The West’s Last Chance: Building a New Global Order

The drone strikes came at dawn. On a January morning in 2026, another wave of Russian missiles arced across Ukrainian skies, while in Khartoum, the sound of artillery fire echoed through emptied streets as Sudan’s civil war ground into its third year. In Gaza, the fragile ceasefire negotiated months earlier showed fresh signs of strain. These aren’t disconnected tragedies flickering across our screens—they’re symptoms of a deeper rupture. The world has transformed more profoundly in the past four years than in the previous three decades, and the international order that once promised stability now resembles a house with crumbling foundations.

We are living through the death throes of the post-Cold War era. The optimism that followed 1989—when Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history” and democracy seemed destined to sweep the globe—now feels like ancient hubris. The very forces that were supposed to bind nations together—trade networks, energy interdependence, digital technology, and information flows—have become weapons in a new kind of global conflict. The liberal international order is fracturing, and the West faces a choice more consequential than any since the Marshall Plan: adapt to build a new global order that reflects today’s realities, or watch its influence dissolve into irrelevance.

The window for action is narrow. Between 2026 and 2030, decisions made in Washington, Brussels, and allied capitals will determine whether the twenty-first century belongs to multipolar chaos or to a reformed, resilient system of global governance. This is the West’s last chance—not to restore hegemony, but to help architect something more sustainable.

Why the Liberal International Order Is Crumbling

The post-1945 international order, refined after the Cold War, rested on three pillars: American military and economic dominance, a web of multilateral institutions from the UN to the WTO, and an assumption that globalization would inevitably spread liberal democracy and market capitalism. Each pillar is now compromised.

Start with the numbers. Global power is dispersing at unprecedented speed. China’s economy has grown from 4% of global GDP in 2000 to approximately 18% today, while the combined GDP of the G7 has shrunk from 65% to around 43% of world output. India is projected to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027. The “rise of the rest” isn’t a future scenario—it’s present reality.

But economic redistribution alone doesn’t explain the order’s collapse. The deeper failure was ideological arrogance. Western policymakers assumed that autocracies would liberalize as they enriched, that technology would empower citizens against authoritarians, and that economic interdependence would make war obsolete. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered the last illusion. As The Economist observed, “The tank is back; so is great-power rivalry.”

The mechanisms that once integrated nations now divide them. Global trade, which surged from 39% of world GDP in 1990 to 60% by 2008, has plateaued and is increasingly fragmented into competing blocs. The U.S. and China are decoupling their technology ecosystems—semiconductors, artificial intelligence, telecommunications infrastructure—creating what some analysts call “parallel universes of innovation.” Energy, previously a force for interdependence, became a coercive tool when Russia weaponized gas supplies to Europe, triggering the worst energy crisis in generations.

Even information—the currency of the digital age—has become a battlefield. Russian disinformation campaigns, Chinese narrative control, and Western social media platforms’ struggle with content moderation have produced not a global conversation but a cacophony of incompatible realities. Democratic backsliding has accelerated, with Freedom House recording 17 consecutive years of declining global freedom.

What a Multipolar World Really Means

The term “multipolar world order” gets thrown around carelessly. It doesn’t simply mean multiple power centers—the world has always had regional powers. What’s emerging is something more complex and potentially more unstable: a system where no single nation can set rules, where coalitions are fluid and transactional, and where might increasingly makes right.

This new multipolarity has three defining features. First, variable geometry—countries align differently on different issues. India, for example, participates in the Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia) to counter China but buys Russian oil and abstains on Ukraine votes at the UN. Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Iran through Chinese mediation while maintaining security ties to Washington. These aren’t contradictions; they’re the new logic.

Second, institutional paralysis. The UN Security Council—designed for a different era—is structurally incapable of addressing today’s crises, with Russia holding a veto and China increasingly willing to use its own. The World Trade Organization hasn’t completed a major multilateral round since 1994. The Bretton Woods institutions remain dominated by Western voting shares that no longer reflect economic reality. As Foreign Affairs recently documented, “The gap between the problems we face and the institutions we have to solve them has never been wider.”

Third, the return of spheres of influence. Russia’s war in Ukraine is explicitly about denying neighboring states sovereign choice. China’s Belt and Road Initiative—spanning 150 countries and over $1 trillion in infrastructure investment—creates economic dependencies that translate into political leverage. The U.S. maintains its alliance network but increasingly frames security in zero-sum terms. We’re not heading toward a rules-based multipolar order; we’re already in a power-based one.

The global South isn’t choosing sides—it’s choosing interests. At the UN vote condemning Russia’s invasion, 35 countries abstained and 12 were absent, representing more than half the world’s population. These nations see Western calls for a “rules-based order” as selective, applied to adversaries but not allies, enforced in Ukraine but ignored in Gaza or Yemen. The credibility deficit is real.

The Weaponization of Interdependence

Globalization was supposed to make conflict costly. It did—but that hasn’t stopped states from wielding economic tools as weapons. We’re witnessing what scholars call “weaponized interdependence“: the strategic use of network positions in global systems to coerce or exclude rivals.

Start with semiconductors. Taiwan produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced chips, making it simultaneously indispensable and vulnerable. The U.S. has effectively banned Chinese access to cutting-edge chip-making equipment through export controls, while Beijing has restricted exports of rare earth minerals critical to defense and clean energy. These aren’t trade disputes; they’re preview skirmishes in a potential conflict over Taiwan.

Energy flows have become political levers. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas—which supplied 40% of its natural gas before the war—gave Moscow enormous coercive power. The subsequent pivot to liquified natural gas from the U.S. and Qatar demonstrates that diversification is possible, but costly and slow. Meanwhile, China has locked up long-term contracts for resources across Africa and Latin America, securing supply chains while Western powers scramble.

Financial architecture is fragmenting too. The U.S. and allies’ decision to freeze Russian central bank reserves and eject Russian banks from SWIFT demonstrated the dollar-based system’s weaponizability—but also accelerated efforts to bypass it. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is expanding, yuan-denominated oil contracts are growing, and discussions of BRICS currencies gained momentum at recent summits. The dollar’s dominance isn’t ending soon, but its primacy is no longer assumed to be permanent.

Data governance presents perhaps the most consequential battlefield. Should data flow freely across borders (the Western position) or remain subject to national sovereignty and storage requirements (the Chinese model)? Europe’s GDPR represents a third way, emphasizing privacy rights over either commercial freedom or state control. There’s no emerging consensus—only divergence.

Why 2026–2030 Is the Decisive Window

History accelerates in certain periods, when choices made reverberate for generations. The late 1940s were such a moment, producing the UN, Bretton Woods, NATO, and the Marshall Plan. The early 1990s were another, though the choices made then—NATO expansion, shock therapy economics, WTO accession without political reform—look less wise in hindsight.

We’re in a third such period. Several factors make the next four years critical for rebuilding global order.

First, leadership transitions. The 2024 U.S. election has produced a new administration taking office as this is written. European elections in 2024 shifted the European Parliament rightward. China’s leadership, while more stable, faces slowing growth and demographic decline that will force strategic choices. India’s emergence as a major power is accelerating, with elections that will shape its trajectory. These concurrent transitions create both risk and opportunity—the chance to reset relationships before they calcify into permanent hostility.

Second, technological inflection points. Artificial intelligence is advancing faster than governance frameworks can adapt. The next few years will determine whether AI development follows a cooperative model (sharing safety research, preventing autonomous weapons races) or a competitive one (national AI champions, digital authoritarianism, ungoverned deployment). Climate technology is reaching scale—solar and batteries are now often cheaper than fossil fuels—creating opportunities for collaborative energy transitions if countries can align incentives.

Third, institutional windows. The UN’s 80th anniversary in 2025 and various institutional reviews create political space for reforms that are impossible during normal times. The 2030 deadline for the Sustainable Development Goals imposes a timeline for global cooperation on development. The WTO’s ministerial conferences and climate COPs provide recurring venues where new frameworks could be negotiated.

Fourth, war fatigue. Ukraine’s war, while ongoing, has demonstrated to Russia and others the unsustainability of conquest in a mobilized, weaponized world. The economic costs of fragmentation are becoming clear—global growth is sluggish, inflation pressures persist, and supply chain vulnerabilities plague everyone. The pain creates incentives to find off-ramps, if leaders are wise enough to take them.

But the window won’t stay open. If the next four years produce further fragmentation—China invading Taiwan, a wider Middle East war, collapse of arms control—the possibility of reconstructing any global order will vanish. We’ll be fully in the realm of competing blocs and zero-sum competition.

Concrete Steps to Build a Resilient Global Order

Rebuilding can’t mean restoring American hegemony or even Western dominance. That ship has sailed. The question is whether it’s possible to construct a polycentric order—multiple centers of power operating within agreed frameworks that prevent catastrophic conflict and enable cooperation on shared challenges.

This requires both humility about what’s achievable and ambition about what’s necessary. Here’s a framework:

Reform Core Institutions to Reflect Reality

The UN Security Council’s permanent membership—decided in 1945—no longer reflects global power. Expansion is overdue, with seats for India, Brazil, and African representation in some form. This is diplomatically complex but necessary for legitimacy. The alternative is growing irrelevance.

The IMF and World Bank need governance changes that give rising economies voting shares commensurate with their economic weight. China has proposed reforms repeatedly; Western resistance makes these institutions look like relics of Western power rather than genuine multilateral forums.

The WTO needs restoration of its dispute settlement mechanism, paralyzed since 2019 when the U.S. blocked appellate body appointments. Trade rules require updating for digital commerce, state capitalism, and climate-related measures. If the WTO can’t adapt, trade will fragment into bilateral and regional deals, losing any multilateral character.

These reforms won’t happen easily. They require Western countries accepting reduced voting shares and influence in exchange for revitalized, legitimate institutions. That’s a hard domestic sell, but the alternative—irrelevant institutions and no frameworks at all—is worse.

Build Coalitions of the Capable

If universal agreements are impossible, work with those willing. This means plurilateral approaches—coalitions of countries that share specific interests, even if they don’t agree on everything.

On climate, for example, the U.S., EU, and China together account for over half of global emissions. A trilateral framework on technology sharing, carbon pricing, and transition finance could achieve more than endless COP negotiations seeking consensus among 190+ parties. Expanding this to include India, Japan, and major developing emitters could create sufficient critical mass.

On technology governance, democracies could coordinate on AI safety standards, semiconductor supply chain security, and data protection frameworks. This isn’t about excluding China completely—interoperability matters—but about setting standards that reflect democratic values and then inviting others to adopt them if they choose.

On nuclear arms control, the U.S. and Russia still possess 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. Bilateral talks must resume, even amid broader hostility. China should be brought into arms control negotiations as its arsenal expands. The New START treaty’s 2026 expiration creates urgency.

Create Minilateral Security Architecture

NATO remains the world’s most capable alliance, but it can’t be the sole security framework for a multipolar world. The West needs additional security partnerships that aren’t about containing China but about regional stability.

The Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) should deepen coordination on maritime security, disaster response, and infrastructure financing—offering alternatives to Chinese-dominated projects. AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.) provides a model for technology sharing among close partners. Similar frameworks could emerge in other regions.

Crucially, these arrangements should have thresholds for engagement with rivals. Regular military-to-military communications with China and Russia reduce accident risks. Hotlines and crisis management protocols prevent escalation. During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR maintained communication channels even at the tensest moments. That wisdom applies today.

Develop Values-Based Tech Governance

Technology competition will define the 21st century, but it doesn’t have to be a race to the bottom. Democratic countries should coordinate on principles for AI development: transparency, human oversight, privacy protection, and limiting use in autonomous weapons.

The EU’s AI Act provides a foundation, establishing risk tiers and requirements for high-risk applications. The U.S., Japan, South Korea, and other democracies could align their approaches, creating a large market for responsible AI that sets effective global standards.

On critical infrastructure—semiconductors, telecommunications, cloud computing—selective decoupling from authoritarian rivals makes sense where genuine security risks exist. But this should be narrow and focused, not a new digital Iron Curtain. Maintaining scientific collaboration and academic exchange remains important even amid strategic competition.

Link Climate and Security

Climate change is a threat multiplier, worsening water scarcity, migration pressures, and resource conflicts. It’s also a rare area where cooperation serves everyone’s interests. The West should propose linking climate finance to security cooperation.

Specifically: major emitters (including China) contribute to a massively scaled-up climate adaptation fund for vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa and South Asia. In exchange, these countries receive support for governance and stability, reducing migration pressures and conflict risks that affect everyone.

China is already the largest bilateral lender to developing countries. The West should match or exceed this with transparent, sustainable financing tied to institutions rather than dependency. If the West can’t compete with China’s infrastructure investments, it loses influence across the global South.

Rebuild Democratic Credibility

None of this works if democracies can’t demonstrate that their system delivers better outcomes. That means addressing the domestic pathologies—polarization, inequality, institutional dysfunction—that have undermined Western credibility.

The U.S. needs to show it can still build infrastructure, regulate tech platforms, and provide healthcare and education at levels comparable to peer democracies. Europe needs to demonstrate it can defend itself and make timely decisions. The alternatives to democracy—Chinese authoritarianism, Russian nationalism—look appealing to some precisely because Western democracies appear sclerotic.

This isn’t altruism; it’s strategic necessity. A world where democracy looks like a failing system will be a world where autocrats gain adherents and confidence. Conversely, democracies that deliver prosperity and justice will attract partners and maintain legitimacy.

The Global South’s Role in the New Order

Any viable global order must account for the voices and interests of countries that make up the majority of humanity. The global South—roughly 85% of the world’s population—isn’t a monolith, but it shares some common perspectives that the West ignores at its peril.

First, a deep skepticism of Western lectures about rules-based order. Countries remember that the Iraq War violated international law, that Western banks caused the 2008 financial crisis with global repercussions, and that climate change was caused primarily by historical Western emissions that now-developing countries are asked to curtail.

Second, pragmatic non-alignment. Most countries want access to Chinese investment, Western technology, and Russian energy—whatever serves development goals. The Cold War–style “you’re either with us or against us” framing doesn’t work. India’s ability to maintain relations with all major powers while advancing its interests is increasingly the model others follow.

Third, demand for agency in global governance. African countries, representing 1.4 billion people, have no permanent Security Council seat. Latin America’s voices are marginalized in economic governance. The Middle East beyond Saudi Arabia and Israel is often treated as a problem to be managed rather than a region with its own agency and interests.

A rebuilt global order must offer the global South genuine partnership, not clientelism. That means:

• Development finance that competes with China’s Belt and Road on scale, not just rhetoric about transparency and debt sustainability (which matters but isn’t sufficient).
• Technology transfer on climate and health, not just intellectual property protection that keeps life-saving innovations expensive.
• Institutional voice through Security Council reform and reweighted voting in economic institutions.
• Respect for sovereignty and non-interference, which most of the global South values more highly than Western promotion of democratic norms.

The West can’t afford to write off the global South or assume it will choose autocracy over democracy. But earning their partnership requires acknowledging past failures and offering tangible benefits, not just moral arguments.

Managing the China Challenge Without Catastrophe

China presents the most complex challenge to any new global order. It’s simultaneously a rival, a partner on climate and trade, and a country whose choices will shape whether this century sees catastrophic conflict or managed competition.

The West’s approach should be competitive coexistence—neither the naive engagement of the 1990s nor the comprehensive confrontation that some advocate. This means:

Compete where interests genuinely clash. On technology supremacy, Taiwan’s security, and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the West and its partners should maintain clear red lines backed by capability. Economic decoupling in sensitive sectors (advanced semiconductors, certain AI applications, defense-critical minerals) is justified.

Cooperate where interests align. Climate change, pandemic preparedness, nuclear non-proliferation, and space debris don’t respect national boundaries. Chinese solar panel production has dramatically lowered clean energy costs globally—that benefits everyone. Scientific research, particularly in basic science, should remain collaborative where possible.

Communicate constantly to prevent miscalculation. The most dangerous scenario isn’t intentional aggression but accidental escalation from Taiwan Strait incidents, cyberattacks, or economic crises. Military-to-military dialogues, leader-level summits, and track-two diplomacy should intensify, not diminish.

Model an alternative. The best response to China’s authoritarian state capitalism isn’t to copy it but to demonstrate that democratic systems can innovate faster, adapt more flexibly, and provide better lives for citizens. If that’s true, many countries will prefer the democratic model. If it’s not true, no amount of rhetoric will matter.

The Taiwan question remains the most dangerous flashpoint. Beijing has made reunification a core nationalist goal; Washington has committed to Taiwan’s defense. War would be catastrophic for all parties. The current status quo—strategic ambiguity, unofficial relations, robust arms sales—has kept peace for decades but looks increasingly fragile.

Maintaining it requires military deterrence sufficient to make an invasion too costly, diplomatic creativity to give Beijing off-ramps, and discipline to avoid symbolic gestures that provoke crises without enhancing security. That’s a tightrope, but it’s navigable with skill and patience.

The Case for Cautious Optimism

The picture painted so far is sobering. War in Europe, democratic backsliding, fragmenting trade, and nuclear-armed rivals with clashing visions. Why should anyone be optimistic that the West—or anyone—can build a new global order?

Because history shows that even amid catastrophe, humans have rebuilt. The institutions created after World War II emerged from even greater devastation. The Cold War ended without nuclear exchange despite decades of existential tension. The 2008 financial crisis, which seemed likely to trigger a depression, was managed through unprecedented cooperation.

More concretely, several trends favor reconstruction over collapse:

Nuclear weapons impose caution. No major power wants direct war with another nuclear state, which constrains escalation in ways that didn’t exist before 1945. Proxy conflicts and economic warfare are awful, but they’re preferable to great power war.

Economic interdependence, while weaponized, remains deep. China and the U.S. trade over $750 billion annually. Complete decoupling would devastate both economies and many others. That creates incentives—grudging, perhaps, but real—for managing competition.

Climate imperatives force cooperation. No country can solve climate change alone. The physics doesn’t care about ideology. As damages mount—from flooding to food insecurity to migration—cooperation on mitigation and adaptation becomes survival, not idealism.

Democratic resilience shouldn’t be underestimated. Yes, democracies face challenges, but they’ve adapted before. The expansion of voting rights, welfare states, civil rights movements—all were responses to crises that made democracies more inclusive and legitimate. Current challenges could spur similar evolution.

Younger generations globally share values around climate action, social justice, and skepticism of nationalism that could reshape politics. Youth voter participation is rising, and while young people’s views are diverse, they’re generally more internationalist and less ideological than older cohorts.

The optimism must be cautious because the path is narrow and failure is possible. But it’s not inevitable.

A Call to Action: What Leaders Must Do Now

Rebuilding global order requires specific actions from those with power to shape it:

U.S. leaders must recognize that hegemony is over but leadership remains possible. That means investing in alliances, accepting institutional reforms that reduce American voting shares, and demonstrating that democracy can still deliver prosperity. It means restraining the impulse toward unilateralism and accepting that multilateralism is sometimes slower but more sustainable.

European leaders must move beyond dependence—on American security guarantees, on Russian energy, on Chinese manufacturing. That means defense spending that allows genuine strategic autonomy, industrial policy that secures critical supply chains, and diplomatic initiative that makes Europe a pole in multipolarity, not a prize to be competed over.

Chinese leaders face a choice between seeking dominance (which will provoke lasting opposition) and accepting shared leadership in a multipolar system. The latter would require transparency about military capabilities, compromise on territorial disputes, and trade practices that don’t systematically disadvantage partners. It’s unclear whether China’s political system can make these choices, but the offer should be extended.

Global South leaders should leverage their position. Non-alignment gives power when major powers compete for partnership. But it also requires making affirmative choices about what kind of order serves their interests, not just playing great powers against each other opportunistically.

Citizens in democracies must hold leaders accountable for both vision and delivery. That means demanding foreign policy that balances idealism with realism, rejecting both isolationism and overextension, and supporting the resources—diplomatic, military, economic—required to sustain global engagement.

The next four years will determine whether the 21st century becomes an era of spheres of influence and recurring crises or a period of managed multipolarity with functional cooperation on existential challenges. The West can’t unilaterally decide this outcome, but it can make the choice between constructive adaptation and nostalgic decline.

This is, genuinely, the last chance. Not because the West will disappear—it won’t—but because the window for shaping a new global order is closing. The decisions made between now and 2030 will echo for decades, perhaps generations. The world has changed more in the past four years than in the previous thirty. The next four will change it even more.

The question is whether we’ll navigate that change with wisdom, building institutions and partnerships that prevent the worst while enabling cooperation on shared challenges—or whether we’ll drift into fragmentation, conflict, and a darker future that none of us wants but all of us might get if we’re not careful.

The foundations are crumbling. We can rebuild them, but only if we start now, work together, and accept that the new architecture must look different from the old. The alternative isn’t stasis; it’s collapse. That’s why this is the West’s last chance—and humanity’s best hope.