France’s 30% China Tariff Proposal: Why the Finance Minister Urges a Targeted Path Amid EU Trade Tensions

On February 9, 2026, a French government advisory body published a report that laid bare the stark arithmetic of Europe’s China problem: either impose an unprecedented 30% across-the-board tariff on Chinese imports, or engineer a 30% depreciation of the euro against the renminbi. Both options, the report acknowledged, would be extraordinarily difficult to implement. Yet both reflect the urgency of a challenge that European leaders can no longer afford to ignore.

What makes this moment particularly revealing is not the boldness of the proposal itself, but the measured response from France’s Finance Minister Roland Lescure—a nuance that illuminates the deeper complexities facing Europe as it navigates between economic protection and pragmatic engagement with Beijing.

The Architecture of an Economic Dilemma

The report from the Haut-Commissariat à la Stratégie et au Plan, an advisory body reporting directly to the French prime minister, reads less like academic analysis and more like an industrial alarm bell. According to Reuters, sectors fundamental to Europe’s industrial backbone—automobiles, machine tools, chemicals, and batteries—now face direct competitive pressure from Chinese manufacturers who have captured market share in industries Europe once dominated.

The numbers are sobering. A quarter of French exports are now exposed to Chinese competition, while an astonishing two-thirds of German production faces similar pressure. This isn’t merely about lost market share; it’s about the potential hollowing out of Europe’s manufacturing core at a time when the continent desperately needs industrial resilience amid geopolitical turbulence.

China’s record-breaking trade surplus exceeded $1 trillion for the first time in 2025, driven partly by Chinese manufacturers flooding global markets with competitively priced goods—from electric vehicles to renewable energy components. For Europe, already squeezed between American protectionism under the Trump administration and Chinese industrial might, the strategic calculus has never been more fraught.

Lescure’s Caution: The Case for Precision Over Blunt Force

Yet even as the advisory report proposed dramatic remedies, Finance Minister Lescure has struck a notably different tone—one that prioritizes surgical intervention over sweeping tariffs. In recent statements, Lescure characterized China’s massive trade surplus with Europe as fundamentally unsustainable, but insisted there exists “no one-size-fits-all answer” to addressing it.

This isn’t merely diplomatic hedging. Lescure’s approach reflects hard-won lessons from Europe’s previous tariff battles, particularly the contentious debate over electric vehicle duties implemented in late 2024. Those targeted tariffs on Chinese EVs—which Germany’s automotive giants vigorously opposed despite broader industry support—demonstrated the political minefield that trade policy has become when national economic interests diverge within the EU.

The Finance Minister’s strategy centers on three pillars: targeted tariffs addressing “obvious unfair competition,” continued diplomatic engagement with Beijing to encourage structural economic reforms, and parallel efforts to boost Europe’s own savings rate, innovation capacity, and industrial competitiveness. It’s an approach that acknowledges reality: punitive tariffs alone won’t solve Europe’s competitiveness problem if the continent cannot simultaneously strengthen its own economic foundations.

Lescure has also acknowledged Beijing’s stated commitment to pivoting toward domestic consumption and away from export-led growth. “They’ve been saying the right things,” he noted at a recent press briefing. “So far, I don’t think the numbers show that it’s happening. There’s been a lot of talk, but not much in terms of results yet.”

The Arithmetic of Industrial Protection in 2026

The 30% tariff proposal represents a recognition that incremental measures may no longer suffice. Consider the automotive sector: BYD overtook Tesla as the world’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer in early 2026, selling 2.26 million pure EVs in 2025—a 28% increase year-over-year. This isn’t just about EVs; it’s symptomatic of China’s systematic dominance in strategic sectors from battery production to renewable energy manufacturing.

The alternative proposal—engineering a 30% euro depreciation against the renminbi—acknowledges that currency dynamics play an enormous role in trade imbalances. However, as the report itself conceded, deliberately weakening the euro would be extraordinarily complex, requiring coordination among EU member states and potentially conflicting with European Central Bank mandates focused on price stability rather than competitive devaluation.

What both proposals share is an implicit recognition: Europe’s industrial protection now requires tools that would have been politically unthinkable a decade ago, when free trade consensus still held sway across the continent.

The Broader Stakes: G7 Presidency and Global Rebalancing

France’s approach to China trade policy isn’t occurring in isolation. As current G7 president, France has positioned global economic imbalances as a central agenda item, with Lescure framing the challenge as a tripartite problem: credit-fueled overconsumption in the United States, chronic underinvestment in Europe, and export-dependent growth in China.

This broader framework matters because it shifts the conversation from bilateral trade disputes to systemic economic architecture. When G7 finance ministers and central bankers convene in Paris on May 18-19, 2026, they’ll be discussing not merely tariff schedules but fundamental questions about sustainable global growth patterns in an era of heightened geopolitical competition.

The challenge for Europe is that it finds itself squeezed between two economic superpowers, both of which view trade policy as geopolitical leverage. The Trump administration has demanded European industrial tariff reductions and threatened reciprocal measures on European goods. Beijing, meanwhile, has demonstrated willingness to weaponize its control over critical minerals and technologies when economic interests are threatened—as Dutch authorities discovered when China blocked chip exports following semiconductor restrictions.

What Comes Next: Targeted Measures in a Fractured Landscape

The most likely outcome isn’t the dramatic 30% across-the-board tariff the advisory report proposed, but rather an intensification of sector-specific measures combined with continued diplomatic engagement. The European Commission has already shown appetite for this approach with its targeted EV tariffs, anti-subsidy investigations, and nascent economic security framework designed to screen foreign investments in strategic sectors.

Lescure’s emphasis on “targeted tariffs” suggests France will push for precision instruments that address specific instances of market distortion—subsidized overcapacity, dumping, or state-backed competitive advantages—rather than blanket protectionism that could trigger escalating retaliation.

Yet the underlying tension remains: Can Europe protect its industrial base without abandoning the market-oriented principles that have underpinned its prosperity? Can it maintain economic engagement with China while defending against practices it views as fundamentally unfair? And can it do all this while navigating American pressure to reduce dependencies on both Chinese supply chains and European industrial policy?

The French tariff debate crystallizes these questions in ways that resist easy answers. What’s clear is that the era of frictionless globalization has given way to something messier—an economic order where trade policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical positioning have become inextricably intertwined. For European policymakers, finding the right balance between protection and openness, between caution and boldness, may well determine whether the continent’s industrial heartland thrives or withers in the decade ahead.

As Lescure navigates France’s G7 presidency with one eye on sustainable trade rebalancing and another on political feasibility, his measured approach offers a template: acknowledge the scale of the challenge, resist simplistic solutions, and build coalitions for targeted action. Whether that proves sufficient to address the China trade imbalance remains the defining economic question for Europe in 2026.