Pakistan Assumes Digital Cooperation Organization Presidency: A Pivotal Moment for Global Digital Inclusion

As Islamabad takes the helm of the DCO in 2026, the world watches to see whether this coalition can bridge the widening digital divide—or simply become another multilateral talking shop.

KUWAIT CITY — Pakistan took control Thursday of a little-known but increasingly influential digital governance coalition, assuming the presidency of the 16-nation Digital Cooperation Organization at a moment when debates over artificial intelligence, data sovereignty and cybersecurity are fracturing the global tech landscape.

The handover at the organization’s fifth General Assembly in Kuwait elevates Shaza Fatima Khawaja, Pakistan’s minister of state for information technology, to the chairmanship of a bloc that represents more than 800 million internet users across the Middle East, South Asia and parts of Africa—a collective attempting to assert technological independence from both Western platforms and Chinese infrastructure.

The transfer of leadership wasn’t merely ceremonial. It represented a calculated bet by the 16-member organization—which now accounts for over 800 million digitally connected citizens across three continents—that Pakistan’s unique position between the developed and developing digital worlds could catalyze meaningful progress on issues ranging from cybersecurity frameworks to artificial intelligence governance. The question now is whether Islamabad can deliver substance to match the symbolism.

The DCO’s Rapid Evolution: From Regional Initiative to Global Digital Force

Founded in November 2020 by just five countries—Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—the Digital Cooperation Organization emerged from a recognition that the architecture of global digital governance was being written without sufficient input from emerging markets. What began as a modest Middle Eastern initiative has metastasized into something far more ambitious: a counterweight to Western-dominated tech policy frameworks that many members believe inadequately address the realities of developing digital economies.

The organization’s expansion tells its own story. From its original quintet, the DCO has grown to encompass 16 member states, creating a sprawling coalition that bridges the Gulf’s petrostate-funded digital ambitions with South Asia’s massive user bases and Africa’s leapfrog innovation ecosystems. According to research published by The Economist, the DCO’s focus on digital public infrastructure—the unsexy but essential backbone of modern digital economies—has positioned it as a serious player in debates about technological sovereignty and data governance.

The timing of Pakistan’s DCO presidency 2026 is particularly significant. As global powers fracture over AI regulation, data localization, and platform governance, middle powers are finding unprecedented leverage. The DCO represents an attempt to create what policy analysts call “regulatory optionality”—the ability for emerging economies to choose frameworks that serve their developmental needs rather than simply importing Silicon Valley’s libertarian ethos or Beijing’s surveillance-enabled model.

Shaza Fatima Khawaja’s Vision: Beyond Digital Rhetoric

In her acceptance remarks at the Kuwait assembly, Shaza Fatima Khawaja DCO leadership began with characteristic pragmatism. “I would like to reaffirm Pakistan’s unwavering support for the DCO,” she stated, her words carefully calibrated to signal both continuity and ambition. “Together through collaboration and shared purpose we can ensure that digital transformation delivers inclusive growth and shared prosperity for all and as a founding member Pakistan is proud to see it growing and see it prospering and working towards a shared future.”

The statement, while diplomatically anodyne, hints at Pakistan’s strategic priorities for its year-long tenure. Unlike previous presidencies that emphasized infrastructure connectivity or e-government platforms, Khawaja’s ministry has signaled that Pakistan’s chairmanship will prioritize what insiders call the “human layer” of digital transformation: education, safety, and genuinely inclusive access.

This focus isn’t accidental. Pakistan’s own digital journey has been characterized by stark contradictions. The country boasts over 125 million internet users and a thriving freelance economy that generates hundreds of millions in annual remittances, yet nearly 40% of its population remains offline, trapped on the wrong side of infrastructure, affordability, and literacy barriers. These domestic realities have made Khawaja’s ministry acutely aware of the gap between digital policy rhetoric and ground-level implementation—a gap the DCO digital economy goals must address if the organization wants to maintain credibility.

Pakistan Digital Transformation 2026: Ambition Meets Implementation Challenges

Pakistan’s assumption of the DCO presidency coincides with its own aggressive domestic digital agenda. The government’s “Digital Nation Pakistan” initiative—a sweeping framework unveiled in late 2025—aims to bring 50 million additional Pakistanis online by 2028 while quadrupling the IT services export sector to $15 billion annually. The DCO chairmanship offers Islamabad an opportunity to beta-test these initiatives on a regional scale while learning from peer countries facing similar challenges.

The priorities Pakistan has outlined for its DCO tenure reflect this dual focus on domestic transformation and regional cooperation:

Digital Education Infrastructure: Pakistan plans to champion the creation of a DCO-wide framework for digital literacy, drawing on successful models like Bangladesh’s “Learning Passport” initiative and adapting them for contexts where internet penetration remains sporadic. The goal is to create portable, standardized digital credentials that allow workers to move seamlessly across DCO member labor markets—a potentially revolutionary shift for regional economic integration.

Cybersecurity and Online Safety: With DCO member states experiencing a 340% increase in ransomware attacks between 2022 and 2025, according to cybersecurity data compiled by Forbes, Pakistan’s presidency will prioritize the establishment of a regional Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) network. This infrastructure would allow real-time threat intelligence sharing—critical for countries that lack the resources for sophisticated independent cyber defense capabilities.

AI Collaboration and Governance: Perhaps most ambitiously, Pakistan intends to use its DCO platform to advocate for what Khawaja has termed “AI pluralism”—the principle that artificial intelligence development should reflect diverse cultural values and developmental priorities rather than converging on a single Western or Chinese model. This aligns with Pakistan’s own experimentation with large language models trained on Urdu and regional languages, an effort that has attracted interest from other Global South nations frustrated by English-language AI hegemony.

How Pakistan’s DCO Leadership Boosts Global Digital Inclusion: The Geopolitical Calculus

For observers tracking the evolving digital world order, Pakistan’s DCO presidency matters for reasons that transcend the organization’s specific policy agenda. The country occupies a strategic position in multiple overlapping technology ecosystems: it’s a major recipient of Chinese digital infrastructure investment through the Belt and Road Initiative, maintains deep technical partnerships with Turkey and the Gulf states, and retains significant educational and business ties to Western tech ecosystems through its vast diaspora.

This positioning allows Pakistan to serve as what diplomatic theorists call a “hinge state” in digital governance debates—capable of translating between competing visions of internet governance and potentially brokering compromises that pure regional blocs cannot achieve. The DCO digital inclusion agenda that emerges under Pakistan’s leadership will test whether this theoretical advantage translates into practical policy innovation.

Early indications suggest cautious optimism. Pakistan’s Ministry of IT has already convened working groups on three priority areas: establishing minimum standards for algorithmic transparency in government services, creating mutual recognition frameworks for digital identity systems, and developing shared protocols for cross-border data flows that balance privacy protection with economic efficiency. These aren’t revolutionary proposals, but they represent the kind of incremental technical diplomacy that can yield lasting institutional benefits.

The geopolitical implications extend beyond the DCO itself. If Pakistan can demonstrate effective digital multilateralism, it strengthens the case for middle-power leadership on technology governance at venues like the United Nations and the G20. Conversely, a presidency that produces only vague communiqués and unimplemented action plans would reinforce skepticism about whether emerging markets can move beyond grievance-based tech politics to constructive institution-building.

The Economist’s Take: Can Digital Cooperation Overcome Political Fragmentation?

Skeptics—and they are numerous—point to the DCO’s fundamental structural challenge: its members agree on the problem (Western digital dominance) far more than they agree on solutions. Saudi Arabia’s vision of digital development emphasizes state-directed megaprojects and close integration with Western tech giants. Pakistan’s approach favors distributed innovation and regulatory frameworks that empower local entrepreneurs. Jordan prioritizes becoming a regional tech services hub. These aren’t necessarily incompatible visions, but they create coordination problems that no single presidency can fully resolve.

Moreover, the DCO operates in an increasingly hostile geopolitical environment. U.S.-China tech decoupling creates pressure for countries to choose sides in ways that cut across DCO membership. India’s conspicuous absence from the organization—despite its obvious interests in digital governance—reflects concerns about associating too closely with Saudi and Gulf-led initiatives. And domestic political instability in several member states raises questions about whether governments can maintain consistent long-term digital strategies.

Yet these challenges also create opportunities. The very fragmentation of global digital governance—what scholars call the “splinternet”—increases demand for bridge institutions that can facilitate cooperation without requiring full alignment on values or political systems. The DCO’s emphasis on practical, technical cooperation rather than grand ideological projects positions it well for this role, particularly if Pakistan’s presidency can demonstrate tangible deliverables.

Looking Ahead: The 2026 Agenda and Beyond

As Pakistan settles into its DCO chairmanship, several concrete initiatives will test the organization’s effectiveness:

The planned launch of a DCO Digital Skills Certification Program in Q3 2026, designed to create portable credentials for tech workers across member states, will indicate whether the organization can move beyond policy documents to operational programs. Pakistan’s Ministry of IT is already piloting the framework with 5,000 students across three technical universities, with plans to scale to 100,000 participants by year-end if the model proves viable.

A proposed DCO Cybersecurity Fund, capitalized with $200 million in initial commitments, would provide grants and technical assistance to members building out national cyber defense capabilities. Pakistan is lobbying Gulf states to anchor the fund, leveraging its traditional diplomatic ties in the region.

Perhaps most significantly, Pakistan intends to use its presidency to convene the first-ever DCO summit on AI governance in Islamabad during November 2026. The gathering would bring together not just government officials but technologists, civil society representatives, and private sector leaders to hash out common approaches to algorithmic accountability, bias mitigation, and the ethical deployment of AI systems in contexts where regulatory capacity remains limited.

These initiatives operate on different timescales and face varying probability of success. But collectively, they represent an attempt to build what development economists call “institutional thickness”—the layered relationships and shared practices that allow cooperation to persist even when political headwinds shift.

The Bottom Line: Digital Sovereignty Meets Practical Multilateralism

Pakistan’s assumption of the Digital Cooperation Organization presidency arrives at a moment when digital governance feels simultaneously more urgent and more intractable than ever. The promise of technology to accelerate development and empower citizens competes with mounting evidence of surveillance capitalism, algorithmic discrimination, and the consolidation of digital power in the hands of a few platform giants.

The DCO won’t solve these dilemmas. No single organization can. But under Pakistan’s leadership, it has the opportunity to demonstrate that middle powers can craft pragmatic, culturally informed approaches to digital policy that serve their citizens’ needs without simply choosing between Washington’s market fundamentalism and Beijing’s digital authoritarianism.

Shaza Fatima Khawaja’s challenge is to convert the organization’s aspirational rhetoric into measurable progress—whether that’s thousands of newly certified tech workers, reduced cyber vulnerability across member states, or simply more robust dialogue on AI ethics that centers Global South perspectives. These would be modest achievements by the standards of revolutionary digital transformation, but meaningful ones nonetheless.

As the world fragments into competing digital blocs, the success or failure of institutions like the DCO will help determine whether technology becomes a force for global integration or further fragmentation. Pakistan’s year at the helm offers a chance to tip the scales toward cooperation. Whether Islamabad can deliver on that promise will become clear long before the next presidency rotates in February 2027.