By the official scorecard, Pakistan’s economy had a good year. The Pakistan Economic Survey 2025-26 reports real GDP growth of 3.7%, easing inflation, improved foreign exchange reserves, and a primary fiscal surplus, according to reporting in Pakistan Today. The Asian Development Bank’s July 2026 outlook confirms the trajectory, projecting 3.7% growth for both 2026 and 2027, with inflation forecast at 7.2% for the year, per the ADB’s Pakistan country page.

Yet the same data that shows recovery also shows why it hasn’t reached most households — and understanding that gap matters more for policymakers, investors, and ordinary Pakistanis than the headline growth number itself.

Where the growth is actually coming from

The composition of Pakistan’s 3.7% GDP growth reveals a sharply uneven expansion. Large-scale manufacturing grew 6.1% in FY2025-26 — nearly double the headline rate — while agriculture, which remains the primary income source for tens of millions of Pakistanis, expanded by just 2.9%, according to the Pakistan Economic Survey figures reported by Pakistan Today. That gap is not a rounding error: agriculture still accounts for roughly 23% of GDP and employs over a third of the national labour force, based on the sector breakdown in Pakistan’s economic profile.

In effect, the recovery has been concentrated in industrial and formal-sector output — the parts of the economy captured most cleanly in GDP statistics — while the rural, agriculture-dependent majority has seen far more modest gains, if any.

The stabilization is real — but so is the poverty backdrop

It would be inaccurate to characterize the improvement as illusory. Pakistan’s headline inflation figures, foreign exchange reserve position, and fiscal balance have all genuinely improved from the acute crisis years of 2022-2024, when the country faced a severe balance-of-payments crunch driven by excessive external borrowing, the 2022 floods, and a global energy price shock, according to background compiled in Wikipedia’s account of the Pakistani economic crisis. By June 2025, Pakistan had reportedly led emerging markets in sovereign credit risk improvement, and April 2025 inflation briefly hit a historic low.

But stabilization from crisis is a different achievement than broad-based prosperity. Pakistan’s population below the poverty line stood at nearly 45%, with close to 16% in extreme poverty as of the latest figures cited in its national economic profile — context that helps explain why 3.7% aggregate growth, concentrated in manufacturing, does not translate into a broadly felt recovery. Unemployment remains close to 7%.

What this means for policy and for markets

For investors and multilateral lenders, the read-through is that Pakistan’s macro stabilization — inflation control, reserve accumulation, fiscal discipline — is on track and consistent with the trajectory the IMF has projected under its ongoing programme, with the Fund’s own data showing 2026 real GDP growth near 3.6% and consumer price inflation around 7.2%, according to the IMF’s Pakistan country page. That is the story that tends to dominate sovereign bond pricing and credit-rating commentary.

For domestic policymakers, the harder problem is structural: converting industrial-sector growth into broad income gains requires addressing agricultural productivity, rural credit access, and job creation in sectors beyond large-scale manufacturing — none of which move as quickly as a GDP print. Sindh’s cotton output, for instance, posted a 67% surge by end-July that offset declines in Punjab linked to monsoon disruption, illustrating how volatile and regionally uneven agricultural performance remains even within a single growing season, per Dawn’s business desk.

Key takeaways

• Pakistan’s FY2025-26 GDP grew 3.7%, but large-scale manufacturing (+6.1%) far outpaced agriculture (+2.9%), the sector employing the largest share of the workforce.
• Inflation, reserves, and the fiscal balance have genuinely improved from the 2022-2024 crisis years.
• Nearly 45% of the population remains below the poverty line, meaning macro stabilization has not yet closed Pakistan’s underlying poverty gap.
• The IMF and ADB both project ~3.6-3.7% growth continuing into 2026-2027, with inflation forecast around 7.2%.
• Regional agricultural performance remains volatile — Sindh’s cotton crop surged even as Punjab’s declined amid monsoon disruption.

FAQ

Is Pakistan’s economy actually recovering in 2026? Yes, by macro indicators — GDP grew 3.7% in FY2025-26, inflation has eased, and reserves have improved. But the growth is concentrated in large-scale manufacturing rather than agriculture, which employs more Pakistanis.

Why don’t ordinary Pakistanis feel the recovery? Because growth has been uneven: agriculture, the main income source for over a third of the workforce, grew only 2.9%, versus 6.1% for large-scale manufacturing, and poverty remains near 45% of the population.

What is Pakistan’s GDP growth forecast for 2027? The Asian Development Bank projects 3.7% growth for both 2026 and 2027, broadly matching IMF projections of around 3.6%.

Britain’s economy is growing again — just not fast enough to spare Chancellor Rachel Reeves from another difficult budget. The UK expanded by roughly 0.1% in August, keeping the economy on track for about 0.2% growth in the third quarter, but that modest rebound won’t be enough to close a fiscal hole opening beneath the government’s plans, according to analysis from FXStreet.

Where the £25 billion gap comes from

The Office for Budget Responsibility is expected to downgrade its economic assessment this autumn relative to its Spring Statement forecast, chiefly on weaker productivity assumptions. Combined with higher gilt yields and a series of policy reversals over the past year, that downgrade is projected to blow a roughly £25 billion annual hole in the public finances compared with the position Reeves described in March, per the same FXStreet analysis. A separate assessment attributes some of the UK’s recent resilience to a substantial rise in government spending — departmental budgets have grown roughly 4% in real terms — a tailwind officials do not expect to persist into the next fiscal year.

This follows an already-large tax package. Reeves’s autumn 2025 budget delivered more than £26 billion in new tax measures, according to Allianz Trade’s UK economic outlook, on top of £41.5 billion in tax increases the year before. Much of that revenue is earmarked for higher welfare spending, leaving comparatively little room for growth-focused stimulus.

The government’s counter-narrative

Downing Street has framed its record differently. In its own Spring Forecast presentation, the government pointed to inflation falling faster than expected, GDP per person growing more than projected in the original Budget, and household energy bill relief as evidence its plan is working, according to the UK government’s own Spring Forecast statement. Officials also cite the UK’s growth rate as the fastest in the G7 among European economies in 2025.

The Bank of England, meanwhile, has penciled in third-quarter growth of around 0.4% — a target that already looks difficult to reach given the pace of expansion through August and September, according to FXStreet’s assessment of the BoE forecast gap.

Why global finance is watching

For institutional investors from Singapore to Dubai, the UK’s fiscal trajectory matters beyond domestic politics. Persistently elevated gilt yields make UK sovereign debt more attractive on a relative-yield basis but signal continued fiscal strain — a dynamic that has already accelerated the migration of UK-domiciled wealth toward lower-tax jurisdictions including Singapore and the UAE (see our companion report on the non-dom exodus). A credible autumn budget, or the absence of one, will shape whether that capital flow accelerates further.

Gasoline shortages have begun appearing at filling stations in and around Moscow, a striking domestic symptom of strain in an economy the Kremlin has long held up as proof that Western sanctions have failed, even as gold reserve liquidation and a collapsing growth outlook point to deepening fiscal pressure from four years of war.

Fuel Shortages Reach the Capital

Images circulating from Moscow filling stations in mid-July showed pylons signalling “no gasoline” at pumps operated by domestic retailer Neftmagistral, according to reporting by TIME on the state of Russia’s war economy. Fuel shortages inside Russia’s own borders — as opposed to sanctions-driven export disruption — mark an escalation of a squeeze that has been building for months across the domestic refining and distribution network.

Growth Grinds Toward a Standstill

Russia’s economy is now projected to grow just 0.4% in 2026, down from an already anaemic 1% in 2025, when the country narrowly avoided outright recession, according to analysis published by Forbes. That trajectory stands in sharp contrast to the 4.1% rebound Russia posted in 2023, when the economy adapted to initial sanctions by forging new trade relationships — a bounce that has since proven unsustainable as wartime spending exhausted its stimulative effect and energy prices softened.

The same analysis notes that Russia has liquidated 71% of its gold reserves to help fund a civilian sector now stagnating alongside an overheating military-industrial complex, a combination that has pushed interest rates higher and squeezed non-defence business investment. Russia’s oil and gas revenues, which fund roughly 40% of the federal budget, reportedly halved in January 2026 before a temporary reprieve arrived via the Middle East conflict, when Brent crude surged more than 55% and the Trump administration eased some sanctions on Russian oil exports.

Gasoline shortages have reached Moscow filling stations in 2026 as Russia’s war economy shows deepening strain: GDP growth is projected at just 0.4% for the year, gold reserves have been 71% liquidated, and the EU has extended sanctions through July 2027, targeting energy revenue and shadow-fleet oil shipping.

Sanctions Extended Through 2027

The European Union has moved to lock in pressure for the medium term. The Council of the EU formally extended its economic sanctions regime against Russia for a further twelve months, through 31 July 2027, covering trade, finance, energy, and dual-use technology sectors first imposed in 2014 and dramatically expanded since February 2022. The bloc has said it remains determined to keep weakening Russia’s war economy, specifically citing plans to further curb shadow-fleet oil shipping operations and constrain the country’s banking system.

Enforcement has intensified in parallel. UK authorities reported seizing sanctioned goods on 58 occasions in the 2025/26 financial year and issuing a £1.1 million settlement for a sanctions breach, according to a summary of enforcement activity published by Fieldfisher.

The Iran War’s Double-Edged Lifeline

The Middle East conflict has proven a complicated boon for Moscow. While the oil-price spike has temporarily bolstered Russia’s export revenue, the same instability has undermined Russian energy and infrastructure ambitions in Iran itself — two Russian-backed power plant projects have reportedly been paused, along with oil and gas exploration work tied to a planned transit corridor linking Russia to India via Iranian territory, according to the Forbes analysis. In other words, the war that briefly rescued Russia’s energy revenues has simultaneously stalled one of its key long-term strategic diversification projects.

What Comes Next

With GDP growth cooling to near-zero, gold reserves depleted, and domestic fuel shortages now visible to ordinary Russians in the capital, the gap between the Kremlin’s public resilience narrative and underlying fiscal strain appears to be widening. Whether this translates into changed battlefield calculus or fresh diplomatic flexibility remains the central open question for Western policymakers as EU sanctions lock in through mid-2027.