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The Rise of China’s Hottest New Commodity: AI Tokens

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Imagine a new global commodity traded not in barrels or bushels, but in trillions of invisible computational units — weightless, borderless, and already reshaping the architecture of economic power. In the summer of 1858, a copper-core cable crossed the Atlantic seabed and rewired who controlled the flow of value across empires. In the spring of 2026, something structurally similar is happening, only the cable is digital, the commodity is China’s AI tokens, and the empire building is happening in plain sight.

The numbers are now difficult to ignore. China’s daily consumption of tokens — the tiny data units processed by AI models — has surpassed 140 trillion as of March 2026, a more than 1,000-fold increase from the 100 billion recorded at the beginning of 2024, and over 40 percent higher than the 100 trillion logged at the end of last year. China.org.cn Liu Liehong, administrator of China’s National Data Administration, announced the figure publicly and framed it not as a technical milestone but as a strategic one. The surge, he said, signals China’s AI industry “evolving from basic chat functions to more sophisticated systems capable of decision-making and task execution.” This is bureaucratic language with a geopolitical subtext: China is no longer catching up in artificial intelligence. It is setting the pace in the metric that matters most — actual usage, at scale, in the real economy.

From OpenRouter to the World: How China’s AI Tokens Surpassed the US

The clearest empirical signal of this shift has come from an unexpected source: OpenRouter, a San Francisco-based API aggregation platform that functions as a kind of global stock exchange for large language models. OpenRouter data published on February 24, 2026, shows that models built in China account for 61% of total token consumption among the platform’s top ten most-used models, with aggregate consumption reaching 5.3 trillion tokens out of a combined 8.7 trillion. Dataconomy The three most-consumed models that week were all Chinese. MiniMax M2.5 claimed the top position with 2.45 trillion tokens consumed in a single week — a 197% increase from the prior week. Moonshot AI’s Kimi K2.5 followed with 1.21 trillion tokens, and Zhipu AI’s GLM-5 placed third with 780 billion tokens, itself up 158%. TechBriefly

The historical reversal was swift and decisive. In the first week of February 2026, the weekly call volume of Chinese models had jumped to 2.27 trillion tokens, sending a strong signal of pursuit. Just one week later, Chinese models officially surpassed their US counterparts with 4.12 trillion tokens versus 2.94 trillion. By the week of February 16th, Chinese models had soared to 5.16 trillion tokens — a 127% increase in three weeks. 36Kr The growth is structural, not episodic, and it has been observed at the highest levels of the American venture capital industry. Andreessen Horowitz partner Martin Casado estimated that roughly 80% of startups using open-source AI stacks are running Chinese models. TechBriefly OpenRouter COO Chris Clark put the dynamic plainly: Chinese open-weight models have gained large market share because they are “disproportionately heavy in agentic flows run by U.S. firms.”

Ciyuan: When a Nation Brands Its Commodity

Beijing has never been content to let economic transformations arrive without a conceptual framework to accompany them. At the 2026 China Development Forum, Liu Liehong used the term ciyuan as the official Chinese translation for “token” during a speech on AI development, effectively resolving a debate within China over how the term should be rendered. South China Morning Post The naming is deliberate and worth examining. In Chinese, ci translates to “word,” while yuan carries double meaning: it is the basic unit of Chinese currency, and the suffix used when naming most foreign currencies in Mandarin. Liu said the token, or ciyuan, was not only a value anchor for the intelligent era but also a “settlement unit” linking technological supply with commercial demand, thereby allowing business models to be quantified. South China Morning Post

The People’s Daily had introduced the concept in January, describing ciyuans as the smallest unit of information processed by large models — possessing characteristics “emergent in the intelligent era” of being quantifiable, priceable, and tradable, with a new value system centered on their invocation, distribution, and settlement rapidly taking shape. TechFlow The semantic move is not accidental. China is not simply producing more AI tokens than the United States. It is trying to name, define, and ultimately govern the unit of account for the next phase of the global technology economy. Jensen Huang arrived at the same conceptual destination independently. At Nvidia’s GTC developer conference last week in San Jose, clad in his trademark leather jacket, Huang told the audience that “tokens are the new commodity,” declaring that Nvidia should no longer be seen mainly as a chip maker but as a builder of what he calls “AI factories” that produce tokens in large numbers. South China Morning Post Two of the world’s most consequential technology figures, one American and one Chinese, are now converging on the same metaphor — which suggests the metaphor is correct.

The Structural Edge: Electricity, Architecture, and the Token Economy

China’s dominance in China’s AI tokens is not a speculative narrative driven by state media hype or a single viral product launch. It rests on compounding structural advantages that are difficult to reverse quickly through policy alone.

The most fundamental is energy. China’s total electricity costs are approximately 40% lower than in the United States — a physical cost advantage that competitors cannot easily replicate. China Academy When a developer anywhere in the world calls a Chinese AI model’s API, the request is processed in a Chinese data center powered by the Chinese grid. The economic value of that electricity is exported globally as a high-margin digital service — one that bypasses customs, evades tariffs, and barely registers in conventional trade statistics. Industry estimates suggest that converting raw electricity into AI processing services can increase its value by up to 22 times compared to simply exporting electricity at the grid rate. China.org.cn China’s western regions — Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan — provide abundant, low-cost renewable energy at scale. The country has also built a vertically integrated supply chain spanning ultra-high-voltage transmission equipment, liquid-cooled data centers, and server assembly that few rivals can match.

The second advantage is architectural. Chinese AI laboratories have pioneered efficiency-first model design under the pressure of US chip export restrictions. DeepSeek V3’s Mixture-of-Experts architecture activates only a fraction of the model’s parameters during inference, with independent tests showing its inference cost is roughly 36 times lower than GPT-4o. MiniMax M2.5, despite having 229 billion total parameters, activates only 10 billion during inference. China Academy These are not merely clever engineering choices. They are the product of operating under genuine resource constraints — constraints that have paradoxically made Chinese models leaner, cheaper, and more deployable at global scale.

The third advantage is price. MiniMax M2.5 charges $0.30 per million input tokens and $1.10 per million output tokens. By comparison, Claude Opus 4.6 costs $5 per million input tokens and $25 per million output tokens — roughly 10 to 20 times more expensive. TechBriefly In the new agentic AI era, where a single automated workflow can consume millions of tokens in a matter of hours, this price differential is not a marginal consideration. It is frequently the deciding factor. A Silicon Valley developer who once tested workflows with GPT-4 at tens of dollars a day has little rational reason not to switch when a Chinese alternative delivers comparable benchmark performance at a tenth of the cost.

Alibaba Token Hub and the Industrialization of Ciyuan

Corporate China has received the signal and reorganized accordingly. Alibaba has established a new internal division called the Alibaba Token Hub, directly overseen by Chief Executive Eddie Wu, moving the research team that develops its flagship Qwen models, the consumer-facing app division, and major AI-related products under a single unified structure. Bloomberg The unit will focus on creating, distributing, and applying tokens — the basic computing units used by AI models — while integrating several internal teams to cover the full AI stack, from foundation model development to enterprise-level AI applications. TechNode The naming of the division after the commodity it produces is itself a statement of intent. Alibaba is not building an AI company. It is building a token factory.

The reorganization lands against a backdrop of surging Chinese AI cloud pricing that reflects genuine demand pressure. Alibaba Cloud announced price increases on select services effective April 18, 2026, citing global AI demand, rising supply-chain costs, and sharp increases in token call volume. Baidu Smart Cloud made an identical announcement the same day. Zhipu launched a new agent-optimized model and simultaneously raised its API price by 20% on March 16th. Tencent Cloud adjusted billing strategies for its intelligent agent development platform starting March 13th. 36Kr When Chinese AI providers raise prices in unison, it is not a cartel behavior — it is a market clearing mechanism. The supply of ciyuans is being consumed faster than it can be provisioned, and the price signal is propagating through the ecosystem.

A report jointly released by Andreessen Horowitz and OpenRouter shows that the total token call volume of Alibaba’s Qwen series ranks second globally at 5.59 trillion, second only to DeepSeek’s 14.37 trillion. 36Kr These are not vanity metrics: they represent real developer adoption, real API revenue, and real geopolitical influence embedded in the codebases of companies that may scale into tomorrow’s global technology infrastructure.

The Counterpoints: Profitability, Chip Constraints, and Sovereign Risk

Honest analysis demands acknowledgment of what the token volume data does not tell us. Market share on OpenRouter — a platform beloved by independent developers and AI hobbyists rather than large enterprise procurement departments — does not translate automatically into enterprise dominance. The main battleground for corporate AI workloads remains, for now, in the hands of American providers offering the accountability, compliance tooling, and integration depth that large institutions require. OpenRouter represents a thin slice of the global AI market; its developer-skewed demographics mean the 61% figure overstates Chinese penetration of the full economy.

The profitability question is equally live. Aggressive token pricing is partly a land-grab strategy — buying market share at margins that may not be sustainable. The simultaneous wave of Chinese cloud price increases in March 2026 suggests the economics are tightening. DeepSeek’s inference costs may be radically lower than GPT-4o’s, but training costs, talent costs, and the escalating expense of acquiring increasingly scarce advanced chips under US export restrictions are real. Washington’s ongoing efforts to tighten the chip embargo — extending restrictions to additional Nvidia architectures and closing loopholes used to route chips through third-country entities — represent a genuine long-run constraint on China’s ability to scale inference capacity. And sovereign risk is not zero. Developers in regulated industries and allied governments face real legal and reputational exposure from routing sensitive workloads through Chinese infrastructure, regardless of how cheap or fast those tokens may be.

Token Exports as a New Form of Digital Soft Power

Yet the strategic logic of China’s position is more durable than its critics typically concede. Tokens are intangible, bypass customs, evade tariffs, and don’t appear in official trade statistics. China exports massive compute and electricity services, yet it remains virtually invisible in trade data. China Academy This invisibility is a feature, not a bug. Token exports occupy a legal and regulatory grey zone that trade hawks find difficult to target. You cannot sanction a token. You cannot put a tariff on an API call. The infrastructure that produces the tokens — the data centers, the power grid, the model weights — sits firmly within Chinese sovereignty and beyond the reach of extraterritorial enforcement.

Beijing appears to understand this clearly. China has named 2026 the “Year of Data Element Value Release,” is building a single national data market with unified property rights, and by end of 2025 had compiled over 100,000 high-quality datasets totaling more than 890 petabytes — roughly 310 times the digital collection of the National Library of China. MEXC The scale of data assembly, combined with cheap inference, low-cost energy, and rapid model iteration cycles, constitutes a vertically integrated token economy that took China’s industrial sector decades to assemble in steel or semiconductors — and that is being assembled in AI in a matter of years.

Chinese artificial intelligence service stocks rallied this week after state media highlighted a sharp increase in domestic AI model adoption and a surge in the token usage they generate. Bloomberg The market’s reaction is rational. Investors are pricing in what economists have been slow to formally model: that the token, like oil before it, will become a commodity whose production geography matters enormously to the distribution of global wealth. The country that most cheaply produces what the world most needs will, history suggests, extract durable rents. In the oil era, that was the Persian Gulf. In the token era, the early evidence points unmistakably toward the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the data centers of Guizhou province humming with renewable hydropower.

The British Empire laid the cables. The rest, as they say, was history. The question now is who controls the flow — and at what price per million tokens.


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Singapore’s AI Boom Is Now a Two-Country Story

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Singapore has spent the past two years becoming one of the primary beneficiaries of the global AI infrastructure buildout, alongside Taiwan’s semiconductor sector. The city-state’s role as a data-center hub allowed it to capture significant capital inflows even as the broader labour-market impact of that investment stayed limited, given how capital-intensive AI infrastructure spending tends to be (J.P. Morgan Private Bank).

Why the AI cycle didn’t stay contained to Singapore

What is changing in 2026 is the geography of that investment. J.P. Morgan’s Asia outlook notes Southeast Asian economies — traditionally anchored in commodities and export manufacturing — are now aligning more closely with the global AI investment cycle by deepening involvement in higher-value areas: infrastructure, hardware and complementary supply chains (J.P. Morgan Private Bank).

Land constraints in Singapore make expansion difficult, which is precisely where the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone becomes central to the region’s AI investment thesis rather than a side story.

The Johor SEZ as capacity release valve

Johor has launched a 7,300-acre innovation sandbox as part of the new special economic zone bordering Singapore, explicitly designed to combine Johor’s land and scale with Singapore’s capital and speed, according to the state investment committee’s chair (Fortune). One local official described the ambition bluntly: the zone is meant to be more than “an industrial park with a nicer brochure” (Fortune).

Malaysia’s structural beneficiary position

Malaysia’s electrical and electronics sector already accounts for roughly 40% of the country’s total exports, with semiconductors comprising about 65% of E&E exports — positioning Malaysia as a structural beneficiary of the AI-linked shift in regional trade, according to J.P. Morgan’s Asia analysis (J.P. Morgan Private Bank). Malaysia’s economy minister has framed 2026 explicitly as a year of “execution” for the Anwar administration as it tries to lock in these policy gains (Fortune).

Monetary policy backdrop supports the buildout

Asian central banks spent much of 2025 easing policy and are entering the final stages of that cycle in 2026, shifting more of the growth-support burden to fiscal policy — a backdrop J.P. Morgan expects to support stronger domestic credit growth and consumer demand across the region, reinforcing rather than competing with the AI capital cycle (J.P. Morgan Private Bank).

The regional risk to watch

Most of the region avoided the brunt of 2025’s tariff shock thanks to exemptions on semiconductors, electronics and pharmaceuticals, but that exemption structure remains a policy choice in Washington rather than a permanent feature — meaning the Singapore-Johor AI corridor’s growth case still carries meaningful US trade-policy risk that investors should not discount simply because 2025’s tariffs were absorbed relatively smoothly (J.P. Morgan Private Bank).


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UK’s Jobs Downturn Now Matches the 2008 Financial Crisis — And AI Is Accelerating It

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Britain’s labour market has now been shedding jobs for as long as it did during the depths of the global financial crisis — and this time, employers are explicitly naming artificial intelligence as a reason for the cuts.

The closely watched S&P Global/CIPS Purchasing Managers’ Index showed services firms and the wider private sector reducing headcount for a 22nd consecutive month in July 2026, according to data reported by Bloomberg. That run now equals the length of the downturn seen during the 2008-09 crash in the dominant services sector, and is just one month short of matching it across the wider economy.

A Downturn Two Years in the Making

Unlike the 2008 crisis, which was triggered by a sudden banking collapse, this slump has crept up gradually. The survey shows the pace of job losses easing slightly in July compared with prior months, but the cumulative duration — nearly two full years of continuous headcount reduction — is what has alarmed economists watching the data, as detailed by Staffing Industry Analysts.

Crucially, firms surveyed gave two distinct explanations for the cuts: general cost-reduction efforts, and — increasingly — a reduced need for workers after investing in AI tools to boost productivity. That second factor marks a shift from earlier phases of the downturn, when cost pressure alone dominated employer commentary.

The PMI Numbers Behind the Story

The deterioration has been building for months. Earlier readings from S&P Global’s official PMI release showed the sector losing momentum steadily through the spring, with survey respondents explicitly citing the fallout from the US-Iran conflict as a drag on client confidence, layered on top of already-elevated domestic political uncertainty.

Separate flash data tracked by FX.co showed the UK Services PMI slipping to 48.7 in June — below the 50.0 threshold that separates expansion from contraction, and short of the 50.5 markets had expected. That marked the sharpest downturn since January 2023, driven by weaker new business volumes, shrinking order backlogs and further job cuts, even as input cost inflation — from transport to IT equipment surcharges — continued to squeeze margins.

The survey’s own methodology notes are telling: data collected in June found “a sustained reduction in backlogs of work across the service economy, largely reflecting a lack of pressure on business capacity due to weak demand,” according to the official S&P Global report. In plain terms, companies have less work to do, and they are responding by not replacing staff who leave rather than launching mass redundancy rounds — a slower but more persistent form of labour market erosion.

The Political Backdrop

The prolonged downturn deepens pressure on the Labour government, which took office in the summer of 2024 promising to reinvigorate growth. Nearly two years of continuous private-sector job losses is a difficult data point for any incumbent administration to explain away, particularly as it now sits alongside separately reported gilt market volatility and scrutiny of the Bank of England’s policy path.

Why AI Is a Different Kind of Headwind

What distinguishes this downturn from previous UK labour market slumps is the structural, rather than purely cyclical, nature of some of the job losses. Employers citing AI-driven productivity gains as a reason for not replacing departing staff suggests that even a rebound in demand may not translate into a proportional rebound in hiring — a dynamic that echoes concerns raised in the US, where financial-sector employment — an industry widely seen as exposed to AI adoption — has fallen to a four-year low.

Economists warn this creates a harder policy problem than a conventional cyclical downturn. Interest rate cuts and fiscal stimulus can revive demand, but they do less to reverse a structural shift in how many workers a given level of output requires.

What to Watch Next

Three data points will determine whether Britain’s labour market stabilises or deteriorates further into autumn:

  • The August PMI releases, which will show whether July’s slight easing in the pace of job cuts was a genuine inflection point or a one-month pause.
  • Bank of England commentary on how much weight it assigns to labour market weakness versus persistent inflation in setting the path for interest rates.
  • Sector-level AI adoption data, particularly in financial and professional services, where the productivity-driven hiring freeze appears most entrenched.

The Bottom Line

Two years of continuous UK private-sector job cuts is no longer a temporary post-pandemic adjustment — it has become the longest sustained labour market downturn since the financial crisis. With employers now openly citing AI adoption alongside cost discipline as drivers of headcount reduction, the shape of any eventual recovery may look very different from past cycles: output could recover well before payrolls do.


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Nvidia’s H200 Chips Are Finally Reaching China — In Numbers Too Small to Matter Yet

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Nvidia has begun shipping its advanced H200 AI chips to China under a reversed US export policy, but the volumes moving so far are, in the words of a senior Commerce Department official, “trivial” — even as Chinese technology firms have collectively ordered more than two million units against a global Nvidia inventory of roughly 700,000.

A Policy Reversal That Remains Mostly Symbolic

Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler told Congress on 14 July that H200 shipments to China remain minimal despite roughly $10 billion in approved licenses, according to TechTimes. Washington has approved sales to roughly ten Chinese firms — including Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, and JD.com — with each cleared buyer permitted to purchase up to 75,000 chips through Nvidia directly or via authorised distributors Lenovo and Foxconn.

The scale of pent-up Chinese demand dwarfs what can actually be delivered. Chinese technology companies have collectively ordered more than two million H200 chips for 2026, against Nvidia’s total global inventory of roughly 700,000 units — a supply gap severe enough to force emergency production discussions with TSMC to restart manufacturing of the older Hopper-generation chip architecture, according to the same TechTimes reporting.

Bipartisan Political Backlash in Washington

The limited shipments have nonetheless triggered a sharp political divide in Congress. Democratic Representative Gregory Meeks, the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, accused the administration of weakening safeguards by approving advanced AI chip licenses, describing export controls as being used as a bargaining chip in broader trade negotiations with China. Republican Representative Bill Huizenga separately criticised the Commerce Department over a reported loophole allowing Chinese subsidiaries operating outside mainland China to acquire the more advanced Blackwell-generation chips despite restrictions targeting the mainland market.

The Policy Architecture Is Genuinely Contradictory

The current framework traces back to a December 2025 announcement by President Trump permitting H200 sales to China, formally codified by the Commerce Department in January 2026 alongside conditions experts have called self-contradictory, according to detailed policy analysis from Semiconductor Insight. Those conditions include a 25% tariff on advanced AI chips meeting specific performance thresholds under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, case-by-case licensing replacing a prior blanket presumption of denial, mandatory end-use certifications, and a volume cap estimated at roughly one million H200 units — about half of what Chinese buyers have already ordered.

The buyer list has continued to expand in recent weeks. Newly cleared purchasers include a unit of telecom equipment maker ZTE and a server assembly firm, alongside a cloud computing subsidiary of Kingsoft cleared to purchase competing AMD chips, according to Technetbook.

Why the Ambiguity Itself Is Costly

Perhaps the most consequential effect of the policy has been on long-term planning rather than near-term volume. Nvidia has not recovered the Chinese customer base it lost after roughly a year of regulatory uncertainty, as export controls introduced in 2022 and escalated under both the Biden and Trump administrations had already pushed the company’s China market share from roughly 95% toward zero, according to Semiconductor Insight’s analysis. Customers requiring long-term procurement certainty are reportedly reluctant to commit against a policy framework that could reverse again within months — while a bipartisan group of lawmakers has separately pushed Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Secretary of State Marco Rubio toward a complete country-level ban on chipmaking equipment exports to China.

What It Means for Investors and the AI Supply Chain

For semiconductor investors, the H200 saga illustrates how thoroughly US-China technology policy has become entangled with broader trade diplomacy — a dynamic that leaves Nvidia’s China revenue outlook genuinely unpredictable regardless of near-term shipment volumes. For TSMC and its packaging partners, the emergency restart of Hopper-generation production lines signals capacity strain that may persist regardless of how the export-control debate ultimately resolves.

What to Watch

The Commerce Department’s enforcement posture on the reported Blackwell subsidiary loophole, along with any Congressional movement toward the proposed blanket equipment-export ban, will be the clearest signals of whether Washington’s China chip policy is heading toward further liberalisation or a renewed crackdown.


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