China’s 50% Domestic Equipment Rule: The Semiconductor Mandate Reshaping Global Tech

How Beijing’s Quiet Policy Shift Is Accelerating Chip Independence and Putting $18 Billion in Foreign Sales at Risk

When Chinese chipmakers began receiving approval applications for new fabrication plants in early 2024, they encountered an unexpected requirement: demonstrate that at least half of their equipment purchases would come from domestic suppliers, or face rejection. No formal regulation announced it. No press conference explained it. Yet this unpublished rule—requiring chipmakers to use at least 50% domestically made equipment for adding new capacity—represents one of Beijing’s most aggressive moves yet in the technology cold war with the West.

The mandate arrives at a pivotal moment. China’s semiconductor equipment market reached $23.89 billion in 2024, accounting for roughly 40% of global wafer fabrication equipment spending. With major chip equipment makers’ China revenue doubling from 17% in late 2022 to 41% by early 2024, the new policy threatens to fundamentally reshape who wins and loses in the world’s largest chip market.

This isn’t just another trade restriction. It’s a calculated industrial strategy that’s already yielding measurable results—and forcing both Chinese manufacturers and foreign suppliers to completely rethink their approach to the most critical technology of our time.

The Policy Decoded: What the 50% Rule Really Means

The mandate operates through China’s state approval process rather than published regulations. When companies like Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) or Hua Hong Semiconductor submit proposals to build or expand facilities, authorities now require detailed procurement tenders proving that domestic equipment will constitute at least 50% of total spending.

Applications that fail to meet the threshold are typically rejected, though the policy includes strategic flexibility. Advanced production lines targeting cutting-edge nodes receive temporary exemptions where domestic alternatives simply don’t exist yet—particularly for lithography equipment, the most sophisticated tools in chip manufacturing.

The scope is revealing. State-affiliated entities placed a record 421 orders for domestic lithography machines and parts in 2024 worth around 850 million yuan ($121.3 million), signaling an unprecedented surge in demand for locally developed technologies. However, these orders include both new systems and spare parts, making the actual number of new tools difficult to assess.

To put this in perspective, a single advanced lithography tool from ASML—the Dutch company that dominates the market—costs approximately $27.9 million for dry ArF systems used in mature node production. The total value of China’s domestic orders barely covers four or five equivalent machines, illustrating both the progress Chinese suppliers have made and the massive gap that remains.

What makes this policy particularly potent is its timing. While US export controls blocked China’s access to the most advanced chipmaking equipment, the 50% rule forces Chinese manufacturers to choose domestic suppliers even in areas where foreign equipment remains available and technically superior.

Winners Rising: China’s Semiconductor Equipment Champions

The mandate is producing exactly what Beijing intended: a rapid acceleration in domestic equipment capabilities, backed by extraordinary revenue growth and technological breakthroughs.

Naura Technology: The Emerging Powerhouse

Naura Technology Group’s 2024 revenue reached between 27.6 billion yuan and 31.78 billion yuan ($3.79-$4.36 billion), reflecting growth of 25% to 44%. Net profit surged even faster, climbing 33% to 53% year-over-year. This isn’t just financial engineering—it’s a company rapidly closing the technology gap.

Naura is testing its etching tools on SMIC’s cutting-edge 7-nanometer production line, a crucial milestone that puts Chinese equipment into advanced node manufacturing for the first time. Previously, such sophisticated etching was exclusively the domain of American giants Lam Research and Tokyo Electron.

The company’s innovation pipeline is equally impressive. Naura successfully developed key products including capacitively coupled plasma etching equipment, plasma-enhanced chemical vapor deposition systems, atomic layer deposition vertical furnaces, and stacked wafer cleaning systems—all of which have been integrated into customer production lines at scale.

Perhaps most revealing: Naura filed a record 779 patents in 2024, more than double what it filed in 2020 and 2021. This isn’t incremental improvement; it’s a company operating in overdrive.

AMEC: Specializing Under Pressure

Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC) is taking a different path, focusing intensely on etching technologies. The company’s 2024 revenue hit 9.065 billion yuan ($1.24 billion), up 45% year-over-year, with etching equipment accounting for 7.276 billion yuan—a 55% increase.

AMEC developed electrostatic chucks to replace worn parts in Lam Research equipment that the company could no longer service after 2023 restrictions, demonstrating how necessity drives innovation. When American suppliers were forced to withdraw support, Chinese companies didn’t just wait—they engineered solutions.

China gained nine percentage points in the dry etch tool segment between 2019 and 2024, with AMEC and Naura each capturing roughly 5% market share. It’s a small but strategically significant foothold in a market previously dominated by the United States (59%) and Japan (29%).

ACM Research: The Quiet Achiever

ACM Research, specializing in cleaning and polishing equipment, expects 2024 revenue between 5.6 billion yuan and 5.88 billion yuan ($769-$807 million), reflecting growth of 44% to 51%. The company projects 2025 revenue will reach 6.5-7.1 billion yuan thanks to a robust order backlog.

Analysts estimate that China has now reached roughly 50% self-sufficiency in photoresist-removal and cleaning equipment, a market previously dominated by Japanese firms but now increasingly led by domestic players like Naura and ACM.

These aren’t paper achievements. Multiple sources confirmed that the 50% rule is “accelerating results” and forcing rapid quality improvements as domestic suppliers work directly with leading fabs under commercial pressure.

Losers Squeezed: Foreign Equipment Makers Face Strategic Loss

For Western equipment suppliers, the 50% mandate represents a slow-motion strategic catastrophe—even as some maintain strong China revenues in the near term.

The Scale of Exposure

The top five global wafer fabrication equipment manufacturers experienced a 48% year-over-year revenue increase from China in 2024, with China now accounting for 42% of total system sales. At first glance, this seems positive. In reality, it’s a warning sign—companies are enjoying a final surge before the hammer falls.

Applied Materials provides a cautionary tale. The company’s China business dropped from 54% of semiconductor equipment revenue in Q1 2024 to 39% in Q2 2024, representing a loss of approximately $750 million in DRAM business. Applied Materials’ CFO acknowledged that China exposure would decline further to around 29% in Q4, with the expectation that depressed levels would persist for several quarters.

ASML’s revenue from mainland China reached 10.195 billion euros (about $11.16 billion) in 2024, accounting for 36.1% of total sales. Yet management forecasts this will drop to approximately 20% in 2025, reverting toward historical averages as the mandate takes full effect.

The Technological Lock-Out

The financial impact is significant, but the strategic implications are more profound. China represents not just revenue but the world’s fastest-growing semiconductor market and a critical testbed for new equipment technologies.

Bernstein analysts estimate that potential further restrictions could jeopardize up to 50% of China’s wafer fabrication equipment spending, with China’s total equipment spending at $43 billion in 2024 and $41 billion forecast for 2025.

Lam Research, which competes directly with AMEC in etching equipment, has seen its fortunes shift. The company expects China’s share of revenue to normalize around 30% in Q4 2024, down from 37% in Q1, with management noting that spending from domestic Chinese customers specifically would decrease.

Even sectors where Chinese capabilities lag dramatically—like lithography—are experiencing pressure. While ASML maintains dominance in extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography for advanced nodes, its deep ultraviolet (DUV) systems for mature nodes face increasing competition as China aggressively develops alternatives and employs multi-patterning workarounds.

The Feasibility Question: Can China Actually Hit 50%?

The ambition is clear. The execution is another matter entirely.

Where China Has Achieved Parity

As of 2024, China’s semiconductor equipment self-sufficiency rate reached 13.6% overall, but this average masks significant variation across different equipment categories.

In specific segments, China has already achieved or exceeded the 50% threshold:

• Photoresist stripping and cleaning: Approximately 50% self-sufficiency, with Naura taking market leadership from Japanese firms
• Chemical mechanical planarization (CMP): China’s market share jumped from 1.5% in 2022 to nearly 11% in 2023
• Dry etching: China reached 11% market share, up from under 3% in 2019

In areas such as etching, a critical chip manufacturing step that involves removing materials from silicon wafers to carve out intricate transistor patterns, the policy is already yielding results.

The Critical Gaps

Lithography remains the Achilles’ heel. China’s leading lithography company, Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), produces systems roughly equivalent to technology ASML developed 15-20 years ago. For advanced nodes requiring extreme precision, no domestic alternative exists.

China’s domestic equipment industry can handle various stages of semiconductor manufacturing processes (excluding lithography machines), according to TrendForce analysis. Challenges also persist in measurement, coating, development, and ion implantation equipment.

This explains why authorities grant flexibility for advanced production lines. SMIC’s 7-nanometer manufacturing—used to produce Huawei’s breakthrough Kirin 9000s chip—still relies on ASML’s DUV immersion lithography systems combined with multiple patterning techniques to achieve features smaller than the equipment was originally designed to create.

The Timeline Reality

By 2030, China’s mature semiconductor process market (≥22nm) is projected to reach nearly 40% global market share, up from 30% in 2023, according to IDC. This suggests China will dominate older-generation chip production where domestic equipment can compete effectively.

For advanced nodes, the timeline extends much further. Industry experts estimate China remains roughly a decade behind the cutting edge, and the gap may widen rather than narrow for the most sophisticated processes. Each new generation of lithography—from EUV to the emerging High-NA EUV—represents exponentially greater technical complexity.

The Geopolitical Chessboard: Washington’s Dilemma

The 50% mandate didn’t emerge in a vacuum. It’s a direct counter-move to US technology restrictions that began escalating in 2022 and intensified dramatically in 2023.

The Export Control Paradox

A former Naura employee noted that before 2024 export restrictions, domestic fabs like SMIC would prefer US equipment and would not really give Chinese firms a chance. Washington’s sanctions created an inadvertent gift to Chinese equipment makers: captive customers with no alternative suppliers.

The October 2023 US export controls blocked sales of advanced AI chips and sophisticated semiconductor equipment to China, forcing companies like Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA to withdraw personnel from Chinese facilities. These restrictions targeted not just finished equipment but also inputs to Chinese domestic equipment makers, attempting to strangle the emerging industry in its cradle.

It hasn’t worked as intended. Instead of crippling China’s chip sector, the controls accelerated exactly what they aimed to prevent: the development of indigenous alternatives.

The State Backing

China established the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Phase III in May 2024 with registered capital of 344 billion yuan ($47.5 billion)—larger than the previous two phases combined and representing the largest government semiconductor investment globally.

The fund operates on a 15-year timeline extending to 2039, acknowledging the long-term nature of semiconductor development. China’s Ministry of Finance holds the largest stake at 17%, with five major state banks each contributing approximately 6% of total capital.

This isn’t venture capital seeking quick returns. It’s strategic industrial policy willing to sustain losses for years to achieve technological sovereignty. The fund targets both the entire semiconductor supply chain and specific critical areas including large manufacturing plants, high-bandwidth memory, and advanced AI chips.

Allied Nations Caught in the Middle

Europe, Japan, and South Korea face an impossible position. Their companies—ASML, Tokyo Electron, and others—generated enormous revenue from China, but increasingly must align with US restrictions or risk their own access to American technology and markets.

The Netherlands, under pressure from Washington, restricted ASML from selling its most advanced High-NA EUV lithography machines to China. Japan implemented similar export controls on advanced chipmaking equipment. These allied restrictions close potential loopholes but also accelerate China’s determination to eliminate foreign dependencies entirely.

Taiwan presents perhaps the thorniest dilemma. TSMC, the world’s leading chipmaker, supplies chips to Chinese customers while maintaining advanced fabs in Taiwan that depend on American equipment and technology. Any escalation in US-China tensions or moves toward Chinese reunification could severely disrupt global chip supplies.

Business Strategy Imperatives: What Companies Must Do Now

The 50% mandate forces a fundamental reassessment of China strategy across multiple stakeholder groups.

For Foreign Equipment Makers: The Diversification Imperative

Companies cannot reverse the trend. The question is how quickly to pivot and where to redirect resources.

Short-term (1-2 years):

• Maximize revenue from remaining China business while it lasts
• Accelerate sales to customers in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and the United States
• Expand service and upgrade offerings for existing installed base in China

Medium-term (3-5 years):

• Diversify manufacturing footprint to reduce dependence on any single geography
• Develop product variants that comply with various export control regimes
• Strengthen positions in advanced packaging, where Chinese competition remains limited

Long-term (5+ years):

• Accept that China will develop domestic alternatives for most equipment categories
• Focus innovation on areas requiring such extreme precision that Chinese suppliers cannot readily replicate
• Build relationships in emerging semiconductor manufacturing regions (India, Vietnam, Eastern Europe)

China spent $41 billion on wafer fabrication equipment in 2024, accounting for about 40% of all purchases worldwide. Losing this market cannot be fully offset, but AI-driven demand in other regions provides a partial buffer.

For Chinese Chipmakers: The Quality-Versus-Sovereignty Tradeoff

Domestic equipment works, but not always as well as foreign alternatives—at least not yet. Chinese fabs must balance production efficiency against strategic imperatives.

SMIC achieved a significant breakthrough with its 7nm process, notably used for manufacturing Huawei’s Kirin 9000s chip, demonstrating that Chinese fabs can produce sophisticated semiconductors despite equipment limitations. However, yields remain lower and costs higher than at TSMC or Samsung using cutting-edge tools.

The pragmatic approach involves tiering:

• Advanced nodes (7nm and below): Use best available equipment, including remaining foreign tools, to maximize competitiveness
• Mature nodes (28nm and above): Aggressively adopt domestic equipment to drive volume and improvements
• Memory and specialty chips: Leverage areas where Chinese equipment has achieved near-parity

For Multinational Tech Companies: The Supply Chain Nightmare

Companies like Apple, Nvidia, and automotive manufacturers face cascading risks. If Chinese chipmakers using domestic equipment cannot match the quality or capacity of global alternatives, supply chains fragment.

The scenarios range from manageable to catastrophic:

• Optimistic: China achieves competent domestic production for mature nodes, bifurcating the global market into “advanced” (TSMC, Samsung, Intel) and “mature” (Chinese fabs) with minimal disruption
• Pessimistic: Quality gaps persist, forcing companies to duplicate supply chains entirely, one using Chinese chips for Chinese markets and another using TSMC/Samsung for everywhere else

Either way, costs increase. China expanded foundry capacity by 15% in 2024 and is scheduled to add another 14% in 2025, creating enormous production capability that must be absorbed somewhere.

The Venture Capital Angle: Where Smart Money Is Moving

The 50% mandate creates asymmetric investment opportunities for those willing to navigate geopolitical complexity.

The Chinese Equipment Thesis

Naura Technology rose to sixth place globally among semiconductor equipment manufacturers in 2024, making it the only Chinese company in the top ten. For investors willing to accept governance and geopolitical risks, Chinese equipment makers offer:

• Revenue visibility: Captive domestic demand virtually guaranteed by policy
• Margin expansion potential: As technology improves, pricing power increases
• Export upside: Eventually, cost-competitive Chinese equipment could compete in other price-sensitive markets

The caveat: US sanctions could expand to block Chinese equipment companies from accessing critical components, and corporate governance in state-backed firms sometimes prioritizes national objectives over shareholder returns.

The Picks-and-Shovels Alternative

Rather than betting on chipmakers or equipment makers directly, sophisticated investors are targeting:

• Materials suppliers: Chemicals, gases, and substrates required regardless of equipment nationality
• Advanced packaging: China lags in this area, creating opportunities for domestic and foreign providers
• Design tools: Chinese chip designers still depend heavily on Synopsys, Cadence, and other EDA providers

These segments face less direct policy pressure while still benefiting from China’s semiconductor expansion.

The 2026-2030 Outlook: Three Scenarios

Scenario 1: Managed Bifurcation (60% probability)

China achieves competent self-sufficiency in mature node equipment by 2027-2028, while advanced nodes remain dependent on limited foreign tool access. The global semiconductor industry splits into parallel ecosystems:

• “Free world”: TSMC, Samsung, Intel leading on advanced nodes using Western/Japanese/Korean equipment
• “China sphere”: Chinese fabs dominating mature nodes with domestic equipment, serving primarily Chinese and developing market customers

Trade continues but within clearly defined boundaries. Western equipment makers lose 50-70% of China revenue but offset partially through AI-driven demand elsewhere.

Scenario 2: Breakthrough Acceleration (25% probability)

Chinese equipment makers advance faster than expected, achieving near-parity with foreign competitors in most categories by 2028-2030. This could occur through:

• Continued talent recruitment from foreign firms
• Breakthroughs in alternative lithography approaches (multi-beam, nanoimprint)
• Brute-force R&D spending enabled by state backing

In this scenario, Chinese equipment companies begin competing globally on cost, threatening Western suppliers’ positions even outside China.

Scenario 3: Technology Wall (15% probability)

Chinese equipment development stalls at current levels, unable to overcome fundamental physics and engineering challenges without access to Western technology and components. The 50% rule remains in place but creates inefficiency, with Chinese fabs producing lower yields and higher defect rates.

This scenario likely triggers more aggressive Chinese action—potentially including forced technology transfer, industrial espionage escalation, or geopolitical moves to secure access to Taiwan’s semiconductor capabilities.

What This Means for You

If you’re reading this as a tech industry executive, the message is clear: the era of a unified global semiconductor supply chain is ending. Every company with significant China exposure needs a bifurcation strategy—yesterday.

If you’re an investor, the 50% mandate creates both risks and opportunities. US equipment makers with high China exposure (Applied Materials, Lam Research, KLA) face structural headwinds regardless of how strong AI demand runs. Chinese equipment makers offer growth but with governance and geopolitical risks. The real opportunity may lie in picks-and-shovels providers and companies with defensible positions in segments where Chinese competition remains distant.

If you’re a policy maker, recognize that export controls alone won’t slow China’s semiconductor development—they may accelerate it. The 50% mandate proves that restrictions create determination, captive markets, and state-backed alternatives. A more effective strategy might focus on maintaining leadership in truly irreplaceable technologies while accepting China’s inevitable progress in commoditized segments.

The Bottom Line

The 50% rule suggests China has concluded that technological decoupling is no longer a risk to manage, but a reality to optimize around, marking a new phase in the global semiconductor standoff.

This isn’t about whether China will develop domestic semiconductor equipment capabilities. That question is answered: they will. The relevant questions are how quickly, how effectively, and what the rest of the world does in response.

The mandate is already producing measurable results—Chinese semiconductor equipment manufacturers set sales records in 2024, with leading companies posting 25-55% revenue growth. Beijing has poured hundreds of billions of yuan into its semiconductor sector through the Big Fund, demonstrating commitment that transcends typical industrial policy.

For Western companies, this represents an $18 billion annual revenue stream gradually slipping away. For China, it’s a forced march toward technology independence that’s happening faster than most observers expected. For the rest of us, it’s a reminder that in geopolitics, sometimes the quietest policies create the loudest consequences.

The semiconductor industry is fragmenting before our eyes, not through dramatic announcements or treaty violations, but through procurement rules that most people will never read. That may be the most important technology story of 2024—and it’s only just beginning to unfold.

What are your thoughts on China’s semiconductor strategy? How should Western companies respond? Share your perspective in the comments below.