted by Yahoo Finance. For markets in the UK, Canada, and the Gulf, the renewed blockade revives the stagflation debate central banks had hoped was fading, with the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, and Gulf monetary authorities all now forced to reassess inflation trajectories against a second energy shock in the same calendar year.

For investors, the central question is whether this is a short-lived spike similar to prior flare-ups in the conflict, or the start of a structurally higher oil price regime that reshapes global growth, inflation, and monetary policy for the remainder of 2026.


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US Economy

US-Iran War Economic Impact 2026: Hormuz Shock, Stagflation Risk, and the Global Recession Threat

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The US-Israel war on Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to 20% of world oil trade. The IMF warns of global recession. Europe faces stagflation. Asia scrambles for alternatives. Here is the full economic map.US and Israeli forces launched strikes on Iran. Within days, the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow maritime chokepoint through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil and LNG passes — was effectively closed to commercial tanker traffic. The International Energy Agency characterised the resulting supply disruption as the largest in the history of the global oil market. The comparison to the 1970s oil crisis was not hyperbole. It was the framework within which global policymakers, central bankers, and finance ministries began operating.

The consequences cascaded across every dimension of the global economy — trade, inflation, currency markets, sovereign debt, and monetary policy — with a speed that caught financial markets unprepared.

The Energy Shock: Prices, Shortages, and the LNG Emergency

Brent crude rose more than 50% from its pre-war level within two months of the conflict’s outbreak, briefly touching $101.89 per barrel by late March. US diesel prices — a real-economy barometer — surged from $3.75 to $5.37 per gallon within weeks, imposing immediate cost pressures on agriculture, logistics, and construction. The national US average gasoline price crossed $3.98, up a dollar in under a month.

But the LNG shock proved equally severe. On March 18, Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, causing a 17% reduction in Qatar’s LNG production capacity — damage that engineers estimated would require three to five years to repair. Asian LNG spot prices rose more than 140% in the aftermath. In 2024, about 84% of the crude oil and 83% of the LNG passing through the Strait was bound for Asia — with China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounting for nearly 70% of those shipments.

The IMF’s Three Scenarios

The IMF cut its 2026 global growth forecast to 3.1% — down 0.2 percentage points from January — but stressed that even this lower number assumes the most optimistic scenario: a short-lived conflict with oil averaging $82 a barrel across the year. The IMF’s own oil price assumption had been $62 at the start of 2026. With prices hovering near $100, the Fund’s intermediate scenario projects global growth falling to 2.5%. In its worst-case scenario — supply disruptions extending into 2027 — global growth falls to approximately 2%, which the IMF characterised as a “close call for a global recession.” Growth has only fallen below 2% four times since 1980.

The regional devastation in the Middle East and Central Asia is more acute: the IMF projects growth for the region at just 1.9% for 2026, a two-percentage-point downgrade, with several economies — Iran, Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain — projected to contract outright.

Europe on the Brink of Stagflation

The European economic position is among the most precarious. The ECB postponed planned rate cuts on March 19, raising its 2026 inflation forecast while cutting GDP growth projections. Oxford University’s economics department modelled the UK and the Eurozone as at risk of contraction. The Ifo Institute assessed Germany and the Netherlands as carrying high recession risk. The OECD flagged the UK as the worst-hit major economy globally.

Chemical and steel manufacturers in the UK and EU imposed production surcharges of up to 30% to offset surging electricity and feedstock costs, with warnings of permanent deindustrialisation in some energy-intensive sectors if the disruption persisted through the summer refill season.

Asia: Scrambling for Alternative Supply

The strategic exposure of Asia-Pacific economies was acute. As of February 2026, 94.2% of Japan’s crude oil imports came from the Middle East. Japan released 80 million barrels from strategic reserves — equivalent to 15 days of domestic demand — from mid-March. Indonesia, an oil producer but importer of a third of its supply, activated emergency rationing measures. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam were identified among the worst-hit economies in the developing world. Bangladesh faced recession-like conditions.

Myanmar restricted private vehicle use to alternate days. Nepal’s state oil corporation announced it would fill only half of consumers’ empty cylinders to lengthen petroleum stockpiles.

The Recession Debate: Euphoria or Denial?

Perhaps the most striking market development was the decoupling between equity performance and the underlying economic reality. The S&P 500 touched a new all-time intraday high of 7,230.12 on May 1, 2026 — despite an oil price that had risen more than 50% since February 28. Energy Aspects founder Amrita Sen described markets as displaying “extremely misplaced euphoria,” warning of “sleepwalking into potentially a pretty big recession.”

Goldman Sachs raised its US recession probability over the next twelve months to 30%. EY-Parthenon placed it at 40%. Their shared concern: that rising energy costs function as a sustained tax on consumer spending — which accounts for roughly two-thirds of US output — while simultaneously eroding corporate margins and dampening business investment.

The global economy in mid-2026 was navigating the rare and uncomfortable territory between geopolitical catastrophe and market complacency. The peace agreement signed between the US and Iran in late June offers a fragile off-ramp. But the structural lessons — about energy security, geopolitical risk pricing, and the fragility of global supply chains — will outlast the ceasefire by decades.


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