US Forced-Labour Tariffs on 60 Countries: The Hidden Trade Shock of 2026

The US is imposing 10–12.5% tariffs on 60 countries over forced-labour enforcement gaps. Here’s what it means for Canada, Pakistan, and global sourcing.

Most tariff coverage in 2026 has focused on headline-grabbing bilateral fights — Section 232 metals duties, the US-Canada CUSMA review, reciprocal tariff threats. But a quieter measure moving through the USTR process may end up touching more of global trade than any single country-specific tariff: a forced-labour enforcement tariff applied not to a handful of adversaries, but to 60 economies accounting for 99% of US imports.

In mid-2026, the US Trade Representative proposed tariffs of 10% to 12.5% on imports from 60 economies — covering roughly 99% of US imports — after finding these countries had not adequately enforced bans on forced-labour goods. Countries with partial enforcement commitments face the lower 10% rate; the rest face 12.5%, with a special mechanism for apparel and textiles.

What the rule actually does

The USTR’s findings state that these 60 economies have failed to adequately prohibit or enforce bans on goods made with forced labour, which the agency frames as a source of unfair competition against countries that do enforce such bans. The proposed structure is two-tiered: a 10% tariff for countries that already have some form of forced-labour import prohibition or have committed to implementing one, and a 12.5% tariff for the remaining countries. A separate mechanism would allow limited apparel and textile imports at reduced rates, softening the blow for garment-dependent exporters.

Canada is on the list despite being a treaty partner under CUSMA — a reminder that forced-labour enforcement gaps are being treated as a distinct trade-policy lever, separate from tariff and quota negotiations under existing free-trade agreements.

Why this is the underreported story

Coverage so far has treated this as a compliance footnote inside broader tariff news. It deserves more attention for three reasons:

1. Scale: unlike sector tariffs on steel or autos, this rule touches nearly the entire US import base at once, which means the aggregate cost pass-through to US consumers could exceed any single sector-specific measure.
2. Enforcement burden shifts downstream: exporting countries — including major garment and electronics suppliers in Asia — will need to demonstrate active supply-chain auditing, not just legal prohibitions on paper, to qualify for the lower rate.
3. Leverage point beyond trade: it gives Washington a tool to press human-rights and labour-standards issues inside what looks, on the surface, like a routine tariff schedule.

What exporters and sourcing teams should watch

• Whether their country lands in the 10% or 12.5% tier once USTR finalises findings after the July 2026 comment period
• Documentation requirements for the textile/apparel carve-out
• Whether affected governments respond with formal labour-enforcement commitments to shift tiers before the rule takes effect.