Malaysia’s 10-Year Chip Design Goal Faces Ultimate Test Amid Global Semiconductor Shifts

Malaysia stands at a crossroads in its semiconductor journey. For decades, the Southeast Asian nation has thrived as a global hub for chip assembly and testing, ranking sixth worldwide in semiconductor exports. Yet beneath this impressive statistic lies a vulnerability that policymakers can no longer ignore: Malaysia lacks the intellectual property and design capabilities that command premium margins in today’s chip industry.

Economy Minister Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir recently framed the challenge with remarkable candor. Speaking to The Business Times ahead of the Malaysia Economic Forum on February 5, 2026, he emphasized that the nation must transition from low-value assembly work to IP creation—a shift he described as the “ultimate test” for Malaysia’s semiconductor ambitions. This test isn’t merely rhetorical. It’s embedded in the 13th Malaysia Plan (RMK-13), a comprehensive blueprint that seeks to reposition the country’s semiconductor industry over the next decade.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. As global chip demand surges and supply chains undergo tectonic realignments following pandemic-era disruptions and geopolitical tensions, Malaysia faces both unprecedented opportunity and formidable competition. The question isn’t whether Malaysia can continue assembling chips—it’s whether the nation can climb the value chain to design them.

The RMK-13 Pivot: From Assembly to Innovation

The 13th Malaysia Plan represents a fundamental recalibration of the country’s semiconductor strategy. Unlike previous initiatives that reinforced Malaysia’s position in downstream activities—assembly, packaging, and testing (APT)—RMK-13 explicitly targets upstream capabilities in chip design and intellectual property development.

This pivot reflects economic necessity. According to Statista, global semiconductor revenues exceeded $600 billion in 2024, with design and IP licensing commanding profit margins two to three times higher than assembly operations. Malaysia’s current model, while generating substantial export volumes, captures only a fraction of this value creation.

The National Semiconductor Strategy (NSS), unveiled as part of RMK-13’s implementation framework, sets ambitious quantitative targets:

• RM500 billion in investment attraction over the plan’s duration
• 60,000 skilled semiconductor workers by 2030, representing a near-doubling of the current technical workforce
• GDP growth of 4.5-5.5% annually, with semiconductors identified as a key high-growth sector
• Home-grown chip designs within 5-7 years through strategic partnerships

These aren’t aspirational figures pulled from thin air. They’re undergirded by concrete partnerships, most notably a $250 million collaboration with Arm, the British chip architecture firm now owned by SoftBank. This deal, reported by Reuters, aims to develop Malaysia-designed processors leveraging Arm’s instruction set architecture—the same foundation used by Apple, Qualcomm, and countless other industry leaders.

Challenges in the Ultimate Test

Yet Minister Akmal’s characterization of this transition as an “ultimate test” acknowledges the formidable obstacles ahead. Moving from assembly to design isn’t a linear progression—it’s a quantum leap requiring fundamentally different capabilities, infrastructure, and mindsets.

The Intellectual Property Gap

Malaysia’s current semiconductor footprint is impressive in scale but limited in scope. The country hosts operations for multinational giants including Intel, Infineon, Texas Instruments, and NXP Semiconductors. These facilities perform sophisticated packaging and testing, but the underlying chip designs—the IP that drives profitability—originate elsewhere.

Creating indigenous IP requires years of R&D investment, extensive patent portfolios, and design expertise that Malaysia is only beginning to cultivate. According to The Economist, Taiwan spent three decades building TSMC into a foundry powerhouse, while South Korea invested hundreds of billions establishing Samsung’s design and manufacturing capabilities. Malaysia is attempting a comparable transformation on an accelerated timeline.

Talent Acquisition and Development

The NSS’s target of 60,000 skilled workers by 2030 underscores perhaps the most acute constraint: human capital. Chip design engineers require specialized training in areas like circuit design, verification, and electronic design automation (EDA) tools—competencies that take years to develop and aren’t easily imported.

Malaysian universities are expanding semiconductor programs, but they’re competing globally for both students and faculty. A design engineer in Penang must be convinced to forgo potentially higher salaries in Silicon Valley, Bangalore, or Shanghai. This brain-drain challenge, analyzed in depth by the Lowy Institute, affects all emerging semiconductor hubs but is particularly acute for countries without established design ecosystems.

The government’s response involves scholarship programs, industry-academia partnerships, and incentive packages for returning diaspora engineers. Yet scaling these initiatives to produce tens of thousands of qualified professionals in four years represents an unprecedented mobilization of educational resources.

Infrastructure and Ecosystem Development

Designing advanced chips requires more than talented engineers—it demands a comprehensive ecosystem. This includes:

• Fabrication partnerships: Design houses need access to foundries willing to manufacture their chips, either domestically or through international agreements
• EDA tool access: Software from Synopsys, Cadence, and Siemens (Mentor) costs millions annually and requires extensive training
• IP licensing frameworks: Legal expertise to navigate complex patent landscapes and licensing negotiations
• Venture capital: Patient capital willing to fund 5-10 year development cycles before revenue generation
• Customer relationships: Trust-building with global OEMs who currently source designs from established providers

Malaysia’s competitors—particularly Singapore, Taiwan, and increasingly Vietnam—are simultaneously strengthening their own ecosystems, creating a regional arms race for semiconductor supremacy.

Global Context and Geopolitical Currents

Malaysia’s semiconductor ambitions unfold against a backdrop of profound industry transformation. The US CHIPS Act, the EU Chips Act, and China’s extensive subsidies have injected hundreds of billions into semiconductor development, reshaping global capacity allocation.

These initiatives present both opportunities and challenges for Malaysia. Financial Times reporting indicates that multinational corporations are diversifying supply chains away from over-concentration in Taiwan and South Korea—a trend that positions Malaysia favorably. The country’s political stability relative to some regional peers, combined with existing semiconductor infrastructure, makes it an attractive diversification destination.

However, this same diversification has intensified competition. Vietnam, Thailand, and India are also aggressively courting semiconductor investment, often with comparable or superior incentive packages. According to Bloomberg, India’s semiconductor mission involves $10 billion in government backing, while Vietnam offers corporate tax holidays extending beyond those available in Malaysia.

Moreover, technology transfer restrictions—particularly US export controls on advanced chip-making equipment and design software—complicate Malaysia’s path to indigenous capabilities. While these controls primarily target China, they create ripple effects throughout Asia’s semiconductor ecosystem, potentially limiting Malaysia’s access to cutting-edge tools and technologies.

Strategic Pathways Forward

Despite these challenges, Malaysia possesses genuine advantages that, if leveraged effectively, could make RMK-13’s goals achievable.

Established Manufacturing Presence: Unlike greenfield semiconductor initiatives, Malaysia can leverage decades of manufacturing experience. Its workforce understands cleanroom protocols, quality systems, and supply chain logistics—capabilities that complement design skills rather than replace them.

Pragmatic Partnerships: The Arm collaboration represents a viable model—partnering with established IP providers rather than developing everything indigenously. Similar arrangements with design automation companies, foundries, and academic institutions could accelerate capability development.

Focused Applications: Rather than competing directly with Taiwan or South Korea across all chip categories, Malaysia could target specific niches—automotive semiconductors for the ASEAN market, IoT chips for smart manufacturing, or specialized sensors. Success in focused applications can build credibility for broader ambitions.

Regional Integration: ASEAN’s collective market of 680 million people provides a substantial customer base for Malaysia-designed chips, particularly in consumer electronics, automotive, and industrial applications where extreme miniaturization isn’t always required.

The government’s approach, as articulated by Minister Akmal, appears to recognize these realities. Rather than wholesale abandonment of assembly operations—which remain profitable and employ thousands—RMK-13 seeks parallel development of higher-value activities, gradually shifting the country’s semiconductor center of gravity toward design and IP.

Measuring Success in the Ultimate Test

As Malaysia embarks on this transformation, clear metrics will determine whether the “ultimate test” yields passing grades. Beyond the NSS’s quantitative targets, qualitative indicators matter equally:

• Patent filings in semiconductor design originating from Malaysian entities
• Tape-outs (completed designs sent to fabrication) by domestic design houses
• Talent retention rates among semiconductor graduates and experienced engineers
• IP licensing revenue generated by Malaysian-developed designs
• Diversification of the customer base beyond traditional assembly clients

Early results won’t appear for years—chip design timelines extend well beyond political cycles. This requires sustained commitment across administrations, insulation of semiconductor policy from electoral politics, and patience from stakeholders accustomed to faster returns.

Conclusion: A Decade-Defining Endeavor

Malaysia’s semiconductor transition represents more than industrial policy—it’s a bet on the nation’s capacity for economic transformation. The pathway from sixth-largest chip exporter to significant design player demands execution excellence, sustained investment, and perhaps most crucially, resilience in the face of inevitable setbacks.

Minister Akmal’s framing as an “ultimate test” captures both the high stakes and the uncertainty ahead. Yet unlike academic tests with predetermined answers, Malaysia’s semiconductor future remains unwritten. Success isn’t guaranteed by ambition alone, but the country’s combination of existing infrastructure, regional positioning, and—if RMK-13 is executed effectively—growing design capabilities provides a foundation that many emerging economies would envy.

As global semiconductor demand continues accelerating, driven by AI, electric vehicles, and ubiquitous connectivity, the question for Malaysia isn’t whether opportunity exists—it’s whether the nation can seize it before the window closes. The next decade will provide the answer, making RMK-13 not merely another development plan but potentially the defining initiative of Malaysia’s economic generation.