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Singapore’s Banking Paradox: Why Fee Income and Loan Recovery Can’t Fully Save Margins in 2026

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The city-state’s banking giants are rewriting their revenue playbook as traditional profit engines sputter—here’s what investors need to know

When DBS CEO announced Q3 2025 results with wealth management fees surging 20% year-over-year, the stock dropped 4%. Welcome to the new reality for Singapore banking: spectacular growth in one revenue stream can’t quite compensate for what’s eroding in another.

As 2026 unfolds, Singapore’s Big Three banks—DBS Group Holdings, OCBC Bank, and United Overseas Bank—find themselves navigating a fundamental recalibration. Analysts foresee a 2% growth in earnings per share for DBS in 2026, driven mainly through fee income, while net interest margins are anticipated to soften further, with UOB guiding for 1.75%-1.80%, down from 1.85%-1.90% in 2025.

This isn’t a crisis. It’s a transformation—one that reveals which banks have successfully diversified their revenue engines and which remain dangerously dependent on interest spreads that peaked in 2024 and won’t return anytime soon.

The Great Margin Squeeze: Why Singapore Banks Face Their Toughest Earnings Test in Years

The golden age of Singapore banking profitability, fueled by the 2022-2024 interest rate surge, is definitively over. Net interest margin declined to 1.84% for OCBC in Q3 2025 from 1.92% in Q2, while DBS reported the highest net interest margin at 1.96%, compared to 1.84% for OCBC and 1.82% for UOB.

These numbers tell a stark story. Between Q2 2024 and Q3 2025, Singapore’s banks watched their core profit engine—the spread between what they charge on loans and what they pay on deposits—compress by 15 to 28 basis points. For context, every 10 basis point decline in net interest margin reduces group profit by approximately 2-3%, according to bank management guidance.

Key Takeaways for Investors

  • Net interest margins will compress further in 2026, with UOB guiding 1.75-1.80% versus 1.85-1.90% in 2025
  • Wealth management AUM surged 18% year-over-year for DBS and OCBC, 8% for UOB in Q3 2025
  • Dividend yields forecast at 6.1% for DBS, 5.4% for OCBC and UOB in FY2026
  • Loan growth expected at low-to-mid single digits (2-5%), driven by corporate lending and regional expansion
  • All three banks maintain CET1 ratios above 15%, providing capital buffers for dividends and buybacks

The culprit? A perfect storm of declining benchmark rates and aggressive deposit repricing. Flagship current accounts and SGD fixed deposits have been repriced by -120 basis points to -175 basis points from Q3 2024 to Q3 2025, with UOB making a further 60 basis point cut to its flagship current account in December 2025.

Here’s what makes this particularly challenging: while rates fell sharply, banks couldn’t immediately reduce deposit rates without risking customer flight. This asymmetry—loans repricing downward quickly while deposits adjust slowly—creates a painful compression period that Singapore banks are navigating right now.

The regional comparison is equally sobering. UOB’s net interest margin narrowed to 1.82% from 2.05%, representing a 23 basis point decline that exceeds what many regional peers experienced. Hong Kong banks, facing similar rate dynamics, have generally maintained margins in the 1.6%-1.9% range, suggesting Singapore banks entered this downturn from a higher baseline—meaning they had further to fall.

Yet there’s a crucial silver lining buried in the data. DBS economists expect 3-month Singapore Overnight Rate Average (SORA) to rebound from lows of 1.13% in early December 2025 to hold at approximately 1.25% through 2026. This stabilization suggests the worst of the margin compression may be behind us, even if margins don’t recover to 2024 peaks.

Fee Income Revolution: The S$4.8 Billion Question Reshaping Singapore Banking

While net interest income declines, an extraordinary wealth management boom is reshaping Singapore’s banking landscape—and the numbers are staggering.

DBS’s wealth management assets under management rose 12% year-on-year in the first half of 2025, while wealth income grew 8% year-on-year. Meanwhile, OCBC recorded an 11% year-on-year increase in wealth management AUM, with wealth income up 4% year-on-year. Even UOB, dealing with integration challenges from its Citibank acquisition, posted respectable gains.

By Q3 2025, the momentum accelerated dramatically. Assets under management grew 18% year-over-year for both DBS and OCBC, while UOB recorded an 8% increase. To put these figures in perspective: DBS alone added approximately S$21 billion in net new money in 2024, lifting total AUM to S$426 billion.

What’s driving this wealth influx? Singapore’s transformation into Asia’s premier wealth management hub isn’t accidental—it’s structural. The city-state now hosts 1,650 single-family offices as of 2025, nearly double the count from two years earlier. Each of these family offices represents not just wealthy individuals parking capital, but sophisticated financial entities requiring comprehensive banking services: treasury management, foreign exchange hedging, multi-currency accounts, and bespoke lending arrangements.

The fee composition tells an even more interesting story. Wealth management income isn’t just investment management fees—it encompasses a sophisticated menu of services. DBS, for instance, generates wealth fees from discretionary portfolio management (where the bank makes investment decisions on behalf of clients), advisory services, custody fees, transaction commissions on securities trades, foreign exchange markups, and insurance product distribution through its bancassurance partnerships.

Fee income showed strong 20% year-over-year growth to S$1.58 billion for DBS in Q3 2025, driven primarily by wealth management fee income. OCBC’s performance was equally impressive, with 15% year-over-year growth in non-interest income to S$1.57 billion, driven particularly by net fees and commissions in wealth management.

The mathematics of fee income versus net interest income deserves scrutiny. While fee income is growing at double-digit rates, it starts from a much smaller base than net interest income. For DBS, total fee income of approximately S$6 billion annually still represents roughly one-third of total net interest income. This means even a 20% surge in fees can only partially offset a 5-8% decline in NII.

But here’s what makes the fee story genuinely transformational: quality of earnings. Net interest income is inherently cyclical, tied to central bank policies and economic cycles beyond any individual bank’s control. Fee income, particularly from wealth management, is stickier. Once a bank captures a wealthy family’s business—establishing trust, demonstrating competence, and embedding itself in the family’s financial infrastructure—that relationship tends to persist across interest rate cycles.

The sustainability question looms large, however. Can wealth inflows continue at this pace? Two factors suggest yes. First, geopolitical instability in Hong Kong continues to drive capital southward. Second, ESG-related investments in Singapore have surged to SGD 45 billion by 2025, doubling in just two years, creating entirely new fee pools as banks develop and distribute sustainable investment products.

Loan Growth: The Comeback That Almost Wasn’t

For most of 2023 and early 2024, loan growth was Singapore banks’ Achilles heel. High interest rates discouraged borrowing, corporate treasurers prioritized paying down debt, and property market cooling measures kept mortgage growth subdued.

The turnaround, while modest, is real. Overall loans to non-bank customers grew by 4.7% year-over-year as of August 2025, compared to 3.8% in Q2, driven by higher corporate loans to residents and increased lending to the Americas.

Breaking down the loan book reveals where growth is materializing. Singapore bank loans increased to SGD 853.3 billion in June 2025 from SGD 844.6 billion in May 2025, driven by higher loans to businesses. Within the business sector, particularly strong growth appeared in building and construction (up to SGD 178.8 billion), general commerce (SGD 88 billion), and financial and insurance activities.

Consumer lending tells a more nuanced story. Housing and bridging loans increased to SGD 237.2 billion in June 2025 from SGD 235.7 billion in May, representing growth but at a glacial pace given Singapore’s perpetually hot property market. This reflects the ongoing impact of property cooling measures—higher stamp duties, tighter loan-to-value ratios, and total debt servicing ratio frameworks that limit how much Singaporeans can borrow relative to their income.

The 2026 outlook for loan growth requires parsing bank-specific guidance and macroeconomic realities. UOB expects low single-digit loan growth, which translates to roughly 2-3% expansion. OCBC projects mid-single-digit loan growth (approximately 4-5%), while DBS, despite its optimistic tone, faces mathematical challenges in maintaining growth from the largest loan book base among the three.

Corporate lending opportunities exist but come with important caveats. Singapore’s GDP growth is projected at 1-3% for 2026, significantly below the 4.4% achieved in 2024. This slower growth naturally constrains business expansion and, by extension, credit demand. However, credit demand should stay healthy in the immediate term as business sentiment improves amid some reduction in uncertainty.

Trade finance represents another bright spot. Singapore’s position as ASEAN’s financial hub means it captures a disproportionate share of regional trade financing. As ASEAN economies continue their 5-6% growth trajectories—faster than developed markets—Singapore banks benefit from financing intra-regional commerce, even when Singapore’s own domestic economy grows more slowly.

The property market deserves special attention because it represents such a large portion of consumer loan books. While mortgage rates are likely to continue easing, potentially offering some relief to homeowners or those looking to enter the property market, banks are simultaneously becoming more cautious. Banks will be scrutinizing loan applications more carefully, particularly for investment properties or in sectors they perceive as higher risk.

This creates an interesting dynamic: borrowing costs are falling, which should stimulate demand, but credit standards are tightening, which constrains supply. The net effect will likely be modest loan growth—positive but underwhelming—that contributes to but doesn’t transform the earnings picture.

The Analyst Verdict: Flattish Profits, Spectacular Dividends

Wall Street and regional investment banks have coalesced around a remarkably consistent view of Singapore banks’ 2026 prospects: profits will plateau or decline slightly, but shareholder returns remain compelling.

DBS is forecast to post a dividend yield of 6.1% in FY2026, while OCBC and UOB are each expected to offer yields of about 5.4%. These yields sit well above Singapore’s 10-year government bond yield (approximately 2.8%) and comfortably exceed fixed deposit rates offered by the same banks (ranging from 2.5-3.2% for 12-month placements).

The earnings forecasts themselves paint a picture of stability rather than excitement. DBS, the sector bellwether, faces expectations of approximately 2% earnings growth—essentially flat in real terms after accounting for inflation. The net profit may ease slightly from 2025 peaks, while total income stays stable.

What underpins these dividend forecasts isn’t just current profitability but capital strength. All three banks maintain Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratios exceeding 15%, which sits comfortably 5 percentage points above Monetary Authority of Singapore requirements. This excess capital provides multiple strategic options: higher dividends, share buybacks, or capital-return programs.

Dividend yields of up to 6% and excess capital continue to be strong tailwinds for the sector, with potential for general provisions writeback and excess capital on the cards (exempting UOB). The mention of general provisions writeback is significant. During 2020-2021, banks dramatically increased loan loss provisions anticipating COVID-related defaults that ultimately materialized less severely than feared. As these precautionary provisions prove unnecessary, banks can release them back into earnings, providing a one-time boost to reported profits.

The investment case increasingly hinges on total shareholder return (capital appreciation plus dividends) rather than earnings growth alone. At current valuations, DBS trades at the highest price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratios among the three banks, with the lowest dividend yield, reflecting its premium positioning and superior return on equity of 17.1%.

Regional comparisons provide useful context. Hong Kong banks trade at similar valuation multiples but face greater uncertainty from China’s property market struggles and geopolitical tensions. Australian banks offer comparable dividend yields but operate in a more mature, slower-growth market. Singapore banks occupy a sweet spot: developed-market stability with emerging-market wealth accumulation dynamics.

One crucial risk factor that analysts flag consistently is asset quality, particularly concerning exposure to Greater China property markets. UOB faced sharply higher allowances for credit and other losses, working through refinancing stress in parts of its real estate exposure. While systemic risk appears contained—Singapore banks’ direct exposure to distressed Chinese developers remains limited—any deterioration would quickly undermine the benign credit cost assumptions underpinning 2026 forecasts.

Strategic Crossroads: How Banks Are Adapting Beyond 2026

The banks’ strategic responses to margin pressure reveal dramatically different philosophies about the future of banking in Asia.

DBS has doubled down on digital transformation and regional expansion. The bank’s wealth management success stems partly from technology investments that allow relationship managers to serve more clients more efficiently. Its digital platforms process over $1 billion in daily transaction volumes, generating fee income from every foreign exchange conversion, cross-border payment, and securities trade.

OCBC’s strategy centers on insurance integration and what it calls the “multi-pillar” approach. OCBC Bank’s performance highlights the critical role of diversification in insulating total income, allowing net profit to remain virtually unchanged year-over-year. Through Great Eastern, its insurance subsidiary, OCBC cross-sells life insurance and investment-linked products to banking customers, generating commissions that appear in non-interest income but originate from the banking relationship.

UOB faces the most complex strategic challenge: integrating the Citibank consumer businesses it acquired across Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The synergy extraction phase from the integration of Citi Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam is proving more challenging than initially anticipated. However, UOB aims to accelerate Southeast Asia expansion, targeting 30% of revenue from the region in 2026, while keeping Singapore’s revenue share at 50%.

The technology arms race deserves particular attention. All three banks are investing heavily in artificial intelligence for credit underwriting, fraud detection, and customer service. DBS processes loan applications that once took three days in under 30 minutes using machine learning models that assess creditworthiness across hundreds of data points. These efficiency gains directly impact the cost-to-income ratio—a critical metric as revenue growth slows.

Regulatory environment shifts could also reshape the competitive landscape. The Monetary Authority of Singapore continues refining frameworks around digital banks, cryptocurrency, and family office regulation. Any tightening of wealth management regulations could slow the very fee income growth that banks are counting on to offset margin compression.

The 2026 Investment Case: Income Over Growth

For investors weighing Singapore bank stocks as 2026 approaches, the thesis has fundamentally shifted from a growth story to an income story.

The bull case rests on three pillars. First, Singapore equity valuations remain attractive, with the yield gap against T-bills tracking above historical averages. Second, dividend sustainability looks rock-solid given excess capital buffers. Third, the worst of net interest margin compression has likely passed, meaning earnings should stabilize rather than continue deteriorating.

The bear case centers on limited upside. With analysts forecasting essentially flat earnings growth, capital appreciation depends on multiple expansion—investors paying more for the same earnings—which seems unlikely in a higher-interest-rate world where bonds offer decent yields. Additionally, any negative surprises on asset quality, particularly from China exposure or Singapore property market weakening, could quickly undermine the defensive narrative.

For income-focused investors, particularly retirees or those building dividend portfolios, Singapore banks offer rare combination of yield, quality, and liquidity. The 5.4-6.1% dividend yields exceed what most developed-market banks offer, while Singapore’s regulatory framework and banks’ capital strength provide safety that emerging market banks cannot match.

The technical picture matters too. The sector is expected to see continued fund inflows, supported by a second round of Equity Market Development Programme fund deployment extending into early 2026. This government-driven initiative channels sovereign wealth into Singapore equities, providing steady bid support that can dampen volatility and support valuations.

Conclusion: Excellence Amid Moderation

Singapore’s banking sector enters 2026 not in crisis but in transition. The extraordinary profitability of 2023-2024, driven by interest rate tailwinds that won’t repeat, is giving way to a more nuanced revenue model where fee income and modest loan growth must compensate for narrowing margins.

Analysts foresee wealth management momentum continuing, creating compensatory fees in place of declines in net interest income. Whether this compensation proves complete or partial will determine whether 2026 earnings merely flatline or actually contract.

For DBS, OCBC, and UOB, the test isn’t survival—their balance sheets and market positions ensure that—but rather whether they can demonstrate the strategic agility to thrive in a lower-margin environment. Early evidence suggests they can, but the journey from record profits to sustainable, diversified excellence requires execution discipline that few banks globally have consistently demonstrated.

Investors should approach Singapore banks with realistic expectations: high dividend yields and defensive characteristics, but limited capital appreciation until either interest rates rise again or fee income growth accelerates beyond current trajectories. That’s not a condemnation—it’s simply the reality of mature, well-capitalized banks operating in a moderating economic environment.

The Singapore banking story for 2026 isn’t about explosive growth. It’s about quality income, prudent capital management, and the slow transformation of business models to match a changing economic reality. For investors seeking stable returns in uncertain times, that might be exactly what they need.


What’s your take on Singapore banks’ strategic pivot? Can fee income models sustainably replace net interest income dominance, or are we witnessing temporary compensation for cyclical margin pressure? Share your perspective in the comments below.


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Analysis

7 Ways Tech Startups Are Revolutionizing Pakistan’s Financial Ecosystem in 2026

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Let’s Explore how Pakistan’s fintech startups are transforming financial inclusion, payments, SME lending, and digital banking in 2026—with real data, key players, and policy insights driving the country’s $4B startup ecosystem.

Picture Amna, a small-scale textile vendor in Faisalabad’s crowded bazaar. Three years ago, she kept her earnings in a tin box under the shop counter—unbanked, invisible to the formal economy, and locked out of credit. Today, she processes supplier invoices digitally, accesses working capital within 24 hours, and tracks her cash flow on a smartphone app. Amna didn’t walk into a bank branch. A startup came to her.

This is the quiet revolution reshaping Pakistan’s financial landscape. With VC-backed startups now collectively valued at around $4 billion—up 3.6 times since 2020—Pakistan’s growth rate outpaces larger ecosystems including India, New York, and Dubai, positioning it among emerging “New Frontier” tech markets Profit by Pakistan Today. Yet for all the momentum, no unicorn has emerged yet, the funding gap at growth stages remains acute, and roughly 85% of transactions still move in cash. The gap between potential and reality is precisely where startups are doing their most consequential work.

Here are seven ways Pakistan’s tech startups are rewriting the rules of finance in 2026—and why global investors and policymakers should be paying close attention.

1. Expanding Financial Inclusion Beyond Urban Walls

Pakistan’s financial exclusion problem is, at its core, a distribution problem. Traditional banks have concentrated their branch networks in major cities, leaving vast swathes of rural Punjab, interior Sindh, and Balochistan underserved. Pakistan aims to increase adult financial inclusion to 75% by 2028, up from 64% currently, with 143 million broadband and 193 million cellular subscribers forming the digital infrastructure to get there. Invest2Innovate

Startups are filling this gap with mobile-first models that don’t require a bank branch, a credit history, or even a formal ID in some pilots. Easypaisa—Pakistan’s largest mobile wallet—has evolved from simple bill payments into a comprehensive financial super-app covering government disbursements, QR payments, and international remittances. JazzCash serves tens of millions of users across peri-urban and rural markets. Meanwhile, newer entrants like Paymo are targeting digital-native youth with social banking features designed for Gen Z’s financial behaviours.

The economics here are compelling on a global scale. Bangladesh’s bKash built a $2 billion enterprise on mobile financial services for an underserved population—a playbook Pakistan’s ecosystem is now iterating and improving upon. The difference is that Pakistan’s startups are layering artificial intelligence and embedded finance on top of basic wallet infrastructure, building toward something more sophisticated than simple cash transfers.

2. Reinventing B2B Payments and Supply Chain Finance

If consumer fintech is the visible face of Pakistan’s digital finance revolution, B2B infrastructure is its beating engine. Haball is perhaps the most striking example. The Karachi-based fintech has raised a $52 million Pre-Series A round led by Zayn VC and backed by Meezan Bank, scaled its platform to handle over $3 billion in payments, and disbursed more than $110 million in financing to thousands of SMEs and multinational clients. Daftarkhwan

What Haball is doing—digitizing the order-to-cash cycle across Pakistan’s vast informal supply chains—addresses a structural inefficiency that has cost the economy billions in idle working capital and reconciliation errors. By automating invoicing, digitizing trade flows, and embedding Shariah-compliant financing into the transaction itself, Haball turns every payment into a data point for underwriting the next loan.

The implications extend well beyond individual deals. Pakistan’s informal sector accounts for over 40% of GDP, and much of that informality is driven by opaque supply chains and the friction of cash. When startups digitize these flows, they don’t just solve a payments problem—they bring entire economic layers into visibility, taxation, and formal credit assessment for the first time.

3. Accelerating Digital Remittances and Cross-Border Finance

Remittances are Pakistan’s economic lifeline. At roughly $30 billion annually, they outpace foreign direct investment and are equivalent to nearly 8% of GDP. Yet the infrastructure carrying this money has historically been dominated by expensive incumbents—hawala networks and legacy wire services that extract 5–7% in transfer fees from workers sending money home from the Gulf, UK, and North America.

Startups are beginning to disrupt this. Platforms like SadaPay are digitizing international remittances, reducing friction and cost for Pakistani diaspora communities. Invest2Innovate The company’s trajectory also illustrates the ecosystem’s volatility—SadaPay faced staff reductions following its acquisition by Turkish fintech Papara, underscoring how consolidation is beginning to reshape the competitive landscape even in early-stage markets.

Pakistan’s Raast instant payment system, launched by the State Bank of Pakistan and inspired by India’s Unified Payments Interface, is now the backbone connecting digital remittance platforms to beneficiary accounts in real time. The combination of a robust central rails infrastructure and agile startup players building on top of it creates the conditions for the kind of remittance cost compression India achieved within five years of launching UPI—a development that could redirect hundreds of millions of dollars in annual transfer fees back into Pakistani household budgets.

4. Unlocking Capital for Small and Medium Enterprises

SMEs account for roughly 90% of businesses in Pakistan and contribute around 40% of GDP, yet they receive less than 10% of total bank credit. The reasons are well-documented: lack of collateral, informal accounting, no credit history, and risk-averse bank lending desks that simply aren’t calibrated for small-ticket loans. This is where Pakistan’s credit-tech and embedded finance startups are making their most economically significant interventions.

Startups like CreditBook provide micro-loans to SMEs and individuals excluded from traditional banking, while Abhi innovates payroll financing, NayaPay supports SME financial management, and Mahana Wealth promotes saving among the underserved. Invest2Innovate Abhi, founded in 2021, has now raised $57.8 million for its financial wellness platform—making it one of the best-capitalised fintech startups in the country.

The pivot toward hybrid financing models is itself a structural innovation. Pakistan’s startups raised approximately $74.2 million in reported funding in 2025, almost double the funds mobilised in 2024, with the increase driven by hybrid financing—combinations of equity and debt—replacing the previous equity-only funding approach. Business Recorder This mirrors what development finance institutions have long advocated: blended finance structures that reduce first-loss risk and unlock private capital at scale. When applied at the SME lending level, the same logic holds.

5. Building Regulatory Infrastructure That Enables—Not Just Constrains—Innovation

A startup ecosystem is only as strong as the regulatory framework it operates within. Pakistan has not always been known for nimble financial regulation, but the State Bank of Pakistan has been quietly constructing an architecture that is beginning to attract serious attention.

The SBP’s regulatory sandbox, launched to allow fintechs to test innovations under controlled conditions without full licensing requirements, has been central to this shift. SBP’s frameworks have created a supportive environment, positioning Pakistan as a promising fintech market. Invest2Innovate The central bank’s digital banking licensing framework, which has drawn applications from a growing cohort of neobank candidates, represents a further commitment to structured innovation rather than arbitrary prohibition.

Globally, the contrast with peer markets is instructive. Bangladesh’s fintech growth was turbocharged by its own regulatory openness to mobile financial services—a decade ago, a decision considered brave at the time. Nigeria’s central bank took a more restrictive path and watched significant fintech capital flow to Ghana and Kenya instead. Pakistan’s regulators appear to have absorbed these lessons, even if implementation speed remains a work in progress. One of the most notable structural shifts in 2026 is the rise of hybrid financing models and growing interest from bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions in supporting Pakistan’s startup ecosystem. Startup

6. Driving Islamic Fintech as a Global Differentiator

Pakistan is home to 230+ million Muslims, and its financial system has a constitutional obligation to move toward interest-free models. This is not merely a regulatory constraint—it is a market opportunity of extraordinary scale that global Islamic finance players have barely begun to exploit at the retail level.

Haball’s Shariah-compliant supply chain financing is one marker of this trend. But the opportunity extends much further: Murabaha-structured digital lending, Musharaka-based equity crowdfunding, and Sukuk tokenization on blockchain rails are all adjacent spaces where Pakistani startups have structural advantages that competitors in secular financial systems simply don’t possess.

Islamic fintech, AI-driven credit systems, open banking, and cross-border payments are identified as the four major growth frontiers for Pakistan’s fintech ecosystem. Startup With the global Islamic finance industry valued at over $3 trillion and growing at 10–12% annually, Pakistani startups that develop credible, scalable models in this space are building for an export market as much as a domestic one—positioning Pakistan as a potential hub for Islamic fintech products serving markets from Indonesia to Morocco.

7. Creating Jobs, Skills, and a Self-Sustaining Innovation Flywheel

Economic ecosystems don’t grow linearly—they compound. The most durable contribution Pakistan’s tech startup sector is making to its financial ecosystem isn’t any single product or funding round. It is the accumulation of human capital: engineers, product managers, compliance specialists, data scientists, and founders gaining experience that will seed the next generation of ventures.

There are now 170+ VC-backed startups across Pakistan, with 13 “Colts” generating $25–100 million in annual revenue and 17 breakouts having raised between $15 million and $100 million. Startup Each of these companies is a training ground. When engineers leave Haball or NayaPay to start their own ventures, they carry institutional knowledge—of regulatory navigation, of underwriting logic, of enterprise sales in a cash-heavy economy—that accelerates their next company’s time to product-market fit.

Funding to female-founded or co-founded startups nearly doubled, rising from $5.5 million in 2024 to $10.1 million in 2025 Business Recorder, though the average deal size for women-led ventures remains smaller, signalling that inclusion in the ecosystem is widening even as capital parity remains elusive. This trajectory matters: research from McKinsey and the IFC consistently shows that more diverse founding teams produce more resilient companies and broader economic multipliers.

The Road Ahead: From Momentum to Transformation

Pakistan’s fintech story in 2026 is one of real but fragile progress. The country’s $4 billion ecosystem could scale rapidly over the next five to seven years with deeper growth capital and large exits—but the funding gap at later stages remains the primary bottleneck, with no company yet earning more than $100 million in annual revenue or reaching unicorn status. Profit by Pakistan Today

The comparison with India is both inspiring and sobering. India’s fintech ecosystem generated over $9 billion in venture funding in 2021 alone, supported by a government that treated UPI as strategic infrastructure and built policy frameworks that pulled private capital in behind. Pakistan’s policymakers have the blueprint. What they lack is the same scale of conviction in execution.

For international investors—particularly development finance institutions, Gulf sovereign wealth funds, and impact-oriented funds looking at frontier markets—Pakistan represents a rare combination: a massive underserved population, a young and mobile-connected demographic pyramid, a regulatory environment trending toward openness, and startup teams with demonstrably world-class technical ambition. The risk is real. So is the asymmetry.

A Call to Action

For policymakers: Accelerate the implementation of open banking frameworks and extend the SBP’s digital banking licensing to include regionally focused neobanks targeting rural communities. Treat financial infrastructure—Raast, digital identity, data-sharing rails—as public goods requiring sustained government investment, not one-time pilot programmes.

For investors: The window for early growth-stage capital in Pakistan’s fintech sector is open and underappreciated. The startups that survive the current funding gap will emerge stronger, leaner, and with defensible market positions. Patient capital with local ecosystem partnerships is the model that will generate both returns and development impact.

For entrepreneurs: The infrastructure is improving. The regulatory environment is becoming more navigable. The market is enormous, largely untapped, and increasingly digital. Pakistan’s first fintech unicorn is not a question of whether—it is a question of when, and who.

Amna in Faisalabad is already there. The rest of Pakistan’s financial system is catching up to her.


Sources and data cited from: Pakistan Tech Report, Dealroom.co & inDrive, January 2026; invest2innovate (i2i) 2025 Ecosystem Report; i2i Fintech Landscape Report; Tracxn Pakistan FinTech Data, January 2026; Daftarkhwan: Top Pakistani Startups 2026; Startup.pk VC Ecosystem Report; World Bank Financial Inclusion Data.


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Analysis

Pakistan’s SBP Reserves Climb to $16.2 Billion: Analyzing the Latest Forex Update and Its Economic Implications

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Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves held by the State Bank of Pakistan edged up to $16.20 billion in the week ended February 13, 2026 — a number that, while modest in isolation, tells a larger story of structural stabilization, IMF discipline, and a country carefully rebuilding its financial credibility after one of the most severe balance-of-payments crises in its modern history.

A Week-on-Week Gain That Signals Quiet Confidence

The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) reported on Thursday that its foreign exchange reserves increased by $19 million during the week ended February 13, 2026, reaching $16,196.9 million ($16.20 billion). Pakistan’s total liquid foreign exchange reserves — which include SBP holdings and net reserves held by commercial banks — stood at $21,301.5 million ($21.30 billion). Of that combined figure, commercial banks held $5,104.6 million ($5.10 billion), a decline of approximately $92.3 million week-on-week, partially offsetting the central bank’s gain.

The weekly increase is unremarkable in size but remarkable in what it represents: the ninth consecutive week of positive movement in SBP-held reserves. Strip away the noise, and a clear trend emerges — Pakistan is steadily, if cautiously, replenishing the reserve buffers it nearly exhausted during the 2022–23 crisis.

The Weekly Data in Context: A Reserve Trajectory Table

The latest SBP reserves update gains considerably more meaning when viewed against the recent weekly trajectory:

Week EndingSBP Reserves (USD mn)Weekly Change (USD mn)
February 13, 202616,196.9+19.1
February 6, 202616,177.8+21.0
January 30, 202616,157.2+56.0
January 23, 202616,101.1+13.0
January 16, 202616,087.7+16.0
January 9, 202616,071.8+16.0
Week of Dec. 19, 2025*16,055.7+141.0
Week of Dec. 12, 2025*15,915.1+13.0
Week of Dec. 5, 2025*15,902.5+16.0
Late November 202515,886.8+1,300.0 (IMF tranche)

Dates approximate based on SBP release sequence. Source: State Bank of Pakistan

The late-November spike — a $1.3 billion jump — represents the single most consequential data point in this series. The SBP confirmed that the weekly increase was mainly due to the receipt of SDR 914 million, equivalent to about $1.2 billion, from the IMF under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF). Everything since then has been organic accumulation: modest but persistent gains averaging roughly $20–25 million per week, a cadence that speaks to improved external inflows rather than one-off injections.

The IMF Scaffolding: What’s Holding the Recovery Up

No serious analysis of Pakistan’s latest SBP reserves update can ignore the role of the International Monetary Fund in engineering the turnaround. Pakistan’s 37-month EFF was approved on September 25, 2024, and aims to build resilience and enable sustainable growth, with key priorities including rebuilding international reserve buffers and broadening the tax base. Gross reserves stood at $14.5 billion at end-FY25, up from $9.4 billion a year earlier, and are projected to continue to be rebuilt in FY26 and over the medium term.

That $9.4 billion-to-$16.2 billion trajectory over roughly eighteen months is striking. But it would be naive to frame it purely as success. Much of the gain reflects the $7 billion IMF program’s front-loaded disbursements — the IMF’s total commitment to Pakistan comprises $5.2 billion under the Extended Fund Facility and $1.4 billion through the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, aimed at strengthening the country’s foreign exchange reserves. A third review is scheduled for March 2026, which, if cleared, would entitle Pakistan to an additional ~$1.04 billion under the EFF and ~$211 million through the RSF. The market is watching.

The IMF has not been ungenerous with its praise, but it has also not been vague about its expectations. IMF officials noted that Pakistan’s reform implementation under the EFF has helped preserve macroeconomic stability, with real GDP growth accelerating, inflation expectations remaining anchored, and fiscal and external imbalances continuing to moderate. The subtext is clear: continued disbursements are contingent on continued discipline.

Remittances: The Underrated Engine

Beneath the IMF headline, a quieter but arguably more sustainable driver has been building momentum: overseas remittances. Pakistan’s remittances are projected to exceed $41 billion in 2026, marking a notable increase from $38 billion last year. Remittances currently account for roughly 7–8% of Pakistan’s GDP — a lifeline that, unlike IMF tranches, does not add to the country’s external debt stock.

January 2026 reinforced this picture dramatically. Pakistan received $3.5 billion in foreign remittances in January 2026, and the country recorded a current account surplus of $121 million in January, compared to a current account deficit of $393 million in the same month last year. That is not merely a number — it is a reversal. A year ago, Pakistan was hemorrhaging foreign exchange; today, it is generating a current account surplus. The improvement was attributed to stronger remittance inflows and a rebound in exports, which crossed the $3 billion mark for the first time in January to reach $3.061 billion, compared to $2.27 billion in December 2025.

With Ramazan beginning in late February and Eid ul-Fitr approaching in late March, seasonal remittance spikes — historically the largest of any year — could provide another meaningful uplift to reserves in the coming weeks. Overseas Pakistanis tend to send significantly more money home ahead of major religious observances, and given the scale of the diaspora across the Gulf, the UK, and North America, this annual inflow is no trivial variable.

Pakistan Economy Recovery: The Macro Backdrop

Understanding the latest Pakistan total liquid reserves 2026 data requires contextualizing it within a broader macroeconomic stabilization story that, just two years ago, looked anything but inevitable.

In 2022–23, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves fell to dangerously low levels — at one point covering less than one month of imports. The rupee collapsed. Inflation surged above 38%. The IMF had to be called in under emergency conditions. Pakistan’s import cover — a key indicator of external sector strength — stood at less than one month during the 2022–23 crisis period; it has since climbed to approximately 2.5 months. At the current trajectory, the SBP’s own upgraded forecast of reaching $17.8 billion by June 2026 would push import cover comfortably above three months — the IMF’s benchmark for adequate reserve buffers.

The IMF projects Pakistan’s current account deficit for FY25 at about $0.2 billion, or 0.1 percent of GDP, helped by resilient exports and a stronger remittance outlook, as improved macro and FX stability has supported a rebound in remittance inflows through formal channels. These projections, calibrated conservatively, now look increasingly optimistic given January’s current account surplus.

However, analysts caution that the road ahead is not without hazard. External debt repayments remain elevated. Import demand — deliberately suppressed during the crisis — is beginning to recover as the economy grows, which will widen the current account deficit over the medium term. Over the medium term, the current account deficit is expected to widen modestly to around 1 percent of GDP as imports rebound. Sustaining the reserve build-up will require export growth and continued structural reforms, not just remittance windfalls and IMF tranches.

The Commercial Bank Divergence: A Nuance Worth Noting

One detail in Thursday’s release deserves closer scrutiny. While SBP-held reserves rose by $19.1 million, net foreign reserves held by commercial banks fell by $92.3 million to $5,104.6 million. Total liquid reserves consequently declined week-on-week from $21.374 billion to $21.301 billion — a net reduction of $73.2 million.

This divergence matters. Commercial bank reserves are typically more volatile, influenced by import payments, letter of credit settlements, and short-term capital movements. Their decline in the same week that the central bank gained suggests that private sector foreign currency demand — for trade financing and external payments — is picking up. This is broadly consistent with an economy that is beginning to return to a more normal import cycle. It is not a red flag. But it is a reminder that the $16.2 billion SBP headline and the $21.3 billion total liquid figure tell somewhat different stories about where Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves impact on economy is most acutely felt.

Bond Market Sentiment and Foreign Inflows

Pakistan’s bond market has undergone a dramatic repricing over the past twelve months. After years of yields in double digits — partly reflecting credit risk premiums that placed Pakistani sovereign debt in near-junk territory — foreign inflows into Pakistan bonds have been recovering as investor confidence improves. The IMF program’s credibility, declining inflation, and a more stable rupee have all contributed.

Pakistan’s economy grew an estimated 2.4 percent in FY25, up from 0.3 percent in the previous fiscal year, as inflation cooled and the rupee stabilized after a steep depreciation cycle in 2022–23. The improvement in external buffers is likely to boost investor sentiment at a time when the government is stepping up efforts to attract foreign direct investment and privatize state-owned enterprises.

For global investors scanning South Asian sovereign debt, Pakistan presents a complicated but increasingly interesting risk-reward proposition. The EFF program provides a backstop. The reserve trajectory is improving. But political risk, energy sector liabilities, and the scale of pending structural reforms — particularly on taxation and state-owned enterprise privatization — remain substantive concerns that no amount of weekly reserve data can fully paper over.

What This Means for Everyday Pakistanis

The relevance of the latest SBP foreign exchange reserves weekly data extends far beyond financial markets. For ordinary Pakistanis, reserve levels are a proxy for economic stability in the most direct sense.

When reserves are low, the rupee weakens, import costs rise, and inflation — particularly in food and energy — accelerates. The 2022–23 crisis saw petrol shortages and cooking oil price spikes that hit the country’s most economically vulnerable citizens hardest. Conversely, as reserves strengthen, the SBP has greater capacity to manage exchange rate volatility, facilitating the import of raw materials for industry, medicines, and consumer goods at more stable prices.

With remittances hitting $3.5 billion in January alone, families receiving overseas transfers are also seeing more purchasing power — dollars converted at a more stable exchange rate translate into more rupees, more household spending, and more local economic activity. This virtuous cycle, fragile as it remains, is more visible now than at any point in the past three years.

Forward Outlook: The $17.8 Billion Target and the Risks

The SBP’s own forecast — foreign exchange reserves reaching $17.8 billion by June 2026, up from a previous estimate of $17.5 billion — follows a controlled current account deficit and the realisation of planned official inflows. Achieving that target from the current $16.2 billion would require an additional $1.6 billion over roughly four months, or approximately $400 million per month. Given recent monthly inflow dynamics — remittances, IMF disbursements pending the March review, and bilateral inflows — the target appears achievable, but not guaranteed.

Key Data Summary (Week Ended February 13, 2026)

MetricValue
SBP-held FX reserves$16,196.9 million ($16.20 billion)
Net reserves — commercial banks$5,104.6 million ($5.10 billion)
Total liquid foreign reserves$21,301.5 million ($21.30 billion)
Week-on-week SBP change+$19.1 million (+0.12%)
Week-on-week commercial bank change-$92.3 million
Week-on-week total liquid change-$73.2 million
SBP FX reserves forecast (June 2026)$17.8 billion

Source: State Bank of Pakistan official weekly release, February 19, 2026

Key risks to the upside scenario include: a deterioration in the IMF relationship that delays the March 2026 review; an oil price spike that widens the import bill; or a global risk-off episode that triggers capital outflows from emerging markets. On the upside, a successful Eurobond issuance or Panda bond placement — discussed in IMF program documents — could provide a step-change in the reserve buffer.

Conclusion: Rebuilding Credibility, One Week at a Time

Pakistan’s $16.2 billion in SBP-held reserves and $21.3 billion in total liquid foreign exchange reserves are, in the grand sweep of emerging-market economics, modest numbers. They pale against India’s $640+ billion reserve war chest, or even Bangladesh’s more insulated external position. But for a country that was, less than three years ago, teetering on the edge of a sovereign default scenario, they represent something more important than a number: they represent the painstaking reconstruction of credibility.

That credibility — with the IMF, with international bond investors, with the Pakistani diaspora deciding whether to remit through formal channels — is what ultimately underpins the reserve trajectory. The weekly $19 million gain is a data point. The story it belongs to is a long-term stabilization project with no guarantees, but with more reason for cautious optimism today than at any point since the crisis began.

The question for policymakers, investors, and analysts alike is not whether Pakistan has turned a corner — the evidence suggests it has. The real question is whether it can hold that corner while accelerating the structural reforms that transform a reserve recovery into durable, private-sector-led growth.

The answer to that question will not arrive in a weekly reserve bulletin. But every Thursday, as the SBP releases its latest figures, it offers a small, incremental clue.


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Analysis

Pakistan and the US Sign a Landmark Pact to Redevelop New York’s Roosevelt Hotel

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On a cold February morning in Washington, two governments separated by thousands of miles and decades of complicated diplomacy sat down to sign a piece of paper that could reshape a New York City skyline — and perhaps, the financial trajectory of a struggling South Asian economy.

On February 15, 2026, Edward C. Forst, Administrator of the US General Services Administration (GSA), and Pakistan’s Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to redevelop the storied Roosevelt Hotel in Midtown Manhattan. The ceremony, witnessed by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, unfolded under the quiet endorsement of the Trump administration — a signal, however subtle, that Washington sees economic utility in deepening ties with Islamabad. According to Reuters, the agreement marks a significant turning point in cross-border real estate deals in 2026, and possibly a template for how sovereign-owned properties in prime global cities could be unlocked for private capital.

The Roosevelt Hotel is not just real estate. It is memory, mythology, and — as Islamabad is now acutely aware — money.

A Grand Dame Reborn: What’s at Stake at 45th and Madison

Built in 1924 and named after President Theodore Roosevelt, the hotel sits at the intersection of 45th Street and Madison Avenue — one of the most commercially valuable addresses on the planet. For nearly a century, it hosted world leaders, jazz legends, and Hollywood icons. Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) acquired it in 1979, and for decades it served as both a diplomatic asset and a revenue stream for the cash-strapped national carrier.

But the Roosevelt closed its doors to guests in 2020, a casualty of both the pandemic and chronic underinvestment. In 2023, it briefly reopened as a migrant shelter — a poignant, if jarring, chapter for a property that once defined Gilded Age glamour. Since then, it has sat largely dormant, a 19-story limestone monument to unrealized potential.

That potential is now being quantified. Current plans, as reported by Dawn, envision transforming the Roosevelt into a 1.8 million square foot mixed-use tower — a vertical neighborhood combining luxury residential units, Grade-A commercial office space, retail, and possibly a reimagined hotel component. The projected joint venture (JV) is estimated at up to $5 billion, which would make it one of the most significant foreign-linked real estate transactions in New York in recent memory.

The MoU: What Was Actually Signed?

The February 15 agreement is, legally speaking, a framework — not a finalized deal. MoUs of this nature establish intent, outline due diligence parameters, and create negotiating guardrails. They are, in the parlance of real estate finance, a starting gun, not a finish line.

What makes this MoU structurally interesting is the involvement of the GSA, the federal agency that manages US government real estate and procurement. The GSA’s role suggests that American institutional backing — potentially including regulatory facilitation, zoning cooperation, or federal-level deal structuring — could be part of the equation. That’s a meaningful signal to private investors evaluating exposure to this project.

Key Facts at a Glance:

DetailInformation
MoU SignedFebruary 15, 2026
SignatoriesGSA Administrator Edward C. Forst; Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb
WitnessesPM Shehbaz Sharif; US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff
Projected JV SizeUp to $5 billion
Planned Development1.8 million sq ft mixed-use tower
Property Location45th Street & Madison Avenue, Midtown Manhattan
Current OwnerGovernment of Pakistan (via PIA subsidiary)

For Pakistan, the stakes are existential in a fiscal sense. The country has been navigating a fragile IMF programme, and monetizing sovereign assets abroad is central to its reform strategy. The Roosevelt, conservatively valued at over $500 million in land alone, represents one of the most liquid and internationally legible assets the government holds.

PIA Privatization: The Domino That Made This Possible

To understand the Roosevelt deal, you need to understand what happened in Karachi in December 2025. In one of the most consequential privatization transactions in Pakistan’s recent history, Arif Habib Corporation acquired a 75% stake in Pakistan International Airlines for Rs135 billion — approximately $480 million at prevailing exchange rates. The transaction transferred operational control of PIA, long a byword for state inefficiency, into private hands.

Arab News has noted that this privatization was a prerequisite condition quietly demanded by international creditors and reform advocates: before Pakistan could credibly claim ownership of a $5 billion Manhattan redevelopment JV, it needed to demonstrate it could execute domestic privatization cleanly. The PIA deal did exactly that.

The Roosevelt Hotel, technically held through a PIA subsidiary called Roosevelt Hotel Corporation, now sits in a transitional ownership structure. With PIA privatized, the government retains the hotel through a separate sovereign vehicle — giving Islamabad clean title to negotiate the redevelopment independently of the airline’s new private owners. That structural clarity, according to brokers cited by The Real Deal, is precisely what has allowed serious JV conversations to accelerate.

Manhattan Real Estate in 2026: The Timing Isn’t Accidental

If there was ever a moment to announce a landmark Midtown redevelopment, this is it. Manhattan’s commercial real estate market, battered through 2022 and 2023 by remote work trends and elevated interest rates, has entered what analysts at CBRE and JLL are calling a “selective recovery.” Office vacancy rates in premier Midtown submarkets have tightened meaningfully, while luxury residential demand — particularly in the 45th to 57th Street corridor — remains structurally undersupplied.

The proposed 1.8 million square foot mixed-use tower would compete in a segment of the market currently dominated by developments like One Vanderbilt and 270 Park Avenue. But the Roosevelt site carries something those glass towers cannot manufacture: history, brand equity, and a 100-year address. Developers who can weave preservation with density — retaining the landmark facade while delivering contemporary interiors — command meaningful premiums in New York’s luxury market.

NYC zoning, however, is never simple. The Roosevelt site falls under the Special Midtown District regulations, and any tower exceeding current as-of-right massing would require either a variance or a city-sanctioned Special Permit. Given the site’s landmark-adjacent status and the political visibility of a Pakistani-American JV, community board engagement and environmental review timelines could add 18 to 36 months to the development schedule. Experienced New York developers price this in; whether Islamabad’s negotiators fully have remains an open question.

The Geopolitical Subtext: Why Washington Cares

Steve Witkoff’s presence at the MoU signing deserves a second look. As President Trump’s Special Envoy — a role he has used to broker conversations from Gaza to Moscow — Witkoff’s attendance at what is ostensibly a commercial real estate signing is not incidental. It suggests the Trump administration views the US-Pakistan economic partnership through a strategic lens: a Pakistan that is economically stable and commercially integrated with American markets is a Pakistan less susceptible to Chinese financial dependence.

This is not new calculus — successive US administrations have used economic diplomacy as a stabilization tool in South Asia. What is new is the vehicle: rather than aid packages or military agreements, the instrument here is a Manhattan skyscraper. It is, in its own way, a very 21st-century form of geopolitical leverage.

For Pakistan, the optics are equally valuable. A $5 billion JV with American institutional partners — potentially including US pension funds, REITs, or sovereign wealth co-investors — would represent the most visible demonstration yet that Islamabad’s reform programme is credible to Western capital markets.

Risks, Realities, and the Road Ahead

No analysis of this deal would be complete without acknowledging the considerable execution risks.

Pakistan’s track record on large infrastructure and real estate deals is uneven. Political transitions, currency volatility, and bureaucratic inertia have derailed ambitious projects before. The Roosevelt initiative has now survived multiple administrations in Islamabad — a promising sign — but the distance between an MoU and a construction permit in New York is vast.

The JV structure itself remains undefined. Who are Pakistan’s equity partners? What is the debt financing strategy in a rate environment that, even with Federal Reserve easing through late 2025, remains elevated relative to pre-pandemic norms? What happens to the historic hotel brand, if any? These are not minor details — they are the deal.

Community and preservationist opposition in New York is a near-certainty. The Roosevelt Hotel is a beloved landmark. Any proposal to dramatically alter its footprint will attract scrutiny from the Landmarks Preservation Commission, local councilmembers, and organized advocacy groups with significant legal resources.

And yet — the fundamentals are compelling. A prime Midtown site, sovereign Pakistani ownership with fresh political will, American federal facilitation, and a global moment when Pakistan real estate investment in New York represents a genuinely novel asset class story. For the right JV partner with patient capital and New York development expertise, this is the kind of opportunity that does not surface twice in a generation.

Conclusion: A Hotel as a Hypothesis

The Roosevelt Hotel redevelopment is, at its core, a hypothesis: that a country once synonymous with financial instability can execute a sophisticated, multi-billion-dollar cross-border real estate transaction in the world’s most competitive property market.

If it succeeds, it validates Pakistan’s privatization strategy, deepens US-Pakistan economic ties in a durable and visible way, and delivers a landmark development to Midtown Manhattan. If it falters — lost to political noise, financing gaps, or New York’s legendary bureaucratic friction — it will become a cautionary tale about the gap between diplomatic ambition and commercial execution.

Either way, on February 15, 2026, two signatories sat down at a table and bet on the future. The Roosevelt Hotel, after a century of witnessing history, may yet be its next chapter.


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