US Energy Secretary Chris Wright Pushes for Flood of Investment in Venezuela Oil Amid Revival Efforts

US Energy Secretary’s Venezuela visit signals major push for oil investment, but industry concerns and legal reforms complicate Trump’s $100B revival plan.

In an unprecedented diplomatic mission that signals a dramatic shift in hemispheric energy politics, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright touched down in Caracas on February 11, 2026, carrying with him Washington’s ambitious blueprint for resurrecting Venezuela’s moribund oil sector. The three-day visit—marking the highest-level American energy delegation to Venezuela in nearly three decades—encapsulates both the audacious promise and profound uncertainty surrounding President Donald Trump’s $100 billion gambit to transform the country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves into a reliable energy partner.

Wright’s handshake with interim President Delcy Rodríguez at the Miraflores Palace wasn’t merely a photo opportunity. It represented the culmination of a month-long whirlwind that began with the January 3 capture of former President Nicolás Maduro and has since unleashed a cascade of regulatory reforms, sanctions relief, and industry skepticism that will define the next chapter of global energy markets.

The Push for Venezuela Energy Sector Revival

“I bring today a message from President Trump,” Wright declared, standing alongside Rodríguez with both nations’ flags flanking them. “He is passionately committed to absolutely transforming the relationship between the United States and Venezuela, part of a broader agenda to make the Americas great again.”

The rhetoric matches the scale of ambition. Venezuela’s oil production has plummeted from 3.5 million barrels per day in the late 1990s to a mere 900,000 barrels currently—roughly equivalent to North Dakota’s output. As reported by The New York Times, the infrastructure decay is staggering: refineries operating at fraction capacity, pipelines corroded, skilled workers fled, and PDVSA—the state oil company—hollowed out by decades of mismanagement and corruption.

Wright’s itinerary reflected the magnitude of the challenge. Beyond high-level meetings with Rodríguez and executives from Chevron and Spain’s Repsol, according to Reuters, the Energy Secretary toured the Petropiar project in the Orinoco Oil Belt, where heavy crude extraction requires sophisticated technology and billions in capital investment. His assessment was diplomatically blunt: while Venezuela’s January 29 legal reforms represent “a meaningful step in the right direction,” they fall short of providing “the kind of large capital flows” Washington envisions.

The reforms in question fundamentally restructure Venezuela’s hydrocarbon sector. For the first time since Hugo Chávez’s 2007 nationalizations, private companies can now operate upstream activities through production-sharing contracts rather than being forced into joint ventures where PDVSA holds majority stakes. The law introduces independent arbitration for disputes, caps certain taxes, and includes economic stabilization mechanisms—all designed to reassure foreign investors scarred by past expropriations.

Yet the devil lurks in implementation. Venezuela passed this sweeping legislation in a matter of weeks, under obvious pressure from Washington. The Financial Times noted that Wright emphasized the administration’s desire for a “flood of investment,” but the rushed nature of reforms has raised eyebrows among legal experts who question whether such fundamental changes can provide the long-term stability that multibillion-dollar oil projects require.

Challenges in Attracting Flood of Investment in Venezuela Oil

The industry’s response to Trump’s Venezuela push has been decidedly mixed—and instructive about the real barriers to US Venezuela oil investment.

Chevron, the only major American oil company currently operating in Venezuela under special licenses, occupies the pole position. The company believes it can increase production by 50% over the next 18 to 24 months without significant additional capital expenditure. Its Vice Chairman Mark Nelson told Trump the company has “a path forward here very shortly to be able to increase our liftings from those joint ventures 100% essentially effective immediately.”

But beyond Chevron’s existing foothold, the landscape grows considerably more complex. According to CNBC, ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods delivered a stark assessment to Trump on January 9: Venezuela is “uninvestable” in its current state. Woods’ blunt verdict—which reportedly angered the president—reflects hard-learned lessons from 2007, when Chávez nationalized ExxonMobil’s Venezuelan assets. The company is still pursuing approximately $2 billion in arbitration claims.

ConocoPhillips faces even steeper hurdles, with roughly $10 billion in outstanding claims from similar expropriations. CEO Ryan Lance echoed Woods’ concerns, emphasizing that Venezuela’s energy system requires fundamental restructuring before major capital commitments make sense.

The hesitancy extends beyond historical grievances. Energy consultancy Rystad Energy estimates that maintaining Venezuela’s current production flat would require $53 billion in investment through 2040. Returning to the glory days of 3 million barrels per day? That demands a staggering $183 billion—roughly equivalent to the entire annual GDP of Portugal.

The Washington Post highlighted another uncomfortable reality: at current oil prices, the economics of reviving Venezuela’s heavy, sulfur-rich crude are marginal at best. The country’s oil requires expensive diluents for transport and specialized refining capacity. Meanwhile, neighboring Guyana—where ExxonMobil has struck bonanza discoveries—offers lighter, cleaner crude with lower taxes, no state oil company partnership requirements, and crucially, political stability.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s comments on February 6 revealed the administration’s recalibration. “The big oil companies who move slowly, who have corporate boards, are not interested,” he acknowledged. Instead, Washington may rely more heavily on independent oil companies and “wildcatters” whose appetite for risk—and tolerance for political uncertainty—runs higher than publicly traded majors answerable to shareholders.

Geopolitical and Economic Implications

Wright’s Venezuela visit reverberates far beyond the oil patch, carrying profound implications for global energy security and geopolitical alignments.

From Washington’s perspective, Venezuelan oil represents a strategic lever on multiple fronts. Increased production from a friendly Caracas could dampen Russia’s energy influence, particularly if Venezuelan crude diverts buyers—like India—away from Russian supplies. Trump has explicitly framed this as part of his plan to weaken Moscow’s war-making capacity while simultaneously addressing American energy dominance.

The environmental calculus, however, complicates this narrative. Climate analysts warn that fully exploiting Venezuela’s reserves could add 13% to the global carbon budget—a sobering figure as nations struggle to meet Paris Agreement commitments. European energy companies with net-zero pledges may find Venezuelan crude incompatible with their climate strategies, potentially limiting the pool of willing investors despite the legal reforms.

The broader Latin American energy landscape is also shifting. Venezuela’s potential recovery alters regional dynamics, from pipeline politics in Colombia to refining capacity in the Caribbean. If Caracas can indeed ramp production meaningfully, it would reshape market fundamentals that have prevailed for over a decade.

China’s conspicuous absence from the current Venezuela equation warrants attention. Beijing had been Venezuela’s lifeline during the Maduro years, providing loans against future oil deliveries. Reuters reported that the new US sanctions framework explicitly blocks entities linked to China, Iran, and Russia from participating in Venezuela’s oil sector—a clear signal that Washington views energy development as inseparable from broader strategic competition.

The Reality Check: Timeline and Expectations

Industry analysts urge tempering expectations about Venezuela’s oil comeback. Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program at Rice University’s Baker Institute, draws parallels to Iraq: it took nearly two decades to revitalize that country’s oil industry after the 2003 invasion, and corruption and mismanagement remain endemic.

Even optimistic scenarios envision Venezuela reaching 1.2 million barrels per day by late 2027—a modest 33% increase from current levels that still leaves production far below pre-crisis peaks. The challenges are structural: Venezuela needs to rebuild its electrical grid (chronic blackouts plague oil installations), import vast quantities of diluents, restore corroded pipelines, and most critically, attract and retain the skilled workforce that fled during the economic collapse.

Political stability remains the x-factor. While Rodríguez’s interim government has cooperated with Washington’s directives—including the oil law reforms and release of some political prisoners—Venezuela’s long-term governance trajectory remains uncertain. Opposition groups boycotted the hydrocarbons law vote, arguing that legislation governing the world’s largest oil reserves should emerge from inclusive national dialogue rather than rushed decree.

Wright acknowledged these concerns obliquely, noting during his Caracas press conference that professionalization of PDVSA would be “a subject of dialogue” with Venezuelan authorities. The state company, once Latin America’s crown jewel of technical competence, has been gutted by brain drain and politicization. Rebuilding institutional capacity may prove more challenging than repairing physical infrastructure.

Conclusion: A Generational Wager on Uncertain Terrain

Chris Wright’s Venezuela mission represents more than energy diplomacy—it’s a high-stakes wager on whether American influence and capital can resurrect a collapsed petro-state in months rather than years. The Trump administration’s swagger belies a complex reality where legal reforms, sanctions relief, and political will confront industry wariness, economic headwinds, and institutional decay.

The pieces for Venezuela energy sector revival are falling into place: reformed laws, sanctions relief, existing infrastructure (however degraded), and the world’s largest proven reserves. Yet as ExxonMobil’s Darren Woods bluntly reminded Trump, oil majors don’t commit tens of billions based on one month of political change and hurried legislation. They require clarity about contract terms, confidence in dispute resolution, certainty about political stability, and crucially, oil prices that justify the enormous capital and risk.

For now, the flood of investment in Venezuela oil remains more aspiration than reality—a “generational opportunity” that may yet materialize, but only if Washington, Caracas, and the global oil industry can bridge the chasm between rhetoric and the hard economics of heavy crude extraction in a still-fragile political environment.

The coming months will reveal whether Wright’s Caracas handshake marks the beginning of Venezuela’s energy renaissance—or merely another chapter in the country’s long history of promises unfulfilled. For investors, policymakers, and energy markets watching closely, the answer will reshape not just Venezuelan fortunes, but the broader equilibrium of global energy security for decades to come.