Analysis
The Great American Equity Squeeze Ends: Why the Public Markets are Expanding Again
For twenty-three years, American capitalism has been eating itself. Since the dot-com bust, the defining feature of Wall Street wasn’t expansion, but subtraction. Trillions of dollars were spent quietly retiring shares, while private equity titans swallowed public entities whole, taking them off the board entirely.
We called it de-equitization. It made executives fabulously wealthy, consolidated corporate power, and left the public markets a hollowed-out shadow of their former breadth.
That era ends now. Driven by a punishing cost of capital, an exhausted private equity model, and a dam-burst of delayed public listings, the mathematics of the market have inverted. The great American equity squeeze is finally over.
The Macro Landscape of Subtraction
To understand the scale of this reversal, look at the high-water mark of the late 1990s. In 1998, the Wilshire 5000 index actually contained over 7,500 listed companies. By the end of 2023, that number had plummeted below 3,500. JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon loudly lamented this contraction in his annual letters, warning that the regulatory environment was actively suffocating public markets. A combination of relentless corporate stock buybacks, elevated compliance costs introduced by Sarbanes-Oxley, and a zero-interest-rate environment that allowed venture capital to keep startups private indefinitely created a perfect storm for structural decline.
Now, the gravitational pull has shifted. Higher baseline interest rates have fundamentally altered the debt-financing math that fuelled two decades of leveraged buyouts. Startups that hoarded private capital are hitting the end of their runway, forcing a massive liquidity event. According to Bank for International Settlements data on global capital flows, institutional capital is rotating back toward public equities at a pace unseen since 2004.
The result is a profound realignment. Capital is no longer fleeing the public square; it is being forced back into the light.
The Core Development: Supply Meets Demand
The realisation that the US stock market shrinking is finally coming to an end has caught many institutional desks off guard. The narrative of permanent de-equitization collapsed under the weight of three converging forces. The first is the sheer exhaustion of the private equity dry powder pipeline.
For a decade, buyout shops acted as the ultimate absorbers of public equity, using cheap debt to take companies private. Today, the cost of that debt has doubled. The math of the leveraged buyout simply no longer supports the aggressive de-listing of the S&P 500’s middle tier. Private equity firms are now net sellers, desperate to return capital to their limited partners.
Simultaneously, the US IPO market revival is unblocking a generational backlog of private enterprises. Between 2022 and 2024, hundreds of high-growth technology and biotechnology firms delayed their public market debuts, hoping for a return to the zero-interest valuation multiples of the pandemic era. They waited in vain. Now, facing intense pressure from early investors and aging founders, the gates have opened. Over 400 major IPOs are slated for the next 18 months, representing hundreds of billions in new equity supply.
The third, and perhaps most decisive factor, is legislative. The introduction of the corporate stock repurchase excise tax fundamentally altered boardroom capital allocation models. When the tax was first implemented at a nominal one percent, critics dismissed it as a minor friction. Yet, as compliance costs compound and political figures push to quadruple the penalty, boards are quietly redirecting cash flow away from buybacks. A recent analysis by the Financial Times confirmed that net share issuance turned positive in the first quarter of this year, marking the first time in over two decades that newly generated shares outpaced those retired by corporate treasuries.
The Analytical Layer: Unpacking the Reversal
Why is the US stock market shrinking?
For over two decades, the US stock market has been shrinking because corporations spent trillions on share buybacks while private equity firms aggressively took public companies private. Simultaneously, strict regulatory burdens deterred startups from pursuing initial public offerings, leading to a massive net reduction in publicly traded shares.
That is the historical reality. What follows, however, is a profound structural realignment of the capital markets.
When the de-equitization trend was the dominant paradigm, passive investors and index funds were forced to chase a dwindling pool of assets. This scarcity artificially inflated the valuations of the remaining mega-cap technology stocks, creating the dangerous top-heavy concentration that defined the S&P 500 in recent years. If there are fewer shares available to buy, but passive inflows from retirement accounts remain constant, prices mathematically have to rise regardless of underlying fundamentals.
The return of net-positive equity issuance acts as a vital pressure release valve. As new companies enter the public markets and existing giants slow their stock buyback programs, capital can finally diffuse across a broader, healthier ecosystem. This public market expansion alters the risk profile of passive investing. Instead of a market where seven technology behemoths dictate the fortunes of millions of 401(k) accounts, a growing market offers genuine, structural diversification.
Still, this transition is not purely organic. It is a forced reckoning. The private markets have become dangerously bloated. Venture capital firms are holding aging assets that simply must be marked to market. The public exchanges are the only mechanism large enough to absorb this backlog. This dynamic permanently shifts the balance of power back to Wall Street’s public underwriters and away from the insular boardrooms of Silicon Valley.
Implications & Second-Order Effects
The downstream consequences of a growing public market will reshape asset management for the next decade. The most immediate impact will be felt in market liquidity and price discovery.
During the era of contraction, fewer shares meant higher volatility. When massive amounts of capital chase a shrinking pool of equities, price swings become violent. An expanding market introduces friction and stability. More listed companies and a higher float of shares outstanding create a deeper, more resilient trading environment for retail and institutional investors alike.
For policymakers, this reversal is a quiet victory. The International Monetary Fund recently noted that the opacity of private credit and private equity poses a systemic risk to global financial stability. Pushing companies back into the light of public disclosures, quarterly earnings reports, and SEC oversight reduces the shadow-banking risks that have terrified regulators since the 2008 financial crisis. SEC Chair Gary Gensler has spent years arguing that the migration of capital to private, unregulated markets harms everyday investors. The current reversal validates that regulatory anxiety.
Corporate behaviour will also mutate. Without the crutch of constant share buybacks to artificially boost earnings per share (EPS), chief executive officers will actually have to grow their underlying businesses to impress analysts. The era of financial engineering is yielding to an era of operational execution. If a company cannot buy its way to a higher stock price by retiring shares, it must innovate, capture market share, or improve margins. This is a far healthier dynamic for the broader American economy, linking executive compensation more closely to genuine productivity rather than treasury management.
Competing Perspectives: The Skeptics’ View
The picture is more complicated than a simple renaissance of public capitalism. A vocal contingent of market strategists warns that the current data is merely a cyclical blip, not a permanent structural reversal.
The sceptical view argues that the sudden burst of IPOs is a desperate clearing of the decks by private equity, not a renewed faith in public markets. Once this backlog of aging unicorns is cleared, they argue, the pipeline will dry up again. They contend that the structural incentives that drove de-equitization—namely, the sheer cost of public compliance, the threat of class-action litigation, and the hostility of activist investors—remain entirely intact.
Cliff Asness, the billionaire quantitative investor, has frequently pointed out that the supposed death of public markets was always overstated, but so too is the current narrative of their rebirth. Critics argue that while buybacks may have slowed due to high interest rates, they have not disappeared. If inflation falls and central banks return to aggressive rate cuts, the cheap debt that fuelled the buyback machine will instantly reappear. A detailed report from Bloomberg Intelligence suggests that corporate boards are merely pausing their repurchase programs to assess the macroeconomic weather, keeping their powder dry for future financial engineering.
These counterarguments carry significant weight. The structural costs of being a public company have not decreased. Yet, they underestimate the profound psychological shift in the investment community. The infinite-duration private capital model is fundamentally broken, and the exit doors are strictly limited to the public exchanges.
The Return to Public Capitalism
For twenty-three years, the trajectory of American equities was defined by subtraction. The shrinking of the US stock market consolidated wealth, masked operational stagnation behind rising EPS figures, and pushed genuine price discovery into the opaque shadows of private equity. That arithmetic has finally broken.
Whether driven by the discipline of higher interest rates, the exhaustion of private capital, or the sheer gravity of market cycles, the public square of American capitalism is expanding again. It will be a messier, more volatile, and intensely scrutinized environment for corporate leaders who have grown comfortable in the dark. Welcome back to the public domain.
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Analysis
China Economy 2026: Export Growth Masks Manufacturing Overcapacity
China’s exports have been the good-news story in an otherwise mixed economic picture. They’re not just holding up; through the first four months of 2026 they were running about 14% to 15% above the same period a year earlier, according to figures cited by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission and Vanguard’s economic outlook. That’s the kind of number that would normally signal a healthy economy. The complication is what’s happening underneath it.
A growth model showing its age
Manufacturing capacity utilization fell to 73.9% in early 2026 — near a decade low outside of the pandemic shutdowns, per the Commission’s bulletin. That’s the tell. China is producing and shipping more, but a growing share of its industrial base is running under capacity, which points to a structural mismatch: the country’s manufacturing engine has outgrown both its domestic consumption and, increasingly, what the rest of the world is willing to absorb without pushback.
Goldman Sachs Research, in a report cited by Goldman Sachs’ own analysis, forecasts 4.8% real GDP growth for 2026 — above consensus expectations of 4.5% — driven substantially by continued export strength and a softening drag from the property downturn. But that same report flags the labor market as a genuine weak spot: hiring, measured across a weighted average of PMI employment sub-indexes, is at its most depressed level in a decade outside Covid, and urban nominal wage growth slowed to just 3.8% year-on-year in Q3 2025.
Why Beijing isn’t reaching for stimulus
Given the export strength, one might expect policymakers to feel less urgency about consumption-side stimulus. That’s roughly what’s happening — and it’s a deliberate choice, not an oversight. Xi Jinping’s government remains committed to dominating high-value manufacturing, which means comprehensive fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers remains unlikely even as domestic demand stays soft, according to the Commission’s bulletin.
The People’s Bank of China is expected to hold its policy rate steady through the rest of the year, preferring targeted structural tools over a broad-based rate cut, per Vanguard’s forecast. That’s a notably cautious stance given how weak the property sector remains — property investment indicators are down 50% to 80% from their 2020–21 peaks, and a “meaningful domestic-demand turnaround remains elusive,” in Vanguard’s own words.
The regulatory push to keep capital at home
Two moves by Chinese regulators in mid-2026 point to where Beijing’s real priority sits: keeping household savings and private capital funneled toward domestic industrial policy rather than flowing overseas. New rules taking effect July 1 restrict outbound investment that could be used to export restricted technology or expertise under the guise of ordinary capital flows, with violations carrying fines, visa restrictions and industry blacklisting, according to the Commission’s bulletin. The regulations follow Beijing’s move to block the founders of AI firm Manus from completing a sale to Meta, even after the company had relocated its headquarters from China to Singapore — a signal that Beijing is willing to reach across borders to keep promising tech assets tethered to domestic or Hong Kong listings.
The currency and trade angle
Goldman’s team makes an out-of-consensus call worth flagging: it expects China’s current account surplus to rise to 4.2% of GDP in 2026, up from 3.6% in 2025, while the broader analyst consensus surveyed by Bloomberg expects a decline to 2.5%. The divergence comes down to export resilience — falling export prices are making Chinese goods more competitive even as the yuan is expected to appreciate slightly, with export-price inflation in dollar terms forecast to turn positive, rising to 0.7% from -2.7% the prior year.
The bottom line
China’s economy in 2026 is a study in contrasts: robust headline export growth sitting on top of underutilized factories, a weak labor market, and a property sector still in its fifth year of decline. The World Bank’s own baseline, published in its country program materials, projects growth moderating toward 4.0% by 2026 — a more conservative read than Goldman’s. Either way, the consensus across forecasters is the same: exports are carrying more of China’s growth than is healthy for the long run, and Beijing’s policy choices this year suggest it’s betting on technological dominance to eventually solve the demand problem, rather than opening the stimulus taps to solve it directly.
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Analysis
Pakistan Circular Debt Crisis 2026: IMF Deadline Missed, Rs 3.44 Trillion
There’s a number that keeps showing up in every conversation about Pakistan’s economy, and it keeps getting bigger: circular debt. As of early July 2026, the gas sector’s share of that debt alone has topped Rs 3.44 trillion, and Islamabad has missed a deadline the IMF set for tariff reforms meant to arrest the slide, according to Dawn.
What circular debt actually is, and why it won’t go away
Circular debt is the chain of unpaid obligations that builds up when the price consumers pay for electricity or gas doesn’t cover what it actually costs to produce and deliver it. Someone in the chain — a power producer, a gas utility, a state-owned enterprise — ends up carrying an IOU, and that IOU gets passed down the line. Earlier this year, IMF officials pressed Pakistan on exactly this dynamic, questioning the government’s plan to zero out gas-sector circular debt, according to Aaj English. At the time, officials said around Rs 150 billion remained payable to companies including Oil and Gas Development Company Limited and Pakistan Petroleum Limited.
Islamabad’s proposed fix included a Rs 5-per-unit levy on gas, dividends from state-owned companies redirected toward debt reduction, and the sale of 35 LNG cargoes annually on the international market. The IMF, per that same reporting, raised pointed questions about whether the plan was actually viable.
The commitments Pakistan has already made
Under its Extended Fund Facility, Pakistan has committed to capping circular debt growth at Rs 300 billion for FY2027 and cutting power-sector subsidies from 0.7% of GDP to 0.6%, according to details reported by ProPakistani. The government has also shifted Nepra’s annual tariff-rebasing cycle from July to January, and Ogra now revises gas tariffs twice a year instead of once.
Structurally, some of this is working. The IMF’s own review in May 2026 credited Pakistan with a primary fiscal surplus of 1.6% of GDP for FY26, broadly in line with program targets, and noted gross reserves had climbed to $16 billion by end-December, up from $14.5 billion six months earlier, according to the IMF’s own press release. That progress unlocked roughly $1.1 billion under the EFF and $220 million under a parallel climate-resilience facility, bringing total disbursements under the two arrangements to about $4.8 billion.
Where the fault lines actually are
The uncomfortable part of this story, laid out by commentary reported in The Hans India, is that revenue targets get IMF scrutiny with great precision, while structural reform of loss-making public enterprises — Pakistan International Airlines and Pakistan Steel Mills chief among them — moves far more slowly. Those enterprises’ losses are absorbed by the national exchequer through subsidies, guarantees, and debt restructuring year after year, and privatization plans keep slipping because the political cost of confronting them is high.
Distribution company inefficiency compounds the problem. In FY25, Discos posted Rs 265 billion in losses, an improvement on FY24’s Rs 276 billion but still a substantial drag, according to Geo News, with Quetta, Peshawar and Hyderabad among the worst-performing utilities.
What happens if the pattern holds
Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio sits between 70% and 80% as of 2026, according to Wikipedia’s economic summary, with debt servicing occasionally consuming two-thirds of government spending. That’s the backdrop against which every circular-debt conversation happens: there is very little fiscal room left to absorb another missed deadline.
The missed gas tariff deadline doesn’t automatically trigger a program breakdown — Pakistan has weathered similar friction points before during its current EFF arrangement. But with the IMF’s own documentation showing persistent concern about the credibility of debt-reduction plans, and with global energy prices still elevated in the aftermath of the Iran war, the margin for further slippage is thin. The next review will likely hinge less on the rhetoric around reform and more on whether the Rs 5 levy and LNG cargo sales actually show up in the numbers.
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Analysis
Malaysia Bets Its 2026 on “Execution” — And the Semiconductor Upcycle Is Doing the Heavy Lifting
Malaysia’s government has declared 2026 a year of “execution” and “discipline” as the Anwar Ibrahim administration races to deliver on the 13th Malaysia Plan (RMK13) ahead of elections that could come as early as February 2028, according to Fortune’s interview with economy minister Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir.
A Strong Base to Build From
Malaysia’s economy grew 4.9% in 2025 following 5.1% growth the year before, with unemployment falling to 2.9% — the lowest in a decade — and the ringgit trading at its strongest level in five years. HSBC’s ASEAN economist Yun Liu forecasts 4.6% growth for 2026, citing strength in electrical equipment manufacturing, tourism, and sound government policy, while Nomura economists have projected an even more bullish 5.2%, pointing to infrastructure spending under RMK13.
The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) projects growth moderating slightly to 4.6% from an estimated 4.9% in 2025, describing Malaysia’s performance as reflecting its “entrenched position in global semiconductor and electronics value chains” and the broader global tech upcycle, according to AMRO’s assessment of Malaysia’s investment upcycle.
Navigating Washington Without Picking Sides
Malaysia’s trade relationship with the US has been turbulent. Washington imposed 25% tariffs on Malaysian goods in April 2025, rattling the country’s export-led economy, before a deal reduced US duties to 19% in exchange for Malaysia lowering tariffs on select American products, with exemptions carved out for aviation components and electrical equipment. Malaysia’s trade hit a record high of more than 3 trillion ringgit (roughly $780 billion) last year despite the friction.
Deputy finance minister Liew Chin Tong has framed Malaysia’s positioning explicitly around neutrality: the country is “not China, not the US,” a stance he argues gives Malaysia a strategic advantage in both geopolitical and supply-chain terms, according to Fortune’s reporting from the Forum Ekonomi Malaysia summit.
Capital Is Flowing In — From Everywhere
Malaysia recorded 22.8 billion ringgit (about $5.8 billion) in foreign direct investment in the first quarter of 2026, a 6.0% year-on-year increase, moderating from the prior quarter’s 48.7% surge. Inflows into information and communication technology services remained particularly strong, with China, Hong Kong, and Singapore serving as the primary capital sources, according to McKinsey’s Southeast Asia quarterly economic review. Bank Negara Malaysia has held its policy rate steady following a pre-emptive 25 basis-point cut in July 2025, with headline inflation projected to average just 2.0% in 2026.
The Long Game: Semiconductors, Rare Earths, and Nuclear Power
Beyond RMK13’s near-term targets, Malaysian officials are positioning the country’s industrial strategy around decades, not years. Minister Akmal has reiterated commitments to eliminate coal use by 2044 and reach net zero by 2050, while confirming Malaysia is actively “exploring the potential” of nuclear power to meet the energy demands of its expanding data-center and semiconductor sectors. AMRO’s structural policy guidance urges Malaysia to develop domestic semiconductor and rare-earth capabilities as a hedge against ongoing US-China “geoeconomic fracturing,” positioning the country as a trusted neutral hub for global manufacturers diversifying away from concentrated exposure to either superpower.
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