AI
The $7.6 Trillion Silicon Imperative: How the AI Investment Boom is Rewiring the Global Economy
A deep dive into the massive AI investment boom reshaping global markets. Big Tech hyperscalers are expected to spend $800 billion in 2026 on AI infrastructure, pushing total AI capex toward a staggering $7.6 trillion by 2031.
The “cloud,” for all its ethereal branding, has always been a remarkably heavy thing. It is made of steel, concrete, rare-earth metals, and miles of copper cabling. But what was once a quiet, steady accumulation of server farms has recently mutated into an industrial mobilization unseen since the construction of the U.S. Interstate Highway System or the post-war reconstruction of Europe. We are in the throes of a massive AI investment boom, one that is violently reshaping the topography of global markets, straining power grids, and testing the limits of human capital.
At the vanguard of this epochal shift are the “Big Four” hyperscalers—Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft. Driven by an arms-race mentality and a fear of obsolescence, these titans are unleashing capital at a scale that defies historical precedent. As we look toward AI infrastructure spending 2026, the combined capital expenditures (capex) of these firms are projected to hit an eye-watering $720 billion to $800 billion.
But this is merely the opening salvo. When you factor in the broader ecosystem—real estate investment trusts (REITs), utility upgrades, specialized cooling systems, and next-generation networking architectures—total global investment in artificial intelligence physical infrastructure could hit $7.6 trillion by 2031.
This is not a software update. It is a fundamental rewiring of the global economy. To understand where the market is headed, we must look past the flashing green lights of the major indices and examine the steel, silicon, and electrons quietly being poured into the earth.
The Scale of the Build: Decoding Hyperscalers AI Capex
To appreciate the sheer velocity of the big tech AI infrastructure boom, one must look at the balance sheets. In a typical technology cycle, capital expenditure rises linearly, trailing revenue. Today, the curve has gone asymptotic.
As recent earnings reports indicate, the hyperscalers AI capex is not being diverted into abstract research and development or speculative marketing. It is being violently injected into the physical layer of the internet. By the end of 2026, Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Meta are expected to collectively spend nearly 80% more than their record-breaking 2024 outlays, according to analysis in the Financial Times.
Why this staggering sum? Because the foundational architecture of computing is changing.
- The Silicon Tax: Upwards of 60% of an AI data center’s budget goes directly to silicon. While Nvidia remains the undisputed kingmaker, commanding premium margins for its Blackwell architectures, the reliance on a single vendor has spurred massive investments in custom ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) chips, such as Google’s TPUs and Amazon’s Trainium chips.
- The Networking Bottleneck: An AI supercomputer is only as fast as its slowest connection. Moving data between tens of thousands of GPUs requires specialized networking equipment, fundamentally altering the supply chains managed by firms like Broadcom and Arista Networks.
- The Power Paradigm: Traditional data centers draw roughly 10 to 15 kilowatts per rack. High-density AI clusters require upwards of 100 kilowatts per rack, demanding entirely new power delivery and thermal management architectures.
“We are no longer building data centers; we are building localized compute-cities. The capital requirements have transitioned from traditional IT budgeting to sovereign-level infrastructure financing.” — Chief Technology Officer, Tier-1 Hyperscaler]
From Training to Inference: The Strategic Drivers
Skeptics often point to the relatively modest immediate revenue generated by generative AI tools, questioning the return on investment (ROI) for this hyperscalers AI spending 2026. But this views the technology through the rear-view mirror. The current spending is not designed for the AI of 2024; it is the necessary foundation for the “Agentic AI” of 2027 and beyond.
The first phase of the AI revolution was defined by training—feeding massive language models the entirety of the open internet. Training is capital intensive but computationally finite. We are now entering the inference phase, where these models are deployed continuously in the real world to solve problems, generate code, and automate workflows.
If Agentic AI—systems that execute multi-step tasks autonomously rather than simply answering queries—becomes embedded in enterprise operations, the compute requirements will scale infinitely. Every time an AI agent negotiates a supply chain contract or dynamically reroutes logistics, it triggers an inference workload.
As McKinsey & Company notes in their latest technology forecast, if generative AI achieves scale across global enterprises, it could add between $2.6 trillion and $4.4 trillion to global GDP annually. To capture that value, the infrastructure must exist first. In Silicon Valley, the prevailing wisdom is brutal: overbuilding is a financial risk; underbuilding is an existential one.
Reshaping Markets: The Ripple Effect Beyond Silicon
The impact of AI investment on markets extends far beyond the “Magnificent Seven.” The most sophisticated institutional investors have moved past the primary beneficiaries (Nvidia, Microsoft) and are aggressively positioning in the secondary and tertiary derivatives of the AI data center investment forecast.
This “picks and shovels” rotation reveals the true anatomy of the boom.
1. The Landlords of the AI Age (Digital Real Estate)
Hyperscalers cannot permit and build facilities fast enough to meet their own timelines, forcing them into the arms of specialized real estate operators. Firms like Equinix and Digital Realty are leasing build-to-suit campuses before the concrete is even poured. In prime data center markets like Northern Virginia and Dublin, vacancy rates have plunged below 3%, giving landlords extraordinary pricing power and locking in high-margin, decade-long leases.
2. The Thermal Management Imperative
You cannot cool a 100-kilowatt AI rack with air. The thermal density of modern GPUs requires direct-to-chip liquid cooling and sophisticated immersion systems. This has vaulted previously unglamorous industrial engineering firms like Vertiv into the center of the technology ecosystem. The liquid cooling market, fundamentally non-existent at this scale five years ago, is growing at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of over 25%.
3. The Foundries and the Bottleneck
No matter how many chips Microsoft or Google design, they must physically be printed. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) essentially holds a monopoly on the advanced packaging (CoWoS) required for top-tier AI chips. In turn, TSMC relies entirely on ASML for the Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines required to manufacture sub-7-nanometer chips. As Bloomberg recently highlighted, this highly concentrated supply chain is both the engine and the Achilles heel of the AI capex trillions 2031 trajectory.
Table: The AI Infrastructure Value Chain (2026 Projections)
| Sector | Core Function | Key Beneficiaries | 2026 Market Dynamics |
| Compute Silicon | Model training & inference processing | Nvidia, AMD, Custom ASICs | Constrained by advanced packaging (CoWoS) capacity. |
| Networking | High-speed data transfer between GPU clusters | Broadcom, Arista Networks | Shift from traditional copper to silicon photonics. |
| Physical Infrastructure | Colocation, land, and facility leasing | Digital Realty, Equinix | Near-zero vacancy in Tier 1 markets; soaring lease rates. |
| Thermal & Power | Liquid cooling, power distribution units | Vertiv, Schneider Electric | Transition from air-cooling to direct-to-chip liquid systems. |
Powering the Beast: The Terawatt Challenge
If there is a hard limit to the AI investment boom, it is not capital, and it is not silicon. It is the physics of electricity.
A standard data center consumes roughly the same amount of power as a small town. A gigawatt-scale AI campus, the likes of which are currently being proposed in the U.S. Midwest and the Middle East, consumes the equivalent of a major metropolitan city.
According to projections by Goldman Sachs Research, data center power demand will rise 165% by 2030, necessitating an estimated $720 billion in grid upgrades in the U.S. alone.
This presents a profound geopolitical and economic bottleneck. While you can expedite the manufacturing of a semiconductor, you cannot hack the permitting process for high-voltage transmission lines, nor can you “download” a nuclear reactor. The grid moves at the speed of bureaucracy, while AI moves at the speed of software.
Consequently, the big tech AI infrastructure boom is rapidly becoming an energy story. We are witnessing the unprecedented sight of tech companies signing long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with nuclear plant operators—such as Microsoft’s deal to revive a reactor at Three Mile Island, or Amazon’s acquisition of a nuclear-powered data center campus in Pennsylvania. In the race to $7.6 trillion, the ultimate victor may not be the company with the best algorithms, but the one that secures the most megawatts.
“The constraint on artificial intelligence is no longer algorithmic capability; it is base-load power. We are re-entering an era where energy abundance is the primary driver of digital supremacy.” — Lead Energy Analyst, Global Investment Bank]
The Bubble Question: Irrational Exuberance or Foundational Pivot?
With numbers this vast—$800 billion in 2026, $7.6 trillion by 2031—the specter of the year 2000 looms large. Is this a replay of the Dot-com telecom crash, where miles of “dark fiber” were laid across the ocean floor only to go unused for a decade as the companies that funded them went bankrupt?
The parallels are tempting, but fundamentally flawed.
During the Dot-com boom, infrastructure was built by highly leveraged upstarts reliant on speculative debt and venture capital. When the market turned, the debt crushed them. Today’s AI investment boom is being funded from the fortress balance sheets of the most profitable companies in human history.
As noted by The Economist’s recent analysis of Big Tech cash flows, the hyperscalers are largely funding this $800 billion buildout out of operational free cash flow. They are not borrowing at 7% to buy GPUs; they are reinvesting their dominant search, e-commerce, and enterprise software monopolies into the next paradigm.
Furthermore, unlike the speculative bandwidth of 2000, AI compute is fungible. If a specific AI startup fails, the underlying infrastructure (the GPUs, the data centers, the power contracts) retains immense value and can be instantly re-leased to another tenant running different workloads.
However, risks remain profound. If the cost of inference does not fall drastically, or if “killer applications” in enterprise productivity fail to materialize by 2027, Wall Street will demand a reckoning. Margins will compress, and the valuation multiples of the “picks and shovels” companies could experience a violent reversion to the mean.
Broader Implications: Geopolitics and the Road to 2031
As we look toward the projected $7.6 trillion total AI capex trillions 2031 milestone, the conversation shifts from economics to geopolitics. Compute is the new oil.
National governments have awakened to the reality that AI infrastructure is a sovereign imperative. A nation that relies entirely on foreign compute to run its healthcare system, optimize its grid, and manage its military logistics is fundamentally insecure. This is driving a secondary, state-sponsored AI investment boom, characterized by the rise of “Sovereign AI.”
Governments across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are subsidizing domestic AI data centers and purchasing massive GPU clusters to ensure they control their own data and cultural narratives. This state-level intervention guarantees a floor for AI infrastructure demand, even if commercial enterprise adoption experiences temporary headwinds.
Concurrently, the U.S. and its allies are weaponizing the supply chain. Export controls on advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) are designed to throttle the AI capabilities of strategic rivals. This geopolitical fragmentation ensures that the infrastructure boom will be geographically redundant and inherently inefficient—meaning it will require even more capital than a perfectly globalized market would dictate.
Conclusion: The Burden of the Future
The $800 billion expected to be deployed by hyperscalers in 2026 is a staggering sum, but it is merely the downpayment on a new industrial reality. The impact of AI investment on markets has already fundamentally altered the valuation of the semiconductor industry, revived the nuclear power debate, and transformed digital real estate into the world’s most coveted asset class.
As total investment marches toward $7.6 trillion by 2031, we must recognize that we are not simply building faster computers. We are constructing the central nervous system for the mid-21st century economy.
There will undoubtedly be cycles of boom and bust, moments of overcapacity, and spectacular localized failures. But the vector is clear. The companies pouring concrete and silicon into the ground today understand a brutal historical truth: in a technological revolution of this magnitude, the only thing more expensive than building the infrastructure is being the one left renting it.
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Analysis
How Private Credit, AI, and Geopolitics Are Rewriting the Rules of Global Capital at Milken 2026
The Beverly Hills Hotel has hosted countless conversations that quietly moved markets. But something about the atmosphere at the Milken Institute Global Conference 2026 — held May 3–6 at the Beverly Hilton — felt different, less celebratory and more reckoning. The sprawling terrace lunches and panel rooms buzzed not with the intoxicating optimism of a bull market, but with the slightly anxious energy of people who can see the next chapter being written in real time and are not entirely sure they like the font.
Across four days, the world’s most consequential allocators, executives, and policymakers gathered under the California sun to wrestle with a trio of forces that are, in concert, dismantling the investment playbook that served the past two decades. Private credit has become too large to ignore and perhaps too crowded to trust blindly. Artificial intelligence is delivering genuine productivity gains even as it hollows out entire lending verticals. And geopolitics — once the polite concern of foreign policy wonks — has migrated squarely onto the spreadsheet.
The central thesis that emerged from Beverly Hills was both clarifying and unsettling: capital is not simply flowing faster; it is flowing differently, toward new instruments, new geographies, and new risk frameworks that most institutional portfolios were never designed to accommodate. The investors who understand this structural rewiring, several panelists argued, will define the next era of wealth creation. Those who mistake cyclicality for seismology will not.
The Private Credit Colossus: Opportunity, Overcrowding, and a Coming Reckoning
Chart suggestion: Private Credit Global AUM Growth, 2018–2030E (bar chart)
No asset class dominated the conversation at Milken 2026 quite like private credit, and the numbers explain why. The global private credit market has surpassed $2 trillion in assets under management as of early 2026, according to data from BlackRock and corroborated by estimates from McKinsey’s Global Private Markets Report 2026. Projections from JPMorgan Asset Management place the market on a trajectory toward $3–4 trillion before 2030, a figure that would have seemed fantastical a decade ago, when private credit was a niche instrument deployed by a handful of specialist funds.
The story of how we arrived here is, at its core, a story about regulatory displacement. Post-2008 capital requirements pushed traditional banks away from middle-market lending, creating a vacuum that private credit managers were only too glad to fill. For years, the trade worked beautifully: borrowers got flexible, covenant-light financing; lenders earned spreads that looked magnificent against a near-zero rate backdrop. The question that hung unspoken over several Milken sessions was whether the trade still works as cleanly in a world of structurally higher rates, AI-driven credit disruption, and maturing loan books.
Harvey Schwartz, CEO of The Carlyle Group, was characteristically measured in his assessment. Speaking on the Alpha in an Era of Uncertainty panel, Schwartz acknowledged the “extraordinary growth” of private credit but urged allocators to distinguish between asset classes within the broader label. “Asset-backed finance — infrastructure debt, real estate credit, specialty finance — retains genuinely attractive risk-adjusted returns,” he noted. “But direct lending to software companies whose revenue models are being disrupted by AI? That’s a different conversation entirely.”
That granular distinction is one sophisticated investors are only beginning to make. The IMF’s April 2026 Global Financial Stability Report flagged private credit’s opacity and interconnection with bank balance sheets as an emergent systemic risk, noting that stress-testing in the sector remains inadequate relative to its scale. The concern is not an imminent collapse but a slow-motion reckoning: vintages of loans written in 2021–2023 against buoyant software valuations may face quiet but painful restructuring as AI compresses the unit economics of the very companies backing them.
The more resilient corners of the private credit universe drew consistent praise. Infrastructure debt — financing the data centers, energy transition assets, and logistics networks that underpin the AI economy — was repeatedly cited as a structural opportunity with genuine demand-pull rather than financial engineering as its engine. “The denominator problem is real for equities right now,” one senior allocator told me between sessions, requesting anonymity. “But the numerator problem for infrastructure debt is also real — there simply isn’t enough of it to go around.”
“Private credit at $2 trillion is not the same animal it was at $500 billion. Scale changes everything — liquidity assumptions, default correlation, systemic importance.” — Senior sovereign wealth fund allocator, Milken 2026
AI at the Enterprise: Productivity Gospel and Its Uncomfortable Prophets
Chart suggestion: AI Capex Investment by Sector vs. Productivity Gain Estimates, 2024–2027E
If private credit represented the financial world’s most discussed asset class at Beverly Hills, artificial intelligence was its most discussed force — invoked in nearly every session, from healthcare to supply chains to the future of knowledge work itself.
The productivity gospel was preached with conviction. Panel discussions citing Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, whose recent public communications have emphasized the transformative compression of software development cycles, noted that AI-enabled coding tools are allowing companies to build in months what previously required years. For CFOs and CIOs in the audience, this represents a genuine cost structure revolution — and for some, an existential pricing event for legacy software vendors.
Schwartz of Carlyle framed the AI opportunity in capital allocation terms with particular clarity: “We are in the early stages of a productivity cycle that has not yet been fully priced into either public or private markets. The capex buildout — semiconductors, power infrastructure, data centers — is the easy part to identify. What’s harder to underwrite is the second-order disruption: which incumbent business models become structurally uneconomic in three years?”
That question carries direct implications for credit markets. Software-as-a-service businesses, which underwrote a significant share of the private credit boom of 2020–2023 on the basis of recurring revenue predictability, face a new competitive landscape in which AI-native competitors can replicate their functionality at a fraction of the cost. Several credit managers at Milken privately acknowledged conducting stress tests on software-heavy portfolio companies for the first time — a discipline that was considered unnecessary when the sector enjoyed near-monopoly pricing power.
The workforce dimension of AI disruption received thoughtful, if occasionally uncomfortable, treatment. Rather than the usual techno-optimist platitudes, multiple panelists acknowledged the distributional asymmetry of AI productivity gains: the capital owners and highly-skilled technologists who deploy AI will capture the vast majority of productivity upside, while mid-level knowledge workers in sectors like financial analysis, legal research, and software development face genuine structural displacement. The World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs Report projects net job displacement in professional services of approximately 12–15 percent over five years — a figure that sounds manageable in aggregate but represents millions of individual economic disruptions.
For investors, the practical implication is a bifurcation in human capital value that mirrors the bifurcation in asset quality. “The premium on judgment — on genuinely novel, contextual thinking — is going up dramatically,” one panel moderator observed. “The premium on pattern recognition and information retrieval is going to zero.” This has direct consequences for how financial services firms structure their own operations and, by extension, their cost bases and competitive moats.
Geopolitics as Portfolio Risk: Capital Realignment in a Fracturing World
Chart suggestion: Gulf Sovereign Wealth Fund Allocation Shifts by Region, 2020 vs. 2026
Ron O’Hanley, chairman and chief executive of State Street Corporation, offered perhaps the conference’s most sobering macro-level observation when discussing the behavior of sovereign capital in an era of geopolitical fracture. Speaking with rare directness, O’Hanley noted that Gulf sovereign wealth funds — which collectively manage upward of $3.5 trillion in assets — are undergoing a “meaningful realignment” of portfolio exposures, driven partly by elevated oil revenues, partly by domestic Vision-economy diversification mandates, and partly by the shifting geopolitical calculus surrounding U.S.-Iran tensions and broader Middle Eastern stability.
“When sovereign capital moves, it does not do so quietly,” O’Hanley observed. “And when it moves in response to geopolitical signals rather than purely financial ones, the destination choices tell you something important about how the world is being repriced.”
The implications run in multiple directions. On one side, Gulf capital is increasingly active in European infrastructure, Asian technology assets, and African natural resources — a geographic diversification that reflects both opportunity and a deliberate hedge against U.S.-centric portfolio concentration. On the other, the withdrawal or reorientation of this capital from certain Western markets creates genuine liquidity effects that smaller allocators must monitor carefully.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2026 Global Risk Outlook identifies geopolitical fragmentation as the single largest systemic risk to global investment flows, ahead of inflation persistence and financial system stress. The mechanism is not primarily one of direct conflict disruption — though that remains a tail risk — but of the steady, structural rewiring of supply chains, technology licensing, and capital account openness that accompanies sustained great-power competition.
Several Milken sessions addressed the investment implications of what has become known as “friend-shoring” — the deliberate relocation of supply chains toward politically aligned geographies. For institutional investors, this creates a novel class of assets: domestic manufacturing facilities, allied-nation infrastructure debt, and critical minerals operations that are explicitly government-backed. The returns are often modest by private-equity standards; the strategic defensibility, by contrast, is considerable.
The technology sovereignty dimension adds a further layer of complexity. U.S. export restrictions on advanced semiconductors and the European Union’s evolving approach to data localization are creating investment environments where the regulatory framework — rather than purely commercial logic — determines viable asset classes. “I’ve spent thirty years doing cross-border investing,” one veteran allocator told the audience during a particularly candid open-question session. “This is the first time I’ve genuinely had to think about whether my investment thesis is legal in five years.”
“Geopolitics is no longer a risk factor in the footnotes. It has become the thesis itself — the organizing principle around which everything else must be structured.” — Ron O’Hanley, Chairman & CEO, State Street Corporation, Milken 2026
The Intersection: When Three Tectonic Forces Collide
The most intellectually generative moments at Milken 2026 occurred not when panelists addressed any single force in isolation, but when they traced the connections between all three.
Consider the interaction between AI disruption and private credit. AI-native companies require enormous upfront capital — primarily for compute infrastructure — but generate cash flows on timelines and with volatility profiles that traditional private credit models struggle to underwrite. Meanwhile, the incumbent software companies that do have the clean credit profiles private lenders prefer are exactly the businesses most exposed to AI-driven revenue disruption. The private credit market is, in essence, confronting a simultaneous opportunity and obsolescence problem within its most familiar asset class.
Or consider the geopolitics-private credit nexus. The infrastructure assets most favored by geopolitically motivated capital — energy transition projects, domestic semiconductor fabs, allied-nation logistics networks — require the kind of long-duration, patient capital that private credit can supply but that requires very different underwriting frameworks than middle-market corporate lending. This is not simply product extension; it is a fundamental reconceptualization of what private credit is and does.
For allocators attempting to navigate this convergence, several senior investors at Milken offered practical frameworks:
- Disaggregate “private credit” as a label. Asset-backed infrastructure finance, direct corporate lending, and venture debt are three different risk profiles that happen to share a regulatory category. Treat them as such.
- Build AI exposure through picks-and-shovels, not pure-play. The infrastructure layer — power, cooling, connectivity, data storage — is more defensible than individual AI application companies, whose competitive moats are being re-evaluated monthly.
- Geopolitical hedging is now a first-order portfolio construction decision, not a risk management afterthought. This means explicit exposure to allied-nation assets, domestic infrastructure, and supply-chain-critical commodities.
- Liquidity premium reassessment. In a world of higher structural rates and more complex redemption dynamics, the illiquidity premium offered by private markets needs to be evaluated more rigorously against investors’ actual cash flow needs.
The Outlook: What 2026 and Beyond Demands From Capital
The forward-looking consensus at Milken 2026 — to the extent such conferences produce consensus — was one of cautious constructivism. The world is not ending; it is restructuring. And restructurings, as every distressed investor knows, tend to produce both significant losses for those who misread the situation and significant gains for those who position correctly ahead of the resolution.
Private credit will continue to grow, but its composition will shift materially toward hard-asset collateral and away from cash-flow lending to software businesses. AI infrastructure investment — from Nvidia’s chip architecture to the grid upgrades required to power data centers — represents one of the most defensible multi-year capital deployment opportunities in a generation, provided investors can tolerate the valuation volatility that accompanies secular growth stories. And geopolitical fragmentation, while creating real friction, also creates real alpha opportunities for managers with the expertise to navigate the new topology of allied-nation capital markets.
The Milken Institute’s own research arm has repeatedly documented the relationship between capital access and economic resilience. The coming years will test that relationship under conditions of unprecedented complexity — technological disruption compressing incumbent business models, geopolitical fracture constraining capital mobility, and a private credit market large enough to have systemic consequences if its stress-testing culture does not mature alongside its asset base.
Conclusion: Leadership in the Age of Productive Uncertainty
There is a particular quality of leadership that distinguishes the best investors from the merely competent: the ability to hold complexity without collapsing it prematurely into a simple narrative. The finance leaders gathered in Beverly Hills this week demonstrated, in their most candid moments, that they are genuinely grappling with the scale of what is changing.
The seismic forces identified at Milken 2026 — private credit’s maturation, AI’s dual role as productivity miracle and credit risk, geopolitics as portfolio architecture — are not discrete events to be managed sequentially. They are simultaneous and interactive, producing outcomes that no single model can reliably predict. That is not a counsel of paralysis; it is a recognition that the analytical frameworks and the teams that employ them need to be as dynamic as the environment they are attempting to read.
The investors who will thrive in this new era, several of Beverly Hills’ most thoughtful voices suggested, will be those who treat uncertainty not as an obstacle to decision-making but as the very medium in which genuine alpha is generated. Capital, after all, has always flowed toward courage paired with rigor. The geography of where it flows next is simply being redrawn in real time.
Key Data Points Referenced in This Article
- Global Private Credit AUM: ~$2T+ (2026), projected $3–4T by 2028–2030 (BlackRock, McKinsey Global Private Markets 2026)
- Gulf SWF Total AUM: ~$3.5 trillion under active reallocation (State Street / Milken 2026 commentary)
- Professional services job displacement from AI: ~12–15% over five years (WEF Future of Jobs Report 2025)
- IMF classification: Private credit flagged as emergent systemic risk in April 2026 Global Financial Stability Report
Sources
- BlackRock — Global Private Credit Outlook 2026
- McKinsey Global Private Markets Review 2026
- JPMorgan Asset Management — Market Insights 2026
- IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2026
- World Economic Forum — Future of Jobs Report 2025
- Economist Intelligence Unit — Global Risk Outlook 2026
- State Street Global Advisors — Capital Realignment Analysis
- Milken Institute — Research & Reports
- World Bank — Capital Flow Dynamics 2026
- Financial Times — Private Credit Special Report 2026
- Reuters — Milken Institute Conference 2026 Coverage
- Carlyle Group — Annual Investor Letter 2026
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Analysis
The New Power Brokers of AI: Capital, Compute, and the Ocean Frontier
It is a fundamental law of modern technology that lofty philanthropic ideals rarely survive contact with massive capital requirements. In May 2026, the global artificial intelligence industry finds itself pinned between two startling realities: the staggering accumulation of personal wealth generated by software, and the unforgiving physical limits of the terrestrial energy grid required to power it.
These twin pressures are currently on full display on opposite sides of the American West Coast. In a humid Oakland courtroom, the ongoing OpenAI Musk trial 2026 has laid bare the financial anatomy of the world’s most consequential AI company, culminating in the revelation of the OpenAI for-profit restructuring Brockman $30 billion stake. Miles away, out in the churning swells of the Pacific Ocean, an entirely different manifestation of AI’s future is taking shape: an 85-meter, solid-steel autonomous buoy engineered by a startup called Panthalassa, backed by a formidable $140 million investment led by Peter Thiel.
To understand the trajectory of the global economy over the next decade, one must synthesize these two seemingly disparate events. The architects of artificial intelligence are no longer merely writing code; they are engineering exotic financial structures and pioneering sovereign infrastructure. This is the dawn of the AI heavy-industry era—a period defined by a brutal arms race, a looming AI data center energy crisis, and the eternal tension between mission and money.
The Courtroom Drama: Billions on the Stand
The spectacle playing out before Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers is nominally a contract dispute, but practically, it is a referendum on the corporatization of the AI boom. Elon Musk, who contributed roughly $38 million to OpenAI’s original non-profit incarnation between 2016 and 2020, is suing to reverse the company’s evolution into a capped-profit leviathan.
On Monday, the world received a rare look under the hood of this financial engine when OpenAI President Greg Brockman took the witness stand. Under aggressive cross-examination, Brockman conceded a staggering reality: his personal equity in the company is now valued at nearly $30 billion. Crucially, as Bloomberg recently detailed, Brockman amassed this Greg Brockman OpenAI stake without investing any of his own cash into the enterprise.
For the prosecution, this is the smoking gun. Musk’s legal team argues that the OpenAI for-profit restructuring Brockman $30 billion stake serves as undeniable proof that the company abandoned its founding public-benefit charter to enrich a tight-knit executive oligarchy. The optics are further complicated by the unearthing of deeply layered financial ties between Brockman and CEO Sam Altman. Court disclosures revealed that in 2017, Altman gifted Brockman a $10 million stake in his family office. Furthermore, Brockman holds shares in Cerebras—an AI chip startup OpenAI has reportedly considered acquiring—and Helion Energy, a nuclear fusion venture heavily backed by Altman.
Yet, to dismiss OpenAI’s pivot as mere executive greed is to misunderstand the fundamental economics of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Brockman’s defense on the stand was not an apology, but a lesson in scale: “We have created the most well-resourced nonprofit in history, with over $150 billion worth of equity value,” he testified.
Answer-First: Why OpenAI Went For-Profit
For observers analyzing the market, understanding why OpenAI went for-profit requires looking past the courtroom theatrics and focusing on the balance sheet.
- The Compute Chasm: Training frontier models requires tens of billions of dollars in specialized hardware (GPUs). Pure philanthropy cannot sustain this burn rate.
- The Talent Wars: To prevent a brain drain to competitors like Google and Meta, OpenAI needed equity to compensate elite researchers.
- The Infrastructure Mandate: Securing Microsoft’s multi-billion-dollar investments required a corporate vehicle legally capable of generating and distributing returns, necessitating the capped-profit subsidiary structure.
The courtroom battle ultimately highlights a profound irony: Musk, who is seeking to force his rivals to revert to a purely non-profit foundation, has recently folded his own AI startup, xAI, into the $1.25 trillion commercial empire of SpaceX. The moral high ground in Silicon Valley is, as always, highly flexible.
The Physical Limit: AI’s Terrestrial Energy Crisis
While lawyers litigate the distribution of imaginary software wealth, the physical infrastructure supporting that wealth is buckling. OpenAI’s $850 billion private valuation—and its widely anticipated march toward a trillion-dollar IPO—is entirely contingent on its ability to train and deploy increasingly massive neural networks. But compute requires power, and terrestrial power grids are tapped out.
The AI data center energy crisis is no longer a theoretical bottleneck; it is the primary drag on global technological progress. Traditional data centers are facing insurmountable hurdles: local grid capacity limits, multi-year permitting delays, and fierce public resistance over fresh-water usage for cooling. As The Financial Times reports, banks are increasingly wary of underwriting debt for AI data centers that cannot guarantee reliable, long-term power access.
If AI models are to continue scaling at their historical pace, the industry cannot wait for the sluggish rollout of terrestrial nuclear or modernized grid infrastructure. It must find power where the grid does not exist.
The Oceanic Pivot: Peter Thiel’s Panthalassa Investment
Enter Peter Thiel and the oceanic frontier. This week, the Palantir and PayPal co-founder led a massive $140 million Series B investment into Panthalassa, an Oregon-based startup that is physically relocating the AI arms race offshore. The funding round, which also drew participation from Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff and legendary investor John Doerr, values the company at nearly $1 billion.
The Peter Thiel ocean data center thesis is breathtaking in its scale and audacity. Panthalassa is manufacturing autonomous, 85-meter-long solid-steel nodes that act as floating server farms. Instead of plugging into an overburdened mainland grid, these wave powered data centers AI modules generate their own clean electricity by harnessing the vertical motion of the open ocean.
Crucially, these nodes do not attempt to transmit power back to the shore—a historically fraught engineering challenge that has doomed previous marine energy projects. Instead, they consume the power locally, running AI inference chips onboard and transmitting the data back to civilization via low-Earth-orbit satellite networks like SpaceX’s Starlink.
“The future demands more compute than we can imagine,” Thiel stated following the investment. “Extraterrestrial solutions are no longer science fiction. Panthalassa has opened the ocean frontier.”
The Strategic Advantages of Floating Data Centers (Panthalassa)
This AI infrastructure innovation ocean waves approach solves multiple terrestrial bottlenecks simultaneously. As CEO Garth Sheldon-Coulson noted, the waves are essentially “twice-concentrated sunlight” that continue to provide kinetic energy 24/7, long after the wind stops blowing.
| Infrastructure Metric | Traditional Terrestrial Data Center | Panthalassa Oceanic Node |
| Power Generation | Dependent on strained local grids | Autonomous 24/7 kinetic wave energy |
| Cooling Mechanism | Millions of gallons of fresh water / HVAC | Free, passive seawater supercooling |
| Deployment Speed | 2-5 years (Zoning, permitting, grid queue) | Rapid modular manufacturing, no zoning |
| Data Transmission | Fiber optic landlines | Starlink / Low-Earth-Orbit satellites |
The Thiel investment AI power play is also deeply aligned with the billionaire’s long-standing ideological interests. Thiel has previously funded “seasteading” initiatives aimed at creating libertarian communities in international waters, free from sovereign regulation. While Panthalassa is strictly an industrial enterprise, the concept of processing the world’s most sensitive AI algorithms in international waters, entirely off-grid, raises fascinating geopolitical and regulatory questions.
Mission, Money, and the Geopolitics of Compute
When viewed side-by-side, Brockman’s testimony and Thiel’s investment illustrate the true nature of the 2026 AI economy. We have moved decisively past the era of software-as-a-service. AI is now a heavy industry, demanding capital expenditures that rival the oil booms of the 20th century.
This reality makes the central argument of the Oakland trial somewhat moot. Whether OpenAI remains technically tethered to a non-profit foundation or operates as a pure corporate entity, the sheer physics of the industry dictate its behavior. You cannot build AGI without billions of dollars in hardware, and you cannot power that hardware without conquering new frontiers of energy generation.
The concentration of wealth and power within this ecosystem is staggering. The same small cohort of interconnected billionaires and venture capitalists—Musk, Altman, Brockman, Thiel—are simultaneously fighting over the philosophical soul of AI, owning its foundational code, and bankrolling the physical infrastructure required to keep it running. The overlapping conflicts of interest, from family offices to satellite data transmission deals, are not bugs in the system; they are the system itself.
Forward Outlook: Navigating the Trillion-Dollar AI Economy
For investors, policymakers, and corporate strategists, the synthesis of these events offers several critical insights:
- Valuations Depend on Infrastructure: OpenAI’s IPO and its $850 billion valuation are hypothetical until the energy equation is solved. Investors must heavily discount software companies that do not have ironclad, multi-year power purchase agreements or proprietary off-grid solutions.
- The Rise of Sovereign Compute: As Reuters analysis suggests, governments will soon realize that offshore data centers represent a regulatory blind spot. If Panthalassa’s commercial rollout in 2027 is successful, expect a scramble by international bodies to regulate maritime compute, lest the open ocean become a haven for unregulated, superhuman AI training runs.
- The Death of the AI Non-Profit: The OpenAI trial proves that capital intensity inevitably supersedes philanthropic intent. Future AI startups will likely abandon the hybrid non-profit charade altogether, structuring themselves as public benefit corporations or traditional C-corps from day one.
The AI revolution was supposed to democratize intelligence. Instead, as the events of May 2026 demonstrate, it has centralized unprecedented wealth in the hands of a few tech executives, while pushing the physical limits of our planet so hard that we are now launching server racks into the sea. The algorithms may be artificial, but the battle for capital and power is as intensely human—and as aggressively terrestrial—as ever.
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Blackstone, Goldman Sachs Back $1.5bn Anthropic JV to Supercharge Private Equity with Claude AI
A landmark joint venture announced today signals that Wall Street is no longer merely watching the AI revolution—it is financing and building the infrastructure to own it.
Sometime in the next eighteen months, the CFO of a mid-size logistics company owned by a buyout firm will open her laptop to find that her quarterly close process—historically a grueling, weeks-long exercise in spreadsheet archaeology—has been compressed into three days by a team of applied AI engineers running Anthropic’s Claude. She won’t have found these engineers through a consultancy pitch or a software procurement process. They will have arrived via a $1.5 billion joint venture that is, as of today, one of the most consequential infrastructure plays in the history of enterprise technology.
On Monday, May 4, 2026, Anthropic formally announced its partnership with Blackstone, Hellman & Friedman, and Goldman Sachs to launch a new AI-native enterprise services company—a venture structured to embed Claude models and applied AI engineers directly into the core operations of private equity portfolio companies and mid-size enterprises worldwide. The deal, which has been confirmed by Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, and Fortune, represents more than a funding event. It is a declaration of strategic intent: that the most safety-focused AI laboratory in the world is now, unmistakably, in the enterprise services business.
The Deal: Structure, Investors, and Capital Commitments
The Anthropic Blackstone joint venture—which has yet to receive its official brand name—is anchored by three co-equal founding partners, each committing approximately $300 million: Anthropic itself, Blackstone (the world’s largest alternative asset manager with over $1 trillion in assets under management), and Hellman & Friedman, the San Francisco-based buyout firm known for deep specialization in software and technology services businesses.
Goldman Sachs, acting in its capacity as a strategic financial investor, is committing roughly $150 million as a founding participant. Rounding out the investor table are General Atlantic, Leonard Green & Partners, Apollo Global Management, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund GIC, and Sequoia Capital—a coalition that, taken together, spans every major category of institutional capital: growth equity, buyout, sovereign, and venture.
The total committed capital across all participants is expected to reach approximately $1.5 billion.
The structural logic of the venture is straightforward, even if its implications are not. Rather than approaching individual portfolio companies one by one—a slow, expensive, and operationally complex process—the JV creates a centralized, AI-native services layer that Blackstone, Hellman & Friedman, and the other private equity firms can deploy across their portfolios at scale. Think less “enterprise software license,” and more “AI transformation partner with skin in the game.”
The new entity will act as a consulting arm for Anthropic, helping businesses—including the private equity firms’ portfolio companies—integrate AI into their operations.
Why Now? Anthropic’s Explosive Growth Sets the Stage
To understand why this JV is happening now—rather than two years earlier or two years later—you have to understand the velocity of Anthropic’s commercial trajectory.
Anthropic hit approximately $30 billion in annualized revenue in March 2026, up roughly 1,400% year-over-year and up from $9 billion at the end of 2025. Enterprise and startup API calls continue to drive the majority of revenue through pay-per-token pricing.
This is not a normal growth curve. No enterprise technology company in recorded history has compounded at this rate at this scale—not Slack, not Zoom, not Snowflake. The engine behind it is the Claude model family—now spanning Claude Opus 4.6 for high-complexity reasoning and Claude Sonnet 4.6 for faster, cheaper code and agentic workflows—and, critically, Claude Code, Anthropic’s agentic coding platform that has driven viral developer adoption.
Over 500 customers now spend over $1 million annually on Claude, up from a dozen two years ago. Eight of the Fortune 10 are now Claude customers.
The company’s financial backing is commensurately staggering. Anthropic closed a $30 billion Series G funding round on February 12, 2026, at a $380 billion post-money valuation, led by GIC and Coatue and co-led by D.E. Shaw Ventures, Dragoneer, Founders Fund, ICONIQ, and MGX. Amazon’s $8 billion investment is now worth more than $70 billion on its books. And investor demand has pushed discussions around a potential $50 billion funding round at a valuation approaching $900 billion—a figure that would make Anthropic one of the most valuable private companies in history.
Today’s JV is not Anthropic’s response to a capital need. It is Anthropic’s response to a distribution opportunity.
The Palantir Playbook, Upgraded for the AI Era
Industry observers have been quick to reach for the Palantir comparison, and it is largely apt. The operational model is a direct copy of Palantir’s playbook: rather than just shipping software, the venture will embed teams of AI engineers directly inside client organizations. But where Palantir targeted defense and intelligence agencies with bespoke, high-touch implementations, Anthropic’s JV is targeting a far broader and faster-growing market: the tens of thousands of companies that sit within the portfolios of global private equity firms.
For the AI companies themselves, this is about pushing deeper into the enterprise—where the checks are bigger and the revenue is usually recurring. It is a whole lot faster for Anthropic to partner with PE firms than to approach each of their portfolio companies independently, and these efforts could be a test ground for non-PE enterprise clients.
The use cases the JV will prioritize reflect where AI is generating measurable ROI today: coding automation, financial due diligence, data analysis and reporting, research acceleration, workflow orchestration, and operational process transformation. These are not speculative applications. They are live deployments being tested across Anthropic’s existing enterprise customers—and the JV is designed to industrialize and scale what has already been proven.
Blackstone’s portfolio alone includes more than 230 companies across sectors including logistics, healthcare, real estate, media, and financial services. Hellman & Friedman’s holdings are concentrated in high-value software and insurance businesses. The addressable market within these two firms’ portfolios represents a formidable launching pad—before a single external enterprise client is onboarded.
Goldman Sachs and the Financial Infrastructure Angle
Goldman Sachs’s participation deserves particular scrutiny. At $150 million, Goldman’s commitment is proportionally smaller than the anchor investors, but its strategic value exceeds its check size considerably.
Goldman brings three things the JV needs: corporate relationships that span virtually every major mid-cap and large-cap company globally, expertise in financial engineering that will be essential as the JV structures its commercial offerings, and credibility with the CFOs, boards, and institutional investors who will ultimately decide whether to bring the venture into their organizations.
In 2026, enterprise AI procurement decisions are increasingly shaped by concerns about consistent outputs, audit-ready governance, and enterprise-grade control. Goldman’s presence on the cap table sends a clear signal to risk-averse buyers: this is not a speculative AI experiment. It is an institutional-grade transformation program.
There is also a subtler dimension. Goldman has been preparing for a potential Anthropic IPO—Anthropic is in early discussions with Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley about a potential public offering that could value the Claude maker at more than $60 billion on revenue terms. A founding role in the JV positions Goldman advantageously when that process accelerates.
The Competitive Landscape: Anthropic vs. OpenAI’s “DeployCo” Gambit
Today’s announcement does not occur in a vacuum. OpenAI and Anthropic are each in talks with different PE groups to create something akin to enterprise AI consulting arms.
OpenAI’s equivalent initiative—internally referred to as DeployCo—has been structured differently and more aggressively on investor economics. OpenAI is offering private equity firms a guaranteed minimum return of 17.5%, significantly higher than typical preferred instruments, as it seeks to enlist investors including TPG, Bain Capital, Advent International, and Brookfield Asset Management.
DeployCo is structured as a $10 billion Delaware LLC, with OpenAI committing up to $1.5 billion of its own capital upfront, while the PE investors are putting in roughly $4 billion over five years.
The contrast between the two ventures is instructive. OpenAI is offering higher financial returns to attract PE partners. Anthropic is offering something subtler but arguably more durable: a co-ownership model in which the PE firms are not merely customers or financial investors, but genuine strategic co-founders of the enterprise services vehicle. Both companies are competing to partner with buyout firms to roll out AI tools across hundreds of private companies, boosting adoption and creating long-term customer stickiness.
The effort is reminiscent of Avanade—a joint venture formed in 2000 between Microsoft and Accenture to implement Windows and Microsoft enterprise solutions into large corporations. Not apples-to-apples, but similar enough in strategic logic.
Strategic Implications: What This Means for Enterprise AI Adoption
A New Distribution Model for AI Infrastructure
The JV solves a problem that has quietly plagued enterprise AI adoption for three years: the implementation gap. Companies sign AI contracts, attend demos, and run pilots—then struggle to translate prototype performance into production-scale value. McKinsey’s research has consistently found that fewer than 30% of enterprise AI initiatives achieve their intended ROI targets within two years of launch.
The Anthropic JV is structurally designed to close this gap. By embedding applied AI engineers within client organizations—rather than handing off software licenses—the venture assumes responsibility for outcomes, not just outputs. This shift from software vendor to transformation partner is the core commercial innovation.
Claude AI for Portfolio Companies: The Compounding Advantage
Private equity’s portfolio model creates a structural advantage for AI adoption that is easy to underestimate. When a single PE firm owns 30 to 50 operating companies, and an AI services provider can deploy a standardized transformation playbook across that portfolio, the economics of AI implementation improve with every successive deployment.
Configuration knowledge, integration templates, industry-specific prompt libraries, and change management frameworks developed for the first portfolio company become assets that accelerate the tenth, the twentieth, the fiftieth. This compounding dynamic—AI playbooks getting better as they scale—is precisely what makes the Palantir comparison feel apt, and what makes Blackstone’s network effect so valuable to Anthropic.
Implications for Traditional Consulting Firms
The JV puts Anthropic in direct competition with the world’s largest consulting firms for the lucrative business of corporate AI transformation. McKinsey, Bain, BCG, Deloitte, and Accenture have all built significant AI practices over the past three years—but those practices remain fundamentally model-agnostic. They advise clients on AI strategy without owning the underlying technology.
Anthropic’s JV collapses the distance between model and implementation. This is not consulting. It is vertical integration at the application layer—and traditional consultancies will need to decide whether to compete, partner, or cede this segment of the market.
Risks and Challenges: The Road Ahead Is Not Smooth
Implementation Complexity at Scale
The vision of deploying AI engineers across hundreds of portfolio companies simultaneously is operationally demanding. Anthropic, for all its model excellence, does not yet have the implementation infrastructure of an Accenture or an IBM Global Services. Building that capability—recruiting, training, deploying, and retaining applied AI engineers at scale—will be the JV’s most immediate and most difficult challenge.
Job Displacement and Workforce Tensions
The JV’s stated focus on workflow automation and operational transformation is a euphemism for process compression—and process compression, in human terms, often means fewer roles. CFOs who reduce quarterly close cycles from weeks to days with AI assistance do not typically add headcount. Private equity’s ownership model, with its emphasis on operational efficiency and EBITDA expansion, creates additional pressure on workforce outcomes. The JV should expect mounting scrutiny from regulators, labor organizations, and ESG-focused institutional investors.
Concentration of AI Power
The investor lineup—Blackstone, Goldman, Apollo, GIC, Sequoia, General Atlantic, Leonard Green—reads like a who’s who of global institutional capital. Their collective network spans thousands of companies and hundreds of billions of dollars in enterprise value. Critics will argue, with some justification, that concentrating access to Anthropic’s most capable AI models through this particular coalition creates structural advantages for PE-backed businesses over their independently owned competitors.
Anthropic’s Pentagon Problem
A complicating backdrop: the U.S. Department of Defense has designated Anthropic a supply-chain risk, requiring defense contractors to cut ties with the company by June 30, 2026—a designation stemming from Anthropic’s usage-policy restrictions that cost it a $200 million defense contract. While the JV targets commercial enterprise clients rather than government contractors, the Pentagon designation creates regulatory uncertainty that sophisticated enterprise buyers will not ignore.
What Comes Next: The AI Private Equity Land Grab
Today’s announcement is best understood not as a singular deal, but as the opening move in a multi-year AI private equity land grab—a race among the world’s most capable AI laboratories to lock in the distribution channels and implementation relationships that will determine enterprise market share for the better part of a decade.
The structural analogy to the cloud transition of the 2010s is imperfect but instructive. When Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud competed for enterprise cloud adoption, the winners were not necessarily those with the best underlying technology—they were those who built the deepest integrations, the largest partner ecosystems, and the most dependable migration pathways. AI enterprise adoption will follow a similar logic.
A large portion of Anthropic’s current revenue growth is driven by AI coding capabilities, specifically through Claude Code and the Cowork platform—and many investors believe the company is only scratching the surface of its potential, given the massive opportunity to expand into finance, life sciences, and healthcare.
The JV accelerates that expansion substantially. With Blackstone’s operational network, Goldman’s corporate relationships, and Hellman & Friedman’s software sector expertise serving as distribution infrastructure, Anthropic’s applied AI engineers will have access to a client pipeline that would take a conventional enterprise software company a decade to cultivate independently.
For mid-size companies watching from the sidelines—particularly those not yet owned by any of the JV’s PE participants—the message is sobering: the premium tier of enterprise AI implementation is consolidating, and the window to access it on equal terms is narrowing.
FAQ: Anthropic Blackstone JV — Your Questions Answered
What is the Anthropic Blackstone joint venture? It is a newly announced, $1.5 billion AI-native enterprise services company co-founded by Anthropic, Blackstone, and Hellman & Friedman (each contributing ~$300 million), with Goldman Sachs as a founding investor (~$150 million) alongside General Atlantic, Leonard Green, Apollo Global Management, GIC, and Sequoia Capital. The JV will embed Anthropic’s Claude models and applied AI engineers into private equity portfolio companies and mid-size enterprises.
What will the JV actually do? The venture functions as a hybrid software-plus-consulting firm, deploying Claude-powered AI workflows across enterprise operations including financial reporting, due diligence, coding automation, data analysis, research, and process transformation—drawing on a model similar to Palantir’s forward-deployed engineering approach.
Why is Goldman Sachs involved in an AI venture? Goldman brings corporate relationships, financial credibility, and IPO advisory positioning. As Anthropic prepares for a potential public offering, Goldman’s founding role in the JV deepens the firm’s commercial and financial relationship with one of the world’s most valuable private companies.
How does this compare to OpenAI’s DeployCo initiative? OpenAI’s competing venture offers PE investors a guaranteed 17.5% return and is structured as a majority-owned OpenAI subsidiary. Anthropic’s JV uses a co-ownership model without guaranteed returns, emphasizing strategic alignment over financial engineering. Both target the same market: accelerating AI adoption across private equity portfolio companies.
What are the risks for enterprise clients considering the JV? Implementation complexity, workforce displacement, vendor concentration, and—specific to Anthropic—the company’s ongoing regulatory tensions with the Pentagon. Enterprise buyers should conduct thorough due diligence on data governance terms, implementation guarantees, and workforce transition planning before committing.
Is an Anthropic IPO coming? Multiple reports indicate Anthropic is in early IPO discussions with Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley. A public offering could come as soon as late 2026 or 2027. Today’s JV, and the revenue visibility it creates, strengthens the IPO narrative considerably.
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